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I. INTRODUCTION 
No economic decisions of practical import are made under 
conditions in which the relevant future is known with certain­
ty. Invariably, elements of uncertainty are present. In 
consequence, an ex ante algorithm for efficient allocation of 
the entrepreneur's resources on an ex post basis is impossible. 
Ex ante he may make his decisions to accommodate the influence 
of uncertainty, but ex post he will, except for chance occur­
rences, be able to see that a more profitable allocation of 
resources would have been possible. Reduction of this mis-
allocation is the normative economic problem (42, p. 49) in 
decision making under uncertainty. Concomitant is a problem 
of positive or descriptive economics (25, p. 8). To wit, how 
are decisions made? Why was this pattern of resource use 
chosen and not another? 
Recognition of these problems has led to the elaboration 
in recent years of a number of theories of choice in risk-
taking situations. As is later shown, these theories are not 
disjunct. 
Most numerous are theories stressing a rather mechanical 
application of simple mathematical rules of thumb to the deci­
sion problem. Included in this group are those procedures 
usually referred to as naive models of decision making (30, 
p. 478). However, these are subsumed under the more general 
theories of decision making stemming from von Neumann and 
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Morgenstern's (57> p* 617) axiomatic treatment of choice among 
probability distributions and from Wald's (86) contributions 
to statistical inference. These algorithms are mathematically 
well-defined and attempt to maximize the decision maker's 
utility function. They stress rational behavior and are 
therefore normative. Also, they have not been promulgated as 
general theories for all decision makers in all choice situa­
tions. Opposing such theories, at least to a degree, is 
Shackle's (69, 72, 73) formulation emphasizing a psychological 
approach based on the individual's degrees of belief and 
potential surprise relevant to a given decision problem. This 
theory is essentially positive. It has been hypothesized by 
Shackle as the general mode of decision making in non-
divisible non-seriable choice situations (73, p. 5)» That is, 
for choice situations that are unique in the sense that no 
actuarial frequency ratios applicable to the possible outcomes 
are available. Lying between the above theories in its em­
phasis on mathematical procedures and psychological variables 
is Simon's (75» pp. 241-260) theory. In this theory, the 
decision maker is portrayed as merely trying to satisfy some 
level of aspiration - he is a satisficer rather than a maxi-
mizer. 
A masterly appraisal, albeit theoretical, of all these 
theories has been given by Arrow (4, 6). Edwards (20) has 
made an expository survey of the relevant literature. 
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To date none of these theories have been assessed in 
terms of their real-world roles, either normative or descrip­
tive. In part this is a reflection of the fact that they are 
theories and, being such, relate to idealizations of the real 
world whose mapping into complex practical situations is dif­
ficult. This study is an attempt to make such an assessment 
for some of these theories ; specifically, for those theories 
that relate to choice under absolute uncertainty. In such 
circumstances the decision maker has no objective knowledge 
of the likelihood of occurrence of the various possible out­
comes of his decision. He knows only what outcomes may occur. 
The relevant theories are those of Simon and Shackle together 
with, of a more mathematical nature, Laplace's principle of 
insufficient reason as elaborated by Luce and Raiffa (48), 
Wald's (86) maximin criterion, Hurwicz's (36) pessimism-
optimism index approach, Savage's (67) minimax regret procedure 
and also the latter's subjective probability approach (66). 
The empirical setting analyzed is the decision problem 
facing a Mid-West farmer in choosing among alternatives within 
his feeder cattle enterprise in a given year. That the deci­
sion makers are farmers and that the problem relates to feeder 
cattle is of relatively little consequence. It is an accident. 
Qualitatively, the important fact for this study is that, in 
the given setting, plans normally have to be made and deci­
sions taken under conditions of absolute uncertainty. How-
if 
ever, any quantitative implications of the analysis can only 
be interpreted in terms of the actual setting of the decision 
problem. 
Part I of the dissertation presents a rational structur­
ing of the resource allocation problem facing entrepreneurs 
operating under conditions of free competition. It is shown 
that in such situations the decision problem can and should 
be posed in a simpler way than as an n-person non-zero sum 
game (57)• An exposition of the theories of decision making 
relevant to this model is also given. Part II is empirical. 
It begins with a description of the source of the data and 
its collection. An appraisal of the model is then given, 
followed by an assessment of the normative and descriptive 
roles of the various theories of choice. 
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PART I. THEORETICAL 
-
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II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this chapter we explore the logic of the general deci­
sion making situation that will be studied later in a partic­
ular empirical context. 
Role of the Model 
Our aim is to develop an analytic framework. Within this 
framework, we will later examine our empirical data in the 
light of the theories of decision making under uncertainty 
that we wish to assess. 
This analytic framework happens to be a normative math­
ematical model. To be of practical use, such a model must be 
capable of empirical application. If it is, it may also be 
true as a descriptive model. Accordingly, the model will be 
appraised in Part II in terms of its agreement with the con­
ception of the decision making environment held by the actual 
group of entrepreneurs studied. In making this appraisal we 
will not, as Papandreou (61, p. 138) has stressed, be able to 
reject the model, but only to confirm or not confirm it for 
the historical individuals studied. 
The model constructed consists of a set of assertions 
constituting a mathematical abstraction of the real world 
situation. To any such model, in any branch of science, math­
ematical arguments yielding mathematical conclusions can be 
applied. This can be done because such a model constitutes a 
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mathematical system (88, p. 13). These mathematical conclu­
sions can, in turn, be interpreted back into real-world con­
clusions. In most fields of science, an alternative path from 
the real-world problem to real-world conclusions is possible. 
Thus in the physical sciences, experimentation is often feasi­
ble and serves as a check on the theoretical abstraction and 
interpretation. In economics, observation and introspection 
must, in general, take the place of experimentation (42, p. 
143). But there is a difference: in economics we may have 
both normative and positive theories. For a normative model, 
observation and introspection do not necessarily serve as a 
check. If the normative model happens to be a true descrip­
tive model, then both paths will agree. Otherwise they will 
not. However, in so far as man does behave as the profit 
maximizing homo oeconomicus that economics postulates (65, 
p. 96), some degree of agreement between the results derived 
from a normative model and the conclusions from observation 
and introspection must be expected. Whether or not the sup­
posedly normative conclusions drawn from a postulated norma­
tive model are truly normative depends only on the correctness 
of the mathematical assumptions, arguments and interpretations 
made. The writer contends that the model and interpretation 
which follow do satisfy these requirements. Hence we propose 
that the model is a satisfactory vehicle for assessing both 
the normative and descriptive roles of the theories to be 
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examined. 
We now construct the model, first describing the real-
world situation; then proceeding to the correct model via a 
game theoretic analysis of the relevant environment. 
The Decision Problem 
We are concerned with groups1 of entrepreneurs, the 
totality of groups constituting a chain in the sense that each 
lower group in the hierarchy produces a commodity that is, 
generically, the major input for the next highest group in the 
chain. The entrepreneurs in each group have some number of 
alternative ways in which they can transform this input. If 
it were assumed that no economic or other restrictions existed, 
then for every member of each group there would be a common 
set of alternatives or transformation processes. However, 
restrictions do exist. Hence the set of alternatives facing 
a given decision maker may or may not be, in part or in full, 
the same as the set facing another decision maker in the same 
group. 
These alternatives will vary in profitability. Firstly, 
the greater the extent to which a particular alternative is 
selected by entrepreneurs within a particular group, the less 
T^he word group is used throughout in its normal diction­
ary sense of a cluster and not in its mathematical sense. 
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profitable it will be. This is because of the induced higher 
level of supply of the output specific to that alternative. 
This specific output, of course, belongs to the generic output 
common to the whole group. Secondly, the profitability will 
vary with the particular concatenation of policies followed 
by the groups above and below in the hierarchy. Those groups 
below, through their decisions, determine input supplies. 
Those higher in the hierarchy determine the level of demand 
for the output from a particular transformation process. 
These inter and intra group influences are endogenous to the 
overall system. There may also be exogenous influences on 
the profitability of a given alternative. For example, 
climatic conditions may be important. 
The economic decision problem facing a member of one of 
these groups, given the uncertainty that exists in the situa­
tion, is to select the production alternative or combination 
of alternatives that will give him the greatest net revenue 
in the forthcoming production period. The production period 
is defined epideiktically as whatever the entrepreneur con­
siders the relevant production period to be. It is assumed 
that production periods further in the future are ignored; 
except in so far as they are accounted for by the mode of 
decision making, conservative or otherwise, that is adopted. 
We wish to formulate a model of this situation, being 
concerned in particular with the decision problem faced by a 
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member of a group that is very large. 
Preliminary Considerations 
In abstracting this decision problem we will be concerned 
primarily with a single group of entrepreneurs and their rela­
tion to the groups above and below in the hierarchy. Thus we 
have a totality of entrepreneurs constituting a set N. N is 
the union of three disjunct non-empty finite sets which we 
specify as: 
N': the group of entrepreneurs whose decision problem 
interests us ; 
N": the set of entrepreneurs belonging to all groups 
above N1 in the hierarchy; 
N"': the set of entrepreneurs belonging to all groups 
below N1 in the hierarchy. 
Thus we have 
(1) N = N'Uf'UF1 
where N must contain at least three elements1. 
We may further specify that an entrepreneur neN has some 
number of alternatives available to him. This number will, 
in general, vary over the elements of N. 
1 
We could consider the complement, N, of N' in N as a 
single set. We do not because the above presentation is more 
convenient in terms of the empirical situation to be studied 
in Part, II. 
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The simplest way in which the decision problem might 
occur for an n'eN' would be if he had only a single alterna­
tive. In fact, the decision problem would then be nonexisten 
Now consider the situation if n' has more than one 
alternative and N contains only three elements. This would 
correspond to the decision problem facing a monopolist whose 
input is bought from a monopolist and whose product is sold 
to a monopsonist. Our chain in this case consists of two 
bilateral monopoly situations, the net profit accruing to nf 
being the difference between his costs and revenue. Revenue 
comes from sales to n"sN" and costs are primarily determined 
by purchases from n"'eN,M. However, n" and n"1 each have 
alternatives and the costs and revenues of n' will vary in 
terms of the alternatives selected by n" and n"1. Indeed, 
the availability of some of the alternatives of n1 may be 
dependent upon the selection of certain alternatives by n"'. 
The situation facing n' might be depicted by a payoff 
matrix showing the net revenue to n! from each of his alter­
natives for all combinations of alternatives that might be 
selected by n" and n"'. The elements of this matrix would 
not be single valued. Each would represent a range of values 
This is necessitated by the fact that we are dealing with 
bilateral monopoly situations; the entrepreneurs having the 
power to negotiate and bargain about prices. Suppose that 
n' selects his i th alternative, n" his j th alternative and 
12 
n"1 his k th alternative. Then the payoff to n1 will lie in 
the range denoted by the payoff element of his payoff 
matrix. Payoff matrices could likewise be developed for n" 
and n"'. 
Assuming profit maximization and complete information 
among n', n" and nM!, we have depicted a game involving three 
players. Moreover it is a non-zero-sum game because the situ­
ation is not strictly competitive. All three entrepreneurs 
may gain in playing the game. What does game theory say of 
such a situation? von Neumann and Morgenstern (57, P» 556) 
examined a single bilateral monopoly situation in terms of 
game theory. They found that a solution, indeterminate within 
a specified range, was possible. As they point out, common 
sense gives the same solution. However, the situation with 
three players is more complicated, for there are now addition­
al bargaining and coalition opportunities available to the 
players. None the less, von Neumann and Morgenstern were able 
to formulate all possible solutions for three person non-zero-
sum games (57, P* 550). It would be thus possible for n1 in 
the specified situation to choose, by the use of a game 
theoretic analysis, the alternative(s) which would maximize 
the value to him of playing the game. He would, of course, 
have to recognize the conflict and coalition possibilities 
inherent in the game. Again, the solution would be indeter­
minate but lie in some specified range. 
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What happens if the order of N is increased so that, as­
suming complete information, the situation becomes a game with 
at least four players? von Neumann and Morgenstern have shown 
that as the number of players increases, not only does the 
game theoretic analysis become more complex on account of the 
number of players involved but also because qualitatively new 
phenomena appear (57, pp. 339 and 403). Indeed, it is to be 
expected that the solution to an n-person game will bear no 
relation to the solution of an (n+l)-person game. For non­
zero -sum games with n>3 no satisfactory game theory analysis 
leading to a solution of the decision problem is available 
(57, p. 542). Thus when the order of N becomes very large, 
a game theory analysis is useless, even if the assumptions of 
game theory were satisfied. 
Moreover, as the order of N increases, it becomes in­
creasingly difficult to sustain the game theory assumption of 
complete information. For this assumption to hold true it 
would be necessary for each player in the game, a number equal 
to the order of N, to know not only his own payoff matrix but 
also the payoff matrix of every other player. In addition, 
the effect of every possible coalition must be evaluated. 
Koopmans (45, p. 160), Marschak (51) and Shubik (74, p. 
147) have commented upon this problem of obtaining, process­
ing, storing and evaluating information. Shubik shows that 
if the r th player has alternatives then the total quantity 
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of numbers needed for complete information in an n-person game 
n 
is nTT ot . This quantity increases very rapidly as n in-
r=l 
creases. Thus if n were 3 and each of the players had five 
alternatives, 625 numbers would have to be stored. If n were 
30 and each had five alternatives, the quantity would be 2,794 
followed by 19 zeros. Indeed, the alternatives may not be 
discrete. They may cover a continuous range, implying what 
has been termed an infinite game. Such games have been 
studied by McKinsey (52) and Tucker (81, p. 21) among others. 
Obviously, the information problem is greatly magnified in 
situations of this type. 
For complete information, the power of all possible co­
alitions must also be examined. The number of possible coali-
n 
tions is H nCm or (2 -1). This quantity, too, increases very 
m=l 
rapidly as n rises. Clearly, as the number of players in­
creases, the volume of such information soon becomes much 
greater than any entrepreneur could store and evaluate. In 
so far as some of the players might have similar alternatives, 
the problem would be alleviated a little - if the concomitant 
information problem of knowing which players had the same 
alternative had an easy solution. Even if all the above in­
formation difficulties could be resolved, the problems of 
communicating and negotiating possible coalitions remains. 
For all these reasons, it is impossible to maintain the 
assumption of complete information perceived either objective­
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ly or subjectively 0+7) •  Undoubtedly, this accounts for the 
fact that there is no correspondence between the economic 
milieu described as free competition and the expectations of 
coalition formation one would have of such a group from a game 
theoretic approach. 
Thus a game theoretic model of the decision problem fac­
ing an entrepreneur n'SN1, where the order of N1 implies that 
this set of entrepreneurs is operating under free competition, 
would be completely unrealistic. 
None the less, such an entrepreneur will have at least 
some information. Certainly he will know something of his 
own payoff matrix. Now, what might this payoff matrix en­
compass for a member, n', of a freely competitive group, N'? 
By definition, if free competition prevails, no entrepreneur 
in the group has any control over the prices he pays or re­
ceives in carrying through a particular production alterna­
tive. Hence in developing his payoff matrix he need pay no 
attention to the individual actions of any of his confreres 
in the set N1. This feature of the situation was apparently 
unappreciated by Shubik (7*+). However, the aggregate actions 
of a freely competitive group are influential in determining 
the prices paid and received by individual members of the 
group. As economic theorists normally explain, the average 
revenue curve facing an individual in a freely competitive 
market is a horizontal line while the average revenue curve 
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of the whole group is a negatively sloped line. Therefore 
such an entrepreneur must estimate his possible payoff for 
each possible aggregative maneuver of the group to which he 
belongs. Since his individual influence is zero, he may just 
as well consider only the aggregate action of all the other 
members of his group. Of course, the number of such maneuvers 
will be very large if the number of alternatives available to 
each member is large. 
It must be emphasized that these aggregative actions are 
not the result of a coalition. Every member of N' makes his 
decisions independently. These independent decisions taken 
in toto determine which particular aggregative state of af­
fairs, out of all those possible, does occur. 
To what extent must n1 take account of the behavior of 
the members of N" and F"? If they are also free competitors, 
only their aggregative actions need be considered, for the 
reasons already given above. To the extent that they are not 
freely competitive groups, the actions of individual members 
of N" and N™ must be considered in constructing the payoff 
matrix of an n'SN'. 
Even within such a limited picture, an information prob­
lem is likely to exist. - For instance, suppose an entrepreneur 
n'eN1 has 25 alternative ways of processing his major output. 
Assume further that there are 40 ways in which the aggregated 
decisions of the remaining members of N* may occur. Now if 
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there are also 40 possibilities relevant to N" and another 40 
to N"', the size of the payoff matrix for n' would be 25 by 
64,000. Obviously no entrepreneur could construct, let alone 
evaluate, such a matrix without help. Nor is it unreasonable 
to say that in most real world problems of the type we are 
discussing there are many more alternatives available than 
the number used in this example. How then could an entrepre­
neur proceed if he had to rely on his own assessment of the 
decision problem without recourse to assistance? All he could 
do, assuming he does not wish to choose one of his alterna­
tives at random, is to stratify his own alternatives and those 
of his opponents taken en masse; amalgamating the alternatives 
within each stratum into a single broad possibility so that 
his payoff matrix is reduced to a size commensurate with his 
capabilities. Such a procedure may even be carried further 
by rejecting some of these broad alternatives, then proceeding 
to consider only the remainder. Simon (75, p. 244) especially 
and, to a lesser extent, Bruner et al (9, p. 232), Luce (46, 
p. 208) and Miller (53, passim) have hypothesized that such 
a pattern of simplification is carried out by real world 
decision makers in complex situations. In fact, such a 
procedure is the basic feature of Simon's theory of decision 
making. He has written (75, P« 243): 
Because of the psychological limits of the 
organism (particularly with respect to computational 
and predictive ability), actual human rationality-
striving can at best be an extremely crude and 
simplified approximation to the kind of global 
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rationality that is implied, for example, by game 
theoretical models. 
We shall incorporate such an approximation procedure in 
our model. In seeking to confirm the model empirically we 
will therefore be testing this hypothesis of -Simon's. 
Formulation of the Model 
Having explored the above preliminaries, the model may 
now be presented in succinct form. The elements of the model 
are: 
(1) An entrepreneur n'eN'cN, the order of N1 being such 
that n' operates under free competition. 
(2) A point set A of behavior alternatives or acts 
available to n*. 
(3) A partitioning of the set A into subsets A^ . Each 
A^  is treated as a single broad alternative. 
O (4) A point set of considered alternatives or acts A 
whose elements constitute a subset of the set of 
subsets, -^ Ajj . 
(5) A point set S of possible future states of affairs 
due to the aggregative actions of those entrepre­
neurs constituting the complement of n' in N and to 
other factors such as climatic conditions. 
(6) A partitioning of S into subsets Sj, each subset Sj 
being considered as a single possible state of af­
fairs. The subsets S, will be referred to as 
J 
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states of Nature. 
(7) For each combination of a considered act from the 
O 
set A and a state of Nature , a probability 
distribution of possible payoffs (net revenues) for 
the forthcoming production period is known. The 
expected value of the payoff from the i th act and 
the j th state of Nature is a^ j. The set is 
an ordered set. 
The aim of n' is to select that act or combination of 
acts which will maximize his net expected revenue in the 
forthcoming production period. The selection of a single 
O 
act A^  is referred to as a pure strategy; selection of a 
number of acts is a mixed strategy. 
For this model, a course of action is rational if it is 
compatible with the aim of maximizing expected profit in the 
forthcoming production period. This definition is extremely 
narrow. In general, it would be preferable to take account 
of additional values and motivations that real-world decision 
makers may have. Schoeffler (68), for instance, has indicated 
how this might be done ideally. 
In his consideration of the decision problem, it is as­
sumed that n1 is indifferent between elements of the considered 
set of acts A°. Only when these acts are adjoined to their 
respective payoffs is a preference ordering possible. Equiv-
alently, we could assume that any preference ordering among 
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these acts, considered apart from their payoffs, is strongly 
dominated by the decision maker's desire for profit maximiza­
tion. Not to make this assumption would lead us into the 
realm of subjective probabilities (66). To what extent the 
assumption is a limiting one in an entrepreneurial choice 
context is a matter that could only be determined by extensive 
empirical analysis. Moreover, the measurement of subjective 
probabilities is a problem not entirely solved (13, 45, p. 
159). 
Also, it is assumed that for n' the utility of a sum of 
money is directly proportional to its amount and that the 
utility of a probability distribution of payoffs is directly 
proportional to the mathematical expectation of the distribu­
tion. Hence n1 is assumed to evaluate each of his possible 
acts in terms of the expected payoff values a^ . Some con­
sideration of this assumption is necessary. 
If the complex real-world problem is simplified by some 
process of amalgamating alternatives into a smaller number, 
it is certainly true that for each of these broader alterna­
tives there is a range of possible payoffs. Even if such a 
simplifying procedure were not carried out, the real-world 
payoff elements could only be estimated within some range for 
two reasons. Firstly, complementarity may exist between 
alternative acts. If complementarity is present, its effect 
will vary with the intensity of use of the relevant alterna­
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tive transformation processes. Secondly, allowance must be 
made for errors of estimation. Hence the payoffs would not 
be single valued but multi-valued, perhaps having some as­
sociated probability distribution. If so, in evaluating such 
payoffs the decision maker might take account of higher moments 
of the payoff's probability distribution and not just the 
first moment as we have assumed. Allais (2) and Tintner (80) 
have postulated that higher moments are taken into account. 
If they are, and the question has not yet been satisfactorily 
answered, then our model is limited to this extent. However, 
as Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow (18, p. 431) stress, to take 
account of these higher moments would be difficult in an 
empirical analysis. Certainly there is strong precedent in 
economic analysis for considering only expected values. Ad­
mittedly this is not a justification for the assumption made, 
except in so far as this study is the first of its type. 
It must be emphasized that each member of N' makes his 
choice in terms of a model similar in construction to this 
one, but differing with respect to the available alternatives 
and the partitioning of these alternatives and Nature's 
possible states. 
The payoff matrix facing an entrepreneur n'eN is 
generalized below. This payoff matrix will vary in size and 
content during the planning period in so far as n' changes 
his conception of the situation. None the less, when a deci­
22 
sion has to be made, it must be in terms of some such matrix 
of the type generalized below, if the model is correct. 
Considered 
alternatives, A , 
of n1 Si . 
Possible states of Nature 
Sj Sm 
O 
h air alj alm 
o 
Ai ail ' aij aim 
O 
Ak akl* *kj akm 
Implications of the Model 
Suppose such a simplified payoff matrix is constructed. 
What then? Does our model indicate how the decision problem 
might now be approached? The decision maker n* knows that 
the other members of N' taken individually can at best base 
their decision on some similarly simplified matrix. However, 
their payoff matrices will differ from his in terms of the 
alternatives available to each of them and the way in which 
they categorize these alternatives and those of Nature. 
Therefore, in terms of his payoff matrix, these individual 
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selections by other members of N' are random. If N" and N"' 
are large, the individual selections of n"eN" and n"'£ Ff ' will 
also be random in relation to the payoff matrix of n'. These 
random individual selections when aggregated give the state 
of Nature which will prevail. Since the individual selections 
are random in relation to the payoff matrix of n', the "selec­
tion" of a strategy by Nature will also be random from the 
point of view of n'. If over time all of the relevant vari­
ables were constant, it might be possible to ascertain a 
probability distribution associated with the occurrence of 
the various states of Nature. Such a probability distribution 
could then be used in assessing the relative merits of the 
O 
alternatives A facing n'. This cannot be done because it 
would be too much to hope for any such constancy to prevail 
in any real-world situation of. the type discussed here. 
If N" or N"' are small so that the choices of n"eN" or 
n" 'eN'" are not random, the payoff matrix will be partitioned 
in some way but within each sub-matrix the strategy of Nature 
will be randomly selected. 
Nature's strategy choice being essentially random, the 
payoff matrix depicts a decision problem under absolute un­
certainty, or as some have called such problems, a game 
against Nature. 
As Arrow (5) and Debreu (17) have shown, it is theoret­
ically possible to remove the uncertainty that prevails when 
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N1 is large. This could be done by having markets in which 
claims are traded on each commodity for delivery at a future 
date, valid only in the event of a specified contingency. As 
Koopmans (45, p. l6l) points out, the real world does not ap­
proximate this ideal although such markets do exist for 
securities and for a small number of highly standardized com­
modities . 
While the model indicates that absolute uncertainty will 
exist, it says nothing of the possible magnitude of the ef­
fects of this uncertainty. These effects will vary, depending 
on the specific situation being considered. For some situa­
tions, it may be that the variations over the set of payoffs 
are so small as to be of little significance. 
Summary 
A model in terms of game theory was constructed. It was 
shown to be unreal, the game theoretic assumptions being too 
demanding. However, by realizing the implications of a freely 
competitive situation and assuming the entrepreneur to have 
less than full information and to follow some method of 
simplifying the complexity of the problem he faces, a more 
satisfactory model of the decision making situation was ob­
tained. The logical implication of the model is that the 
decision problem is one under absolute uncertainty. It is 
asserted that this structuring of the decision problem is the 
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most rational way to frame the problem in terms of a profit 
maximizing goal. 
A number of theories applicable to decision problems 
under absolute uncertainty have been advanced. They are 
described in the next chapter. 
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III. THEORIES OF CHOICE UNDER ABSOLUTE UNCERTAINTY 
Absolute uncertainty prevails when the decision maker 
has no objective knowledge about the likelihood of occurrence 
of the various possible states of Nature. Although he knows 
what alternatives are possible for Nature, he is genuinely 
ignorant of which of her alternatives she will follow. Some 
theories of decision making have been postulated specifically 
for such circumstances. Such are those of Wald, Savage, 
Laplace and Hurwicz. These will be outlined first. The more 
general theories of decision making of Simon and Shackle will 
then be described in so far as they relate to absolute un­
certainty. No consideration will be given to the pioneering 
contributions of Hart (28), Hicks (33), Knight (4-3), and 
Tintner (80) beyond pointing out here that theirs were the 
first systematic approaches to the problem of uncertainty in 
economics. 
The discussion throughout will be in terms of the 
generalized payoff matrix given on page 22. Except for show­
ing the relationship between Shackle's theory and Hurwicz's 
approach and some comments upon Simon's theory, this chapter 
contains nothing original. It is merely a gathering together 
of the material to be found in the sources noted. 
Decision Theories Specific to Problems of Absolute Uncertainty 
The theories in this group have a number of common fea­
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tures. They have not been postulated as general theories. 
Each of them postulates a mathematical algorithm for selecting 
the best act, the best act being defined tautologically as 
that selected by the algorithm. Also, they are rational to 
the extent of being mathematically well-defined, the postulated 
algorithm in each case being precise and never leading to 
ambiguous selections under a given set of circumstances. 
As Luce and Raiffa (48, p. 296) stress, there are no a 
priori theoretical grounds for prescribing one of these 
theories instead of another. Which is the preferred algorithm 
depends on the decision maker's predisposition and judgement. 
There is therefore no single best mathematical procedure for 
solving a decision problem under absolute uncertainty. Indeed 
an infinite number of well-defined algorithms are possible. 
However, it is doubtful that any more plausible criteria than 
those discussed below are available for normative analysis 
of empirical situations. Moreover, they are not so complex 
that it would be implausible for them to have a descriptive 
role for some decision makers. 
Our exposition of these criteria will essentially follow 
that of Luce and Raiffa (48, pp. 278-286). We do not, how­
ever, consider all of the theoretical objections to each 
criterion which they elaborate. 
Wald criterion 
If only pure acts can be selected, the Wald or maximin 
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criterion suggests selection of that act which has the maximum 
minimum payoff. If a mixed strategy is permissible and the 
payoff matrix has no saddle point, then that mixture of acts 
should be chosen which has the maximum minimum expected pay­
off. This criterion is equivalent to treating the problem as 
a two-person zero-sum game; a procedure that assumes the worst 
possible result will occur. Since Nature is playing a passive 
role and not actively trying to defeat the decision maker, the 
Wald theory is extremely conservative. 
Savage criterion 
This theory takes account of the regret that might be 
felt after the true state of Nature is known and it is re­
alized that a larger payoff may have been obtained (67). The 
procedure aims at minimizing this regret. To this end a new 
payoff matrix, termed the risk or regret payoff matrix, is 
constructed from the actual payoff matrix ^ a^ j . Each 
element, r^ j, of the regret matrix jr^ j is the amount that 
would have to be added to the original element a^  in order 
to equal the maximum payoff in the j th column. Thus 
(2) [rij] = [maxjaij * aij] • 
If only pure acts may be selected then that act which 
minimizes the maximum regret should be chosen. If the regret 
matrix has no saddle point and mixed strategies are permis-
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sible, that mixture of acts which minimizes the maximum ex­
pected regret should be chosen. 
An equivalent procedure is the application of the Wald 
criterion to the negative of the regret matrix. Like the Wald 
theory, Savage's criterion is conservative in assuming that 
the worst will occur; worst in this case implying the largest 
possible regret. 
Hurwicz criterion 
Sometimes known as the pessimism-optimism index criterion, 
this theory takes account of both the best and the worst pay­
offs for each act. In the form proposed by Hurwicz (36), it 
is as follows. Let fi , a fixed number between 0 and 1, denote 
O 
the decision maker's level of pessimism. With each act A^  
associate the index /^ min^ a^  + (1- ^max^ a^ . That act 
should then be chosen which maximizes this index. If the 
decision maker has no optimism, so that ft =1, then this 
procedure is equivalent to Wald's criterion. Thus the latter 
theory is a special case of Hurwicz's suggestion. 
By leaving the explicit form of the pessimism-optimism 
index function unspecified, Radner and Marschak (64, p. 62) 
have given a more generalized form of the Hurwicz criterion. 
As is shown later, in a context of absolute uncertainty this 
generalized form subsumes Shackle's theory. 
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Laplace criterion 
Oldest of all the decision theories to be elaborated is 
Laplace's principle of insufficient reason. This postulates 
that since there is no information about the likelihood of 
occurrence of the various possible states of Nature, the deci­
sion maker should act as though each of Nature's states has 
an equal chance of being the true state. The expected utility 
m 
associated with an act A, is therefore JJ, a, 4/m where m is 
1 3=1 13 
the number of possible states of Nature. The act which has 
the largest expected utility should be chosen. 
Savage's subjective probability theory 
Not to be confused with his minimax regret criterion is 
a later theory of Savage showing how subjective a priori 
probabilities may logically be attached to the various states 
of Nature in a decision problem under absolute uncertainty. 
To do this he synthesizes de Finetti's (21) personalistic 
approach to probability and von Neumann and Morgenstern1s 
(57? pp. 617-632) axiomatic approach to utility. Savage 
(66, pp. 6-104) has outlined at length the postulates under­
lying his approach. Koopmans (45, pp. 157-161) has given a 
very understandable paraphrase of them while Luce and Raiffa 
(48, pp. 300-304) have shown the relationship between the 
algorithms described above and Savage's subjective probability 
approach to absolute uncertainty. The essential distinguish­
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ing feature of Savage's theory is the postulate that a complete 
preference ordering of all acts exists for the decision maker, 
quite apart from any consideration of the payoffs relevant 
to each act. If this is so, an optimal set of subjective 
probabilities can be attached to Nature's states. The deci­
sion problem can then be handled in subjective terms as a 
risk problem (48, p. 277) - provided that only the expected 
value of the payoff distributions are considered by the deci­
sion maker. 
This approach is normative. A decision maker following 
Savage's logic would base his choice on maximization of the 
expected utility of the consequences; such utility being de­
rived not only from the payoff itself, but also from his 
preference for the act apart from its payoffs. In this sense, 
Savage's theory is an important contribution. It allows for 
the fact that utility need not be derived solely from money 
income. Commenting upon the theory's possible descriptive 
role, Koopmans (45, p. 159) says: 
Whether or to what extent these results have 
descriptive value is an empirical question to which 
the answer is not obvious verification by 
observation of actual economic decisions appears 
difficult, whereas verification in experimentally 
created conditions may well be of limited relevance 
for explanatory theory. 
While recognizing the importance of this approach, we 
will not attempt to assess the empirical role that it might 
play. To do so would have been impossible in terms of the 
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resources available for this study. Our empirical analysis 
will be based on the assumption that the decision maker has 
no preference ordering among acts in his considered set of 
O 
acts A . At least within this set of acts, choice on the 
basis of profit maximization is assumed to be dominant. 
Simon's Theory of the Satisficer 
A major feature of Simon's theory has already been in­
corporated in our model. It is that in complex situations 
the real-world decision maker simplifies the problem by con­
sidering not all possible alternatives but only some subset 
of them that is commensurate with his capabilities. One 
other postulate completes Simon's theory. It is that the 
decision maker behaves as a "satisficer", seeking a course of 
action that is "good enough", rather than as a maximizer 
seeking the best possible course of action (75> pp. 204 and 
246-248). He argues that the decision maker has some aspira­
tion level which he tries to attain. Any considered act whose 
outcome may lie below this level is regarded as unsatisfactory. 
In a given situation there may be a number of satisfactory 
considered acts. The first one of these to be studied may or 
may not be accepted. So long as the chosen act meets the 
aspiration level of the decision maker he is behaving in what 
Simon terms an intendedly rational manner (75» P* 200). This 
theory is, of course, descriptive and not normative. 
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Simon (75» pp. 201-204) is extremely critical of the game 
theoretic variants of decision making under absolute un­
certainty that we have outlined above. He believes (75» 
p. 202) that such theories are wrong 
...in seeking to erect a theory of human choice 
on the unrealistic assumptions of virtual omniscience 
and unlimited computational power. 
He does not recognize, as our model does, that these as­
sumptions of omniscience and unlimited computational power 
may be relaxed by accepting his hypothesis of simplifying the 
real-world problem and then applying the algorithmic proce­
dures to the simplified version of the problem. 
Shackle's Theory of Potential Surprise and Focus Outcomes 
Stressing psychological variables, Shackle (69, 70, 72, 
73) has postulated a theory of decision making for what he 
terms non-divisible non-seriable situations. That is, for 
decision situations where actuarially certain outcomes cannot 
be assigned. In such circumstances he believes it illogical 
to use mathematical probability (73, p. 38). He substitutes 
possibility or what he terms degrees of belief in its place. 
His rejection of probability in such decision problems has 
led to extensive discussion in the literature (4, p. 433» 
23» 87). However, this discussion is irrelevant in a context 
of absolute uncertainty. 
Shackle's degree of belief concept becomes operational 
3^ 
in his theory through its relationship to potential surprise. 
The degree of belief a decision maker feels in a possible 
outcome is defined as corresponding uniquely with the degree 
of surprise which he feels himself exposed to if that outcome 
should occur. 
In making a decision, Shackle theorizes that the decision 
maker considers each possible outcome in relation to its 
potential surprise, sighting for each act what he terms a 
focus gain-focus loss pair of outcomes. Graaf and Baumol 
(26, p. 341) and Arrow (4, p. 432) have criticized this 
distinction between losses and gains, a criticism accepted by 
Shackle (71, p. 346, 72, p. 49). Me will therefore speak of 
focus best-focus worst pairs. These are the "good" and "bad" 
outcomes for each act which, when taken in conjunction with 
their associated potential surprise, have the greatest atten­
tion arresting power. By some conscious or subconscious 
method these pairs are standardized in terms of utility. The 
standardized pairs, one set for each act, are then evaluated, 
perhaps intuitively (60, p. 17), on the decision maker's 
gambling indifference system. The act whose standardized 
focus outcome pair lies highest on this loss versus gain in­
difference system will then be selected. 
Such is Shackle's general theory. What becomes of it 
when absolute uncertainty prevails? In such circumstances 
the concept of potential surprise plays no role. With ab­
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solute uncertainty, maximum potential surprise must be at­
tached to every possible outcome. The focus pairs then con­
sist simply of the best and worst payoffs for each act, 
potential surprise playing no part in the ordering of the 
possible payoffs. It is these pairs that are evaluated in the 
decision maker's gambling indifference system. Hence, under 
absolute uncertainty, Shackle's theory devolves to an analysis 
of the situation rather close to that of Hurwicz. In fact, 
it is subsumed under the Eadner - Marschak (64) generalization 
of Hurwicz's theory and includes Hurwicz's actual suggestion 
as a particular case. Arrow (4, p. 433) has already pointed 
out that Shackle's theory includes the Wald maximin criterion 
as a special case. 
These relationships between Shackle's theory and the 
axiomatically derived game theoretic type of approach are 
interesting in that Shackle's theory has, in general, been 
well received by British economists and psychologists (11, 
passim) but not by North American economists (4, p. 433» 59» 
p. 701, 87) or psychologists (20, p. 402). Conversely, the 
game theoretic type of approach has received much attention 
in this country (45, p. 155» 48) but little commendation from 
English sources (72, p. 60). This dichotomy is very apparent 
in a comparison of two relatively recent conferences on deci­
sion making. The British conference (11) was devoted entirely 
to Shackle's theory with no direct references to the game 
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theoretic type of approach while the report of the United 
States conference (79) stresses the latter approach but con­
tains no mention of Shackle's contribution. 
Shackle's theory is purely descriptive. It has no norma­
tive intent. For a given set of the relevant variables it 
may be considered as an algorithm for reaching a decision. 
However, its essential feature is the use of the psychological 
variable termed potential surprise and the gambling indif­
ference system; together with the unspecified procedure for 
standardizing focus outcome pairs. These elements are not 
constant. They may change from what Shackle terms one 
"moment-in-being" (72, p. 13) to the next. Thus, in facing 
a given payoff matrix, a decision maker may decide on one act 
now and another in the next moment-in-being ; all the while 
behaving in what Shackle would call a rational manner. 
Stochastic Theories of Choice 
With the exception of Simon's theory, all of the contri­
butions outlined above imply that, given the decision maker's 
O 
state of mind, there is some specific act(s) among the set A 
that he should accept. Should he select some other act, he 
must be behaving illogically in the light of his own pre-
O 
dispositions. As Akerman (1, pp. 3^7-3^8) points out, the 
rules of behavior allow no randomness of response nor any 
countenance of free will or even libertarian!sm. In a norma­
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tive context this does not matter. Descriptively it is im­
portant: a single observed inconsistency would lead to refuta­
tion of the theory in cases where the decision maker had a 
predilection for the particular theory being assessed. As 
Koopmans (45, p. 161) says in discussing Savage's subjective 
probability theory: 
Verification will need to be preceded by a 
certain relaxing of the postulates sufficient to 
accommodate natural variability of response but not 
going so far as to deprive the theory of all empirical 
content and descriptive value. 
To this end a number of workers, notably Chipman (12), 
Luce (46), Marschak (50) and Papandreou (62), have formulated 
a number of probabilistic theories of choice. We will not 
consider these stochastic approaches in our empirical analysis 
beyond recognizing the general validity of the comment by 
Koopmans quoted above. 
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17. ANALYSIS OF A SIMPLE PROBLEM 
As an example of the functioning of the decision criteria 
to be considered empirically, we apply them here to the fol­
lowing decision problem under absolute uncertainty. This 
particular problem will figure prominently in the empirical 







A1 2,500 3,500 0 1,500 
A2 1,500 2,000 500 1,000 
A3 0 6,000 0 0 
A4 1,500 4,500 0 0 
Wald Criterion 
Using this algorithm, that act or combination of acts is 
sought which has the maximum minimum payoff. Inspection of 
the matrix shows that a saddle point exists at the a^  posi­
tion with a payoff of 500. Hence A2 should be selected. 
Savage Criterion 
When this criterion is used, the aim is to minimize the 
maximum regret that may be felt ex post. To this end the 
regret matrix is calculated as indicated in Equation 2. Hence 
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we have for [r-y] : 
0 2500 500 0 
1000 4000 0 500 
2500 0 500 1500 
1000 1500 500 1500 
If only pure strategies are allowed, must be selected 
for its maximum regret of 1500 is smaller than that for any 
other act. With mixed strategies permitted, the decision 
maker should use A^ , A^ , A^ ; allocating his resources among 
them in the proportions of 9 : 23 : 68 respectively^ . With 
such a mixed strategy his maximum expected regret would be 
1365-
Hurwicz Criterion 
The choice that should be made when this algorithm is 
used in the form suggested by Hurwicz is the act for which the 
value of (y# min^ aj. j + (l-/4,)maXja^ j ) is a maximum, remembering 
that ft is an index of the decision maker's level of pessimism 
and lies between zero and one. The minimum and maximum payoff 
values for each act are: 
4[his solution is obtained by analyzing the negative 
regret matrix as a linear programming problem. Heady (29) has 
illustrated the method. 
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A1 o, 3,500 
A2 : 500, 2,000 
Â3 : 0, 6,000 
a4 : 0, 4,500 
Since the minimum-maximum payoff pair for dominates 
those of Aj and A^ , the choice will always lie between Ag and 
A^  regardless of the size of . Which act out of A^  and A^  
should be selected depends on the value of . 
If 
(3) /'(500) +• (1-/0)2000 > /?(0) + (1-/4)6,000 
which implies 
(4) fi > 8/9, 
then A2 should be selected. If the inequality in Equation 3 
is reversed, we find that for 
(5) < 8/9 
Ag should be selected. When 
(6)  = 8 /9  
either A2 or A^ , or some mixture of these two acts, should be 
selected. 
Laplace Criterion 
Since there are four possible states of Nature, the 
principle of insufficient reason says a probability of 0.25 
should be given to each of these states. The expected value 
of each act is then: 
hi 
A1 " 1875 
AG : 1250 
A3 1 1500 
A4 : 1500 
has the maximum expected value and should be selected. 
Simon's Theory of the Satisficer 
If the decision maker had an aspiration level of zero, 
he would be satisfied with any of the four acts available. 
All of them guarantee at least a zero payoff. 
With an aspiration level greater than zero, Ag must be 
selected. This is so even if the aspiration level is greater 
than $00, for A2 is still the best act; although in such a 
case the best of a bad lot. 
Shackle's Theory of Potential Surprise and Focus Outcomes 
Since absolute uncertainty prevails, the standardized 
focus outcomes are simply the pairs of best and worst payoffs 





Acts A^  and A^  are dominated by Ay The choice therefore 
lies between Ag and Ag. Which of these is selected depends 
A1 : 3500 
A2 : 2000 
A3 ' 
6000 
\ : 4500 
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on the decision maker's gambling indifference system. The 
greater his disposition to gamble, the more likely it is that 
A^  would be selected; the smaller this disposition, the greater 
the chance that Ag would be chosen. At any rate, either Ag 
or A^  must be selected. A^  or A^  should never be selected. 
Summary 
Drawing together the analyses of this simple problem, we 
have the following solutions for each of the decision theories 
applied: 
Wald criterion with only pure 
strategies 
Wald criterion with mixed 
strategies 
Savage criterion with only pure 
strategies 
Savage criterion with mixed 
strategies 
Hurwicz criterion with ft  ^8/9 
Hurwicz criterion with ft % 8/9 
Laplace criterion 
Simon's theory with an aspira­
tion level of zero 
Simon's theory with an aspira­
tion level greater than 0 
Shackle's theory 
: A, 
: A2 • 
V 




: A^  or Ag or A^  or A^ , 
: Ag. 
: Ag or Ag. 
43 
V. RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK 
Theoretically, the most important feature of the model 
we have constructed is its implication that entrepreneurs 
operating in a freely competitive market, whose members have 
a number of production alternatives, must normally make their 
production decisions under absolute uncertainty. As was 
pointed out in constructing the model, Shubik (74) came close 
to this result in his analysis of the full information assump­
tion of game theory. However, he did not realize the role of 
the aggregative maneuvers of the decision maker's opponents. 
Heady and Candler (31, p. 500) and Koopmans (45, p. 163) 
recognized such a possibility but have offered no substantia­
tion of the hypothesis. 
The empirical importance of the model lies in its indica­
tion of the role that theories of decision making under 
absolute uncertainty should play in such real world situations. 
It shows how the relevant decision problem might best be ap­
proached. Also, it offers an opportunity to assess empirical­
ly the normative and descriptive roles that the various 
theories we have outlined might play. Conversely, it provides 
a framework in which the malaffects of the foibles of real 
world decision makers, with their rules of thumb, habits and 
beliefs, might be measured. To date, such studies have not 
been carried out because of the lack of a suitable frame of 
reference. It is to this extent, then, that this study is 
44 
original in its empirical analysis. 
So far as can be ascertained, the literature contains no 
real-world analyses of the roles of the theories outlined in 
Chapter III. However, recent years have witnessed a prolifera­
tion of laboratory type experiments on decision making ; 
conducted with a high degree of mathematical sophistication 
by a relatively small group of mathematical economists and 
psychologists. In the main, such studies have been concerned 
with the measurement of utility and of subjective probabilities 
and their role. Most important has been the work of Coombs 
and Beardsiee (13), Davidson, Suppes and Siegel (16), and of 
Hosteller and Nogee (56); Chipman (12) and Papandreou (62) 
have studied stochastic models of choice experimentally while 
Flood (22) and Kalisch, Milnor, Nash and Nering (4l), among 
others, have examined decision making in experimental games 
involving a small number of players. In general, such studies 
have approached the problem of decision making by considering 
the basic postulates underlying the various theories that have 
been proposed. They are fundamental rather than applied 
studies. As such, their results tend to indicate that people 
do have fairly consistent preference structures and tend to 
behave in a way consistent with these preferences. 
There appear to be no experimental studies of the various 
theories in which we are interested, taken in toto. Numerous 
studies have been made of the expectations and reactions to 
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uncertainty of entrepreneurs operating under free competition. 
By necessity, most such studies relate to farmers. However 
they never quite reach the problem of decision making in an 
analytic sense, mainly because of the lack of a suitable 
model. Nor do they show any appreciation of the normative or 
descriptive roles that might be played by the theories we have 
outlined. Typical of such studies is that of Morrison, Judge 
and Tompkins (55)• 
Mention should be made of an applied study by Wray (90) 
which is referred to by Shackle (72, p. 64), seemingly in 
support of his theory. Wray does not test Shackle's theory. 
Rather, she assumes its truth. Moreover, her attempt to 
explain entrepreneurial behavior on this basis is inconclusive. 
Against the background of related work sketched above, 
a background lacking in real-world studies of the pertinent 
decision theories, we now proceed to the empirical analysis 
of Part II. 
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PART II. EMPIRICAL 
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VI. SOURCE AND COLLECTION OF THE DATA 
The data to be analyzed were collected in the course of 
a four stage panel survey. This panel constituted a popula­
tion of 77 farmers. As the schedules shown in Appendix B 
indicate, the survey was primarily oriented to farmer price 
expectations. Discussions were held with each farmer in June, 
August and October of 1957 and (by mail and telephone) in 
January, 1958. 
Description of the Population 
The population consisted of farmers who: 
(1) were farming in Marshall County, Iowa; 
(2) were aged between 30 and 50 years in June, 1957; 
(3) had owned and operated at least 80 acres of farmland 
during the three years prior to June, 1957; 
(4) had fed an average of at least 25 feeder cattle"*" in 
each of the three feeding seasons prior to the 
survey; 
(5) cooperated in all stages of the survey. 
Restrictions 1 to 4 were made so as to control possible 
tenure and age effects while guaranteeing that the respondents 
occupied a decision making role and had more than a modicum 
of experience in the feeder cattle operation. By making the 
"hrhese are purchased cattle which the farmer fattens and 
sells for slaughter. 
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group more homogeneous than would otherwise have been the 
case, they permit a more clear cut analysis and give a greater 
chance that any important relationships will be discovered. 
Marshall County is one of the more important in Iowa with 
respect to feeder cattle. It is in North Central Iowa and can 
be identified with the highly productive Central Corn Belt 
region. Somewhat less than one-half of the farms are operated 
by owners while the majority of the remainder are operated by 
regular tenants. The agriculture is diversified in terms of 
crops and livestock production although more income is from 
livestock than from crops. The amount of capital per worker 
is relatively high, and the farms are highly mechanized. 
The means of some selected characteristics of the 
respondents are listed in Table 1. The left side column of 
Table 1. Summary of selected characteristics describing the 
respondents 
Mean 

























aThe two farmers with extremely large farms are excluded. 
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figures refers to the population of 77 farmers. Included in 
this population are two farmers who had extremely large farm 
businesses relative to the other members of the population. 
In terms of acres operated, capital invested and gross income, 
their farm operation was twice the size of that of any other 
member of the population. The means of the selected charac­
teristics are therefore also presented, in Table 1, with these 
two farmers excluded. 
As noted above, the population was restricted to farmers 
between 30 and 50 years who were owner-operators of three 
years standing. For this reason the mean years of education, 
number of dependents, dollars of investment and per cent 
equity are probably somewhat higher than the comparable means 
for all farmers in the area. 
Considerable variation existed among the 77 farmers in 
all the characteristics measured. Five of the 77 were pro­
fessional men who had invested in farming while still main­
taining their professional practices. Another two devoted 
the majority of their time to small-town businesses. Two 
operated large seed corn plants and one farmed as a sideline 
to general contract work. Only one farmer worked part time 
as a non-farm employee. At least one year of college had been 
completed by 17 of the farmers while 20 of the 77 had not 
completed high school. Seventeen had full-time non-farm work 
experience. Only 13 had not worked as farm laborers and 22 
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had never operated a farm as a tenant. Some rented land was 
farmed by 24 of the farmers. Sixteen had an equity of 100 
per cent. Further details of the personal, financial and 
farm organization characteristics of the population are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Survey Procedures 
An initial list of 120 farmers who were thought to satisfy 
characteristics 1 to 4 of page 47 was drawn up. This was done 
with the aid of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva­
tion Committee of Marshall County. Originally, the aim was 
to interview a random sample of 70 from these 120 farmers. 
However, initial contacts indicated that there might be a 
large number of ineligible or uncooperative farmers. Since 
a multi-interview survey was planned, it was decided to con­
tact all of the farmers listed; thereby ensuring a satisfac-
tory number of completed schedules over all stages of the 
survey. The initial survey indicated that 95 of the 120 
farmers were eligible while two additional members of the 
population were found. Of these 97 farmers, 18 refused to 
cooperate at some stage of the survey. Another two were un­
available. The number of cooperating farmers at each stage 
of the survey was as follows : 
First stage: 85 
Second stage: 82 
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Third stage: 77 
Fourth stage: 77 
It appears that the number of respondents had become 
fairly constant at the completion of the third survey. 
Nothing is known about the 12 farmers who would not cooperate 
at the first stage of the survey. In terms of the data col­
lected in the first survey, there appear to be no marked 
distinctions between those who later refused to cooperate and 
those who did cooperate. However, this may not be true with 
respect to their decision making characteristics. Certainly, 
in deciding not to cooperate they made one decision quite 
distinct from those who did acquiesce! Therefore, only the 
data provided by the 77 farmers who cooperated throughout all 
stages of the survey will be analyzed. 
The applicability of the study in its empirical aspects 
could have been extended by drawing a stratified random sample 
over a number of counties. This was not feasible because of 
financial and interviewing time restrictions related to the 
price expectation side of the study. If it had been possible, 
an even better extension of the analysis would have been to 
examine one or more other decision problems under absolute 
uncertainty. 
The questionnaires 
The personal interview using a questionnaire poses a 
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number of problems. Most serious are those related to memory 
bias on the part of the respondent, interviewer bias, and 
communication between the interviewer and the respondent. 
Memory bias was not a serious problem in this study, the 
majority of the relevant questions not being about the past1. 
Ambiguity in communication was a more serious problem. 
It may arise from two sources : ambiguity in the question and 
ambiguity in the answer. Several steps were taken to reduce 
the possible ambiguity of the questions. The first consisted 
of unstructured interviews with three farmers who had a feeder 
cattle enterprise. The objective was to obtain some idea of 
farmers' expressions and word use in relation to the feeder 
cattle enterprise. This information was of aid in wording 
and structuring the questionnaires. 
Formulation of the first stage questionnaire was the 
next step. A draft was pre-tested on three farmers. After 
the pre-test the questionnaire was reworked, account being 
taken of comments by Professors Howell, Kutish and Heady of 
this Department. The schedule was then pre-tested again on 
two farmers, and became, with a few slight changes, the 
schedule for the first survey. The questionnaires for later 
stage surveys were not pre-tested; sufficient knowledge of 
^The questions are reproduced in Appendix B. 
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the farmers1 frames of reference and of the communication 
problems involved having been obtained in the first survey to 
ensure the formulation of satisfactory follow-up question­
naires. 
In an interview, ambiguity of response may occur when 
the respondent has low ability to give a pertinent and co­
herent answer. Also, the interviewer may not understand the 
implicit basis of the answer. Efforts were made to overcome 
these exigencies by asking the respondent to elucidate his 
answers and by repeating the question with more interpreta­
tion. So far as the latter technique presents more stimuli 
to some respondents than to others, it is bad. 
Interviewer bias 
Because it was desired to complete each stage of the 
survey within the smallest possible time, a number of inter­
viewers were used. There were three for the first survey, 
five for the second and three for the third. Three inter­
viewers assisted in all three of these personal contact 
surveys. Before commencing field work, each interviewer was 
instructed in detail on the aims and implications both of each 
question he had to ask and of the over-all study; also, on 
the general conduct of an interview as suggested by Cannell 
and Kahn (10). Every interviewer was accompanied by the 
author on his first one or two interviews. All completed 
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schedules were checked for irregularities that may have arisen 
through interviewer bias or mistakes. This was done within 
a day of their completion. Where anomalies, existed, the 
respondent was contacted again and the query clarified. It 
is hoped that interviewer bias was reduced to a minimum by 
the use of these procedures. 
A check on responses to one of the most important ques­
tions strongly indicates that interviewer bias was not present. 
The data analyzed are shown in Table 2. The question to which 
Table 2. Number of alternatives considered by farmers as 
determined by each interviewer 
Inter- Number of alternatives Number 
viewer considered of 
farmers 
A 1, It 1» 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5 17 
B 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 5, 8 17 
C 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 5 16 
D 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, \ 5, 7 14 
E 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 7 13 
it relates is probably, of all those asked, the one most like­
ly to be subject to interviewer bias1. 
Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance, as outlined 
by Snedecor (76, p. 287), was applied to test if the inter­
viewing samples had the same population variance. This as-
T^he question is number IX: 1 of Schedule B, Appendix B. 
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sûmes a random distribution of respondents among inter­
viewers - an assumption that was not fully satisfied with 
regard to the geographic locations of the respondents within 
Marshall County. It does appear to be satisfied for other 
attributes of the respondents. Bartlett's test was applied 
to a transformation of the data. The transformation used 
was from x to (x+1)^ . This was done because counts of a 
discrete variable, such as the one considered here, tend to 
follow a Poisson distribution as Snedecor (?6, p. 315) has 
noted. The test supported the hypothesis that the variances 
of the interviewer samples were not significantly different. 
The data were also tested to see if significant differ­
ences existed among the interviewers with regard to the mean 
number of alternatives elicited by each. As for the previous 
test, a transformation of the data to (x+l)2 was carried out 
before applying analysis of variance (76, p. 269). This test 
strongly supported the hypothesis that the means were the 
same1. 
Since these tests indicate that significant differences 
did not exist among the means or variances of the interviewer 
samples, it is concluded that the precautions taken to prevent 
interviewer bias were satisfactory. 
^As would be expected, the mean and variance of a Poisson 
distribution being identical. 
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VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
We have constructed a model of the production decision 
problem facing an entrepreneur operating under free competi­
tion. In this chapter our aim is to assess the descriptive 
role of this model. Ideally, it would be desirable to make 
the appraisal in a number of decision making contexts. This 
has not been possible. We shall appraise the model in only 
a single decision making context - that of a Mid-West farmer 
in his consideration of feeder cattle as a possible enterprise 
in a given season. 
The Feeder Cattle Pre-Purchase Decision Problem 
The decision problem facing such a farmer has two broad 
components. Firstly, how large should the feeder operation 
be? Secondly, what type(s) of feeder program should he fol­
low? 
Although not strictly true, it is a useful simplification 
to think of these problems as being independent. For a given 
bundle of resources, the price relationships between the beef 
and other possible enterprises determine how large the feeder 
enterprise should be. The problem of what type(s) of feeder 
program to follow becomes a decision problem within the feeder 
enterprise. Under conditions of certainty, this dichotomy 
would be a false one. However, the feeder cattle enterprise 
is a risky one relative to other enterprises possible on Mid-
57 
West farms. One livestock expert (7? P» 327) has described 
it as 
not a business, but a disease or vice -
something within the law in which you can engage if 
your wife objects to poker or the races. 
It is also an enterprise requiring specific managerial skills 
(7» passim, 54, pp. 776-808), and, in most instances, a 
sizable fixed investment in cattle housing, feed lots and 
ancillary feeding facilities (75 p. 387, 39). For these 
reasons the separation of the decision problem into two parts -
choice within the feeder enterprise and choice between the 
feeder and other enterprises - is a justifiable analytic 
simplification in an exploratory study such as this. In our 
analysis we consider only the decision problem within the 
feeder enterprise in a given season. Moreover, the analysis 
is restricted to the planning situation of the farmer. No 
consideration is given to the specific market situation he 
faces when he actually enters a buying or selling market where 
decisions, made with a minimum of reflection, may be forced 
upon him (40, pp. 68-69). 
Within the feeder enterprise, the general pre-purchase 
decision problem facing a Mid-West farmer is as follows. 
Between July and December he must buy feeder cattle from the 
(Western) feeder raisers. These cattle will be fattened for 
sale. This operation may vary in terms of the age and sex of 
the cattle bought, their purchase weight, quality and date, 
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the feeding program followed, the length of the fattening 
period or selling weight of the cattle, and their quality when 
sold. Additional variables are the location of the buying and 
selling markets and the degree of personal entry into these 
markets. In selecting a feeder program, a decision has to be 
made as to which combination(s) of these variables would be 
best for him to use. The questions the farmer must pose for 
himself are: What type of feeder cattle program should I fol­
low in the coming season? If I should have a number of 
programs, what should their relative proportions be? These 
questions may be answered by default. Such would be the case 
for a farmer who followed some habitual feeder program. 
Specification of the Model 
This decision problem must be related to our model. The 
transformation process we are concerned with is that for the 
feeder cattle input. This is the generic input. It may take 
a variety of specific forms in terms of the age of the cattle, 
their quality, breeding and previous management. The generic 
output is fat cattle and this output also may take a variety 
of forms in terms of quality, weight and date of selling. 
The economic hierarchy 
The hierarcheal groups relevant to the decision problem 
within the feeder enterprise may be specified as follows, 
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using the same symbols as before: 
N1 : the group of all farmers who may be expected to 
have a feeder cattle enterprise. The order of N' 
is approximately 500,0001. 
N" : the set of economic decision makers above N' in the 
economic hierarchy relevant to feeder cattle. This 
set is composed of three broad groups. In ascend-
2 ing order they are the meat packers , the retailers 
and the consumers (83). While there are only 
relatively few meat packers, there are thousands 
of retailers and millions of consumers. 
N'": the set of economic decision makers below N' in 
the economic hierarchy relevant to feeder cattle. 
This set is essentially composed of the ranchers 
who raise the feeder cattle. Its order is ap­
proximately 200,0001. 
Regarding cattle as the generic input and output, N', 
N" and N,u satisfy the chain arrangement underlying our model. 
For all practical purposes these three sets are disjunct. 
Nature's alternatives 
Consider first the possible role of the meat packers and 
% 
Exact figures are not available. The figure given is 
based on the 1954 census of agriculture (82, p. 473)• 
2 In general, the meat packers act as wholesalers by sell­
ing direct to retailers. 
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of the meat retailing and consumer groups. As the final link 
in the chain, it is the consumers who determine the demand for 
beef. Over a period of years, the most important factors 
influencing the aggregate demand schedule for beef are the 
number of consumers, their tastes and disposable incomes and 
the price of other meats (24, pp. 14-17, 89, pp. 80-87). With 
respect to a given production season, the consuming population 
with its tastes is relatively fixed (34, p. 63). Also, Fox1 
has recently shown that when account is taken of unemployment 
compensation payments and the progressive structure of personal 
income tax rates, there is very little within-year variation 
in disposable income. This was true even for recessions of 
the magnitude experienced in 1949, 1953 and 1957* Indeed, 
by Fox's calculations, none of these recent recessions led to 
a change in aggregate disposable income of more than two per 
cent. 
For these reasons, variations in the quantity of beef 
demanded, relevant to the short-run of a single production 
period, are primarily related to changes in the price of beef 
and of other meats; apart from minor predictable fluctuations 
due to religious and other customs» These price-induced varia-
Fox, K. A. Department of Economics and Sociology, Iowa 
State College, Ames, Iowa. Variations in disposable income. 
Private communication. 1958. 
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tions in the quantity demanded will in turn affect beef 
prices. However the dominant cause of changes in the month 
to month price of beef is the supply of beef. Why? Because 
in the fresh unfrozen form generally preferred by consumers 
(77, p. 6), beef is a highly perishable commodity. It has to 
be moved quickly from the saleyard to the table. In fact, 
most beef is consumed within l4 days of slaughter (77, p. 6). 
Most importantly, within a given year, the current supply of 
beef relevant to current demand is a given or predetermined 
variable. Moreover, competition among the meat packers in 
supplying marketing services forces them to accept the quan­
tity of fat stock offered for sale at any particular time 
(14). Because of its perishable nature, the wholesale and 
retail prices of beef must be adjusted to this supply if the 
supply is excessive. A rather similar situation prevails for 
other meats. 
In such short-run circumstances, it is not so much the 
consumers who influence meat prices as that attempts are made, 
through meat price variations, to influence the consumers. 
The necessity for this arises because of short-term fluctua­
tions - from week to week and month to month - in the number 
of livestock supplied for slaughter. In the short-run this 
supply is not influenced by the current actions of the packers, 
the retailers or the consumers. It is a function of the deci­
sions made by the thousands of livestock producers; decisions 
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made not so much under the influence of current circumstances 
as under the influence of conditions some months in the past 
and of prior expectations of current conditions (14). Thus 
the primary influences causing within-year variations in fat 
cattle prices emanate from the supply side. The role of the 
meat packers per se, and likewise of the retailing and con­
suming groups is negligible. It is the farmers who "deal the 
cards". Given the deal, the packers, retailers and consumers 
have to play accordingly. 
The above analysis shows that, strictly speaking, pro­
ducers of other types of livestock, as well as those producing 
fat cattle, affect fat cattle prices. Hence they influence 
the payoffs facing the farmer in his feeder cattle decision 
problem. None the less, in the short-run, the major influence 
on fat cattle prices comes from the supply of fat cattle. 
Account must be taken of this feature of the situation. How­
ever, following Beresford (7, pp. 324-329), no consideration 
will be made of the role of the producers of other types of 
livestock in our specification of the model. Their role is 
ancillary to that of the feeder fatteners. Also, we are 
considering the feeder cattle pre-purchase decision problem. 
This problem is faced from four to l4 months prior to the time 
when the fat cattle will be sold. The farmer therefore has 
ample time to adjust his feeding program to the expected ef­
fects of the producers of other types of livestock. Such 
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adjustments could involve any of the selling specifications -
weight, quality and date of sale - of the program(s). Given 
human capabilities, this seems a reasonable approach to the 
decision problem at the pre-purchase stage. Hildreth and 
Jarrett (34, p. 105) have suggested that such behavior does 
occur. 
Specifying the model in such fashion, it is the ag­
gregated choices of the other farmers considering a feeder 
cattle enterprise and of the feeder cattle raisers that deter­
mine Nature's strategy. Countenance must also be taken of 
the weather. It plays an important role through its effect 
on feed production, both grain and roughage. This has been 
shown by Cox, Eisenach and Mitchell (15, p. 9) and Kohls and 
Paarlberg (44, p. 15). The former found that 76 per cent of 
the year to year variation in the number of cattle on feed 
could be explained in terms of corn production; a variable 
largely determined in the short-run, as Fox (24, pp. 34 and 
37) has stressed, by the weather. 
The set S of possible states of Nature thus consists of 
all possible combinations over the ranges of the aggregative 
manuevers which might be followed by the feeder raisers in 
aggregate, all the other beef feeders taken in toto and the 
weather. Obviously, Nature's strategy selection will affect 
the individual decision maker but not vice versa. 
Our model postulates that the decision maker partitions 
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this set S into subsets Sj, each such subset being considered 
as a single broad alternative. The actual form of this parti­
tioning will depend on the decision maker. The practical 
necessity for such a simplification of the problem is obvious, 
for S is an infinite set since climatic effects may occur over 
some continuous range. 
The decisionmaker's alternatives 
Some mention has already been made of the alternative 
acts available to the decision maker. The feeder cattle 
program may vary in terms of the age and sex of the cattle 
bought, their purchase weight, quality and date, the feed 
program followed, the length of the fattening period or sell­
ing weight of the cattle and their quality when sold. The 
set A of alternatives available to the decision maker is the 
set of all possible combinations of these variables, each 
taken over its range of possible values. The set A is there­
fore of infinite order, some of the listed variables being 
continuous. Weight and age at purchase and weight and age at 
sale are such variables. Hence the necessity for simplifying 
this set is easy to see. For instance, consider one of the 
decision variables - say purchase weight. To discriminate 
between programs on the basis of a one pound difference in 
the average purchase weight of the cattle involved, ceteris 
paribus, would be meaningless. Such a small difference does 
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not matter. Even if it had some significance, it would lead 
to an immense number of alternatives. The result would be a 
choice problem beyond human capabilities. At the other ex­
treme, the comparison of programs without regard to purchase 
weight would mean neglecting an important factor. 
Some compromise grouping of the possible alternatives 
under each decision factor is warranted. Such a simplifying 
procedure would lead to the set of broad alternatives whose 
general element is designated by A^. This set of broad 
alternatives perceived by the decision maker will vary from 
individual to individual. However, it might be expected to 
be a set of alternatives with practical significance, being 
finite and containing feeder programs in the form and with 
the implicit range of variation usually found in common 
reference to the feeder enterprise. 
O 
Some subset, which we designate A , of this set of broad 
alternatives will be considered by the farmer in his planning 
for the forthcoming production period. This subset may be 
delimited by the farmer on the basis of habit. More rational 
ly, it might be based on some detailed longer-run assessment 
of the situation in terms of trends in consumer demand, the 




The model stipulates that the considered acts, A^, will 
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be appraised in relation to the broad alternatives, S.., avail­
able to Nature. This appraisal will be based upon the payoff 
O 
element a^ relevant to each act A^ and state of Nature S,-. 
For a rational analysis of the problem, these payoff elements 
must be comparable. This could be achieved in the present 
context by considering as payoffs the expected annual net per 
cent return accruing to an investment in each of the con­
sidered acts. This return is determined by the expected 
price of feeder cattle, the estimated cost of fattening the 
cattle and the expected price of fat cattle. Account must 
also be taken of the length of the feeding program and of 
alternative investment of the feeder enterprise capital when 
it is not invested in feeder cattle. The method of combining 
these variables so as to derive comparable payoffs is de­
scribed in Appendix E. 
Since cattle buying and selling prices and fattening 
costs vary over the possible states of Nature, the payoffs 
will, in general, vary over the payoff matrix. They will also 
differ from one decision maker to another due to varying 
specifications of the alternatives considered and of Nature's 
possible states; and because expectations will vary from one 
individual to another. 
Uncertainty Implications of the Specified Model 
For all practical purposes, the group of feeder cattle 
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fatteners and the feeder raiser group both operate under free 
competition. As one analysis of these livestock markets 
describes the situation (35» p. 3): 
Price differences, except those caused by 
freight differentials and various marketing costs, 
do not last long. This is true of terminal as 
well as local markets. If one market becomes 
much higher than the other, it attracts more live­
stock and the price falls to the general level; if 
the price at one market works substantially lower 
than surrounding markets, receipts will drop off 
and prices go up. 
This price behavior, combined with the fact that the 
individual feeder raiser or fattener normally has no signif­
icant influence upon the market price (19, p. 344, 63, p. 5), 
indicates that the buying and selling of cattle occur under 
conditions of free competition. Hence, by the implications 
of the general model we have constructed and shown to be 
capable of specification in terms of the feeder cattle deci­
sion problem, the decision problem within the feeder cattle 
enterprise is a problem under absolute uncertainty. 
The Bole of Outlook Information 
There is, however, one aspect of the beef feeder decision 
problem that has not been mentioned so far. To wit, the role 
played by outlook information. The general model we have 
constructed makes no provision for such information - for two 
reasons. Firstly, such information is generally not freely 
available. Agriculture is an exception in this regard, the 
68 
provision of such information being undertaken by public 
agencies such as the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the 
Land Grant Colleges. Secondly, such information may itself 
lead to uncertainty if sufficient individuals accept the 
information at its face value (27)• It is noteworthy that 
this outlook information is couched in aggregate terms - an 
implicit recognition of the importance of the aggregated 
choices of the individual decision makers. 
So far as Mid-Western feeder raisers are concerned, the 
primary sources of cattle outlook information are two publica­
tions of the U. S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural 
Marketing Service (84, 85) and one of the Extension Service 
of Iowa State College (38). The information contained in 
these publications is made available to farmers through a 
variety of media - newspapers, farm journals, radio, televi­
sion and agricultural consultants. It would be difficult for 
a farmer to avoid all contact with such information. This 
being so, an important question relevant to our model is 
raised. Namely, to what extent does such information negate 
the implication of the model that absolute uncertainty pre­
vails in the prepurchase decision problem within the feeder 
cattle enterprise? The answer to this question involves 
empirical data. It will therefore be considered conjointly 
in the next section with other data pertinent to an assessment 
of the model. 
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It remains now to assess the normative model, attempting 
to see if it may have any descriptive value. In other words, 
do farmers approach the decision problem within the feeder 
cattle enterprise in some fashion akin to the model we have 
outlined? 
Assessment of the Model 
In making this appraisal we will use data collected from 
the population of 77 farmers described in Chapter VI and Ap­
pendix A. Since the group of farmers questioned constitute 
the whole population, statistical analysis as normally applied 
to sample data is not necessary. In so far as conclusions 
can be made about the population, they can be made directly 
from tabulations of the data. In this way we will now con­
sider the evidence relevant to the hypothesis that our norma­
tive model has descriptive value. 
Discernment of alternative acts 
No attempt was made to ascertain the farmer's cognizance 
of the infinite set A of all possible feeder programs. It 
was obvious that all thought in terms of much broader alter­
natives than those that would constitute this set. Accord­
ingly, the farmers' discernment of alternative acts was first 
considered systematically at the level of the broad alter­
natives, A^. These are the alternatives that constitute a 
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partitioning of the set A. 
Theoretically, this partitioning might be approached in 
two ways: in terms of the overall programs or by way of the 
attributes specifying each program. As would be expected, 
preliminary discussion during the first stage survey indicated 
that the program by program approach was impractical. The 
set of discerned alternatives is too large to be enumerated 
verbatim. The approach through the decision variables - age 
type of cattle, purchase weight, date and quality, feed 
program and selling weight, date and quality - was therefore 
adopted. The problem is at what levels of the various deci­
sion variables does a farmer discern one program as being 
distinct from another? In what fashion are the decision 
variables stratified, if at all? 
In varying degrees, the farmers did stratify the decision 
variables ; the typical groupings made for each decision factor 
are shown in Table 3. Purchase weight, for example, was 
commonly grouped by 50 pound intervals so that the average 
farmer distinguished five steer calves programs with respect 
to the average purchase weight of the calves. While some 
farmers made finer distinctions and some broader ones, espe­
cially in relation to quality and feed program alternatives, 
the pattern of simplification is clear. No farmer's discern­
ment of alternatives was so different from the general assess­
ment shown in Table 3 as to be worthy of comment. Moreover, 
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Table 3* Farmers discernment of alternatives within the 
feeder cattle enterprise 
Decision factor Commonly discerned alternatives No. of 




Age type steer calves, heifer calves, 4 
yearlings, two-year olds 
Purchase weight by increments of 50 lb. 
steer calves: 300 - 550 lb. 5 
heifer calves:300 - 500 lb. 4 
yearlings : 550 - 750 lb. 4 
two-year olds:800 -1000 lb. 4 
Purchase quality medium, good, choice, fancy 4 
Purchase date by months 5 
Fattening period by months 
steer calves: 8 - l4 months 6 
heifer calves:7 - 12 months 6 
yearlings : 6 - 11 months 5 
two-year olds:3 - 7 months 5 
Feed program dry lot 2 
pasture 1 
Selling quality good, choice, high choice, prime 4 
no farmer appeared to have difficulty in understanding the 
questions relevant to this discernment of alternatives. This 
is taken as evidence that the noted levels of stratification 
are indicative of the average farmer's train of thought. 
The pattern of simplification exhibited by the data of 
Table 3 shows close correspondence to that typically used in 
newspaper and other farmer oriented reportings of the cattle 
market. Perhaps the farmers were merely reiterating these 
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oft used distinctions. If so, it would not matter; this would 
merely enhance the evidence that the set A is partitioned into 
some more practical and simpler set of alternatives as postu­
lated by our model. 
However, even with the level of stratification indicated 
in Table 3, the set of all possible combinations among the 
decision factors is unmanageable. Indeed, from Table 3 it 
should be possible to specify 22,560 alternative feeder cattle 
programs that could be distinguished by the typical farmer 
interviewed. Obviously no farmer could consider so many 
alternatives in planning his feeder enterprise. Although he 
could discern that they differed, it would be impossible for 
a farmer to evaluate so many possibilities. 
The evidence gathered indicates that this set of dis­
cernible alternatives is further reduced by two processes. 
Firstly, a longer run decision appears to be made (sometimes 
by default) as to which of these alternatives will be consid­
ered over the shorter run of a few years. Although no attempt 
was made to study this longer run decision, farmer comments 
indicated that it is greatly influenced by the farmer's risk 
feelings, experience, and resource limitations. Thus quite a 
few farmers prompted that they never considered two-year old 
feeder cattle because they were too risky. Others commented 
that they considered only calves because they were generally 
sure of at least getting their capital back from such an in­
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vestment. The second method of reducing the number of alter­
natives to be considered consisted of a further broadening of 
the strata relevant to some of the decision variables. This 
applied especially to those factors relating to the selling 
specifications of the program. 
That these processes were carried out by the farmers was 
evidenced by their responses to the question: In planning your 
feeder cattle enterprise, what alternative feeder programs do 
you normally give consideration to? 
These possible programs were specified in terms of the 
age type of feeders bought, their quality, weight and month(s) 
of purchase, the feed program to be followed and their grade, 
weight and month(s) of sale. The specific programs nominated 
by each farmer are listed in Appendix C. So far as we are 
concerned at this juncture, the essential feature of these 
responses is the number of alternative programs mentioned by 
each farmer and the level of stratification exhibited in these 
alternatives. 
Consider first the number of distinct alternatives men­
tioned by each respondent. Since these alternatives consti­
tute the set A° of considered acts, their number is the order 
of A°. Table 4 gives, in frequency distribution form, the 
order of A for each of the 77 farmers. 
While the information collated in Table 3 indicates every 
farmer realized that there was an extremely large number of 
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Table 4. Frequency distribution of number of pre-purchase 
alternatives considered by farmers 













alternatives, Table 4 shows that only four per cent considered 
more than five alternatives in the short-run. For the 17 per 
cent who had only a single program in mind, the short-run 
prepurchase decision problem was trivial. Their selection was 
habitual. The modal number of alternatives considered was 
two, 43 per cent of the farmers considering only a pair of 
alternatives. Compared to the order of the average discerned 
parent set implicit in the data of Table 3> it is obvious that 
Q 
the subsets A classified in Table 4 are remarkably small. 
Table 5 shows the extent to which the quality, weight and 
date of buying and selling were broadened by the farmers in 





Ranges in quality, weight and date of buying and 




Per cent of considered 
alternatives falling in 
each range 
Buying Selling 
Quality single grade 80.5 82.9 
two grades 19.5 17.1 
Weight zero 73-6 35.6 
50 lb. 9.8 7.8 
100 lb. 15.1 46.8 
150 lb. 0.5 4.4 
200 lb. 1.0 4.4 
250 lb. 0.0 1.0 
Date 1 month 61.4 41.9 
2 months 21.5 30.2 
3 months 13.2 24.4 
4 months 2.4 3.5 
5 months 1.5 0.0 
variable is not referred to explicitly in the table. However, 
a range in the specification of weight, quality or date im­
plies a range in the feed program. 
Perusal of Table 5 indicates that weight and date of 
buying and selling were most frequently broadened, especially 
in specifying the selling characteristics of a program. Seem­
ingly, the farmers felt less sure about the selling environ­
ment than about the buying environment. In consequence, they 
made their considered alternatives more flexible in terms of 
selling than of buying characteristics. Overall, 205 con­
sidered acts were nominated. The following figures show the 
percentage of these considered programs that contained a 
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broadening of at least one, two or three of the buying and 
selling decision factors listed in Table 3' 
No. of decision Buying Selling 
factors broadened factor factor 
per cent per cent 
At least one 57 80 
At least two 23 48 
At least three 3 9 
Of the 77 farmers, 70 specified a range of some decision 
variable in at least one of their considered alternatives. 
Fifty-six broadened at least one variable in each of their 
considered alternatives. There is therefore abundant evidence 
that the farmers simplified their decision problem, not only 
by abstracting some small number of discerned alternatives, 
but also by amalgamating a number of these alternatives in 
terms of the individual decision factors. 
To gain some indication of the reliability of the farmers' 
O 
statements of the composition of the set A of considered 
acts, the alternatives mentioned were checked against a pre­
vious statement by each farmer of his plans for the current 
season. In only one case out of the 77 did the current plan 
include a program not specified in the subset of short-run 
alternatives. Further inquiry indicated that this plan en­
tailed a prior commitment and was, in the current situation, 
a forced decision. 
Thus in terms of the way in which the farmers discerned 
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and reacted to the acts available to them, they did so in a 
manner completely in agreement with that postulated by our 
normative model. At least in this regard, the model has 
descriptive value. Simon's hypothesis has been strongly 
substantiated. Our real-world decision makers did simplify a 
complex range of possible acts to a degree compatible with 
their capabilities. 
What of the other aspect of our model, that of the states 
of Nature? 
Discernment of Nature's alternatives 
In this regard, the first question to be considered is 
the extent to which the farmers conceived of Nature's strat­
egies as being determined by the aggregative actions of all 
other beef feeders, the feeder raiser group and the weather. 
All of the 77 farmers recognized the weather as an 
important influence. As regards the feeder raisers and other 
farmers fattening feeder cattle, the farmers' thoughts are 
presented in Table 6. This table shows the various ways in 
which the farmers conceived the prepurchase situation in terms 
of these other entrepreneurs as opponents in what might be 
called the beef feeder game. Each category of the table is 
exclusive. Summarization indicates that 71 of the farmers 
had some conception of an opposition: 59 in a form involving 
some grouping and 12 in terms of individuals. The influence 
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Table 6. Farmers' conception of their opponents in the 
beef feeding game 
Conception of opponents in addition to No. of 
the weather farmers 
No conception 6 
All other beef feeders individually 9 
All other beef feeders as a group 7*' 
Meat packers as a coalition 4 
Meat packers as a coalition sometimes 2 
Meat packers as a coalition within markets 3 
Feeder raisers as a group 2 
All other feeders individually, feeder raisers as 
a group 2 
All other feeders as a group, feeder raisers as 
a group 3 * 
Meat packers as a coalition within markets, feeder 
raisers as a group 1* 
All other feeders individually, packers individually 3 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition 
sometimes 6 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition 
within markets 3 
All other feeders grouped, packers individually 1* 
All other feeders grouped, packers grouped 3* 
All other feeders grouped, packers grouped sometimes 3* 
All other feeders grouped, packers grouped 
within markets 3* 
All other feeders individually, packers individually, 
feeder raisers grouped 2 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition, 
feeder raisers grouped 1 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition 
sometimes, feeder raisers grouped 3 
All other feeders grouped, packers individually, 
feeder raisers grouped 2* 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition, 
feeder raisers grouped 4* 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition 
sometimes, feeder raisers grouped 2* 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition 
within markets, feeder raisers grouped 2* 
Total 77 
An asterisk is used to denote those farmers who had a 
conception of the situation not very different from our 
specification of the theoretical model. 
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of other feeders in some fashion was recognized by 59 of the 
farmers ; of meat packers by 48; and of the feeder raisers by 
24 of the farmers. Not shown in Table 6 is the fact that one 
farmer mentioned the consumer group as a segment of his op­
position. Another specified all livestock producers as an 
opponent. This farmer is included among the three who may be 
said to have visualized the situation exactly in terms of the 
theoretical model as we have specified it. That is, with a 
combination of the weather, a feeder raiser group and a group 
of all other beef feeders constituting the basic determinants 
of Nature's possible states. With some degree of subjectivity, 
31 of the farmers had pictures of the situation approaching 
the normative model rather closely. These farmers are in­
dicated by an asterisk in Table 6. 
The data of Table 6 were obtained during the second stage 
survey by letting the farmers read the questions numbered 
VIII: 1-4 of Schedule B as shown in Appendix B. They were 
then asked for their opinions. Among these questions, there 
is no mention of feeder raisers. This is a purposeful omis­
sion, designed to provide a check on the farmers' responses. 
If the farmer did not mention the feeder raisers, he was asked 
about them after he had answered the listed questions. Nine­
teen farmers mentioned feeder raisers on their own initiative. 
An additional five admitted their influence when questioned 
specifically on their role. It would seem that the data 
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gathered are fairly reliable. 
To gain some idea of how operational these concepts of 
an opponent might be, and as an additional check on the 
original answers, the farmers were later asked an open-ended 
question as to which factors were most important in determin­
ing the type of feeder program they followed. As this was 
done in the third-stage survey, it is unlikely that answers 
were biased by memories of responses given to the related 
questions of the second stage survey. The data are tabulated 
in Table 7» It shows the frequency with which each of the 
listed factors was mentioned either as a primary or secondary 
determinant of choice. Fifty-four farmers mentioned only a 
single factor; 23 nominating two factors. It is noteworthy 
that no farmer mentioned any other specific farmer as influ­
encing his choice. It would seem that no farmer played the 
role of a leader among the population. 
Nineteen of the farmers placed major emphasis on some 
aspect of their feed supply, the primary short-run determinant 
of which is the weather. Some aspect of expected cattle 
prices, either buying or selling, was given primary consider­
ation by 28 of the farmers. One nominated the purchases made 
by other farmers with feeder programs. These responses are 
quite compatible with our conception of Nature since the main 
determinant of cattle buying and selling prices is the ag­
gregate actions of the feeder raisers and the other farmers 
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Table 7» Factors nominated by farmers as influencing their 
choice of programs within their feeder cattle 
enterprise 








Expected personal supply of grain 
and roughage 10 4 
Expected personal supply of grain 1 0 
Expected personal supply of roughage 8 4 
Expected buying price of feeder cattle 14 3 
Expected buying and selling prices 
of cattle 9 2 
Expected selling price of fat cattle 5 2 
Expected corn price 0 1 
Feeder cattle purchases of other farmers i 1 
Amount of risk involved 21 6 
Force of habit 8 0 
Total 77 23 
who buy feeders. 
There were eight farmers who said they selected their 
programs on some habitual basis. Reference to their considered 
alternatives indicated that two of these farmers considered 
only a single feeder program while five considered two alter­
natives. A check of these stated alternatives against the 
history of their feeder enterprise over the prior two years 
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and their current plans showed that six of them did indeed 
have a common selection over the three years. For the other 
two a habitual selection did not appear to have taken place. 
It seems most likely that these eight farmers did not think 
in terms of an opponent, at least in the short-run. 
Of the 21 respondents who mentioned risk as a major in­
fluence on their choice, seven considered only a single alter­
native, another seven two alternatives and the remaining seven 
at least three possible programs. Excluding those with a 
single alternative, four considered only calf programs, seven 
gave some consideration to yearlings and three included two-
year old cattle as one of their alternatives. There is abun­
dant evidence that calves are the least risky of feeder pro­
grams and two-year olds most risky (7, p. 327, 49, p. 5)• It 
thus appears that those 10 farmers mentioning risk who con­
sidered more than one alternative and included a yearling or 
a two-year old program among these alternatives, did not mean 
to imply that they considered only less risky alternatives. 
Rather, they considered their alternatives in the light of the 
risk associated with each alternative. This was also indicated 
by the actual past and present selections made by these 10 
farmers. They were quite diverse. Hence, these farmers may 
have been acting in accordance with our hypothesis. Nature 
may have played some part in their considerations. 
Tallying these results, we see that only 19 of the 77 
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farmers responded to the open-ended question on factors in­
fluencing their feeder choice by mentioning a primary deter­
minant incompatible with the concept of Nature. These were 
the eight mentioning habit or tradition and 11 of those men­
tioning risk. For the remaining 58, it seems Nature probably 
did play some role; although perhaps not exactly as we have 
postulated. If account is taken of the secondary factors 
mentioned by some of the farmers, it would appear that only 
nine farmers did not place emphasis on some aspect of Nature. 
To what extent did the responses tabulated in Table 6 
and those shown in Table 7 correspond? Our main concern is 
with those farmers marked by an asterisk in Table 6. It is 
they who came closest to the conception of the situation 
postulated by the model. Of these 31 farmers, only one was 
not among the 58 who mentioned a primary choice influencing 
factor compatible with our model. 
Equivalently, included among the 46 farmers not marked 
by an asterisk in Table 6 were eighteen of the nineteen 
farmers who mentioned, as the primary influence on their feeder 
program choice, a factor apparently incompatible with the 
theoretical concept of Nature. There are thus 28 farmers 
whose response to the open-ended question on choice was 
compatible with the model while their formalized answers, as 
tabulated in Table 6, were not. The most reasonable explana­
tion for this discrepancy is probably that these farmers did 
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not answer the formal questions correctly in terms of their 
normal way of thinking about the problem. Certainly the 
majority of the farmers had not previously thought explicitly 
in terms of an opponent. This was indicated by many of the 
side comments on the formal questions. At the same time, it 
was obvious that many of the farmers thought and acted in­
tuitively in terms of an opponent. In a sense, they were at 
war but did not wish to make a declaration of war. 
Summarizing these comments on the data of Tables 6 and 
7, it appears that at least 30 and perhaps as many as 58 of 
the 77 farmers had conceptions of an opponent in fair agree­
ment with the model. A more definite statement would be 
desirable but, given the data, not warranted. 
Discernment of states of Nature and associated payoffs 
Nothing has been said, so far, of the payoffs involved 
in the model; nor of the postulated discrete states of Nature. 
The farmer's appreciation and use of these concepts is ob­
viously dependent upon his thinking in terms akin to the model. 
In attempting to assess farmer use of the payoff and 
state of Nature concepts, an oblique method of questioning 
was pursued. For each respondent, a game against Nature was 
constructed. This was done by way of question number IX:2 of 
Schedule B as shown in Appendix B. For this decision problem, 
each farmer's set of considered alternatives was taken as his 
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available acts. Four broad states of Nature were delimited. 
These consisted of the four combinations possible from two 
types of weather - good and bad in terms of grain production -
and two levels of aggregate activity on the part of other 
farmers with feeders - mainly short feeding or mainly long 
feeding. Prior informal questioning indicated that the in­
clusion of all the postulated components of Nature would make 
the problem too complicated. Hence the feeder raisers were 
specified as behaving in an "average or normal fashion". This 
may not sound very meaningful to the reader. However, it was 
sufficiently meaningful to the farmers to enable construction 
of the game against Nature. Only two farmers quibbled over 
the meaning of the words "average or normal". 
For each of his available acts, the farmer was asked his 
expectation of cattle buying and selling prices under each of 
Nature's four possible states. 
Two of the farmers found this formulation of the decision 
problem incomprehensible. Both of them were among the six 
farmers who are listed in Table 6 as having no formal concep­
tion of an opposition. The concepts involved assuredly meant 
nothing to them. The 75 farmers who did comprehend were asked 
if they normally considered their pre-purchase alternatives 
in some such way with payoffs varying according to the condi­
tions that might prevail. Twenty-four said that they did. 
In each of these cases, however, further questioning indicated 
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that the states of Nature involved in such considerations were 
very broad. Two of these farmers apparently considered four 
states of Nature, more or less in line with those postulated 
in the constructed game. One of these farmers considered two 
alternative acts, the other three. All of the other 22 farmers 
specified only two states of Nature. Nine of these pairs of 
states were based on the possible feed situation, 11 on the 
possible aggregative buying actions of other feeder fatteners, 
two on the possible cattle feeding programs of all other 
farmers and one on consumer demand for meat. Nineteen of 
these 24 farmers were included among the 31 marked with an 
asterisk in Table 6. All 24 were among the 58 farmers who 
mentioned as a primary influence on their choice a factor 
compatible with the theoretical formulation of Nature. 
Fifty-three farmers apparently did not follow some 
specific conception of multiple states of Nature. It would 
seem that they made their deliberations in terms of a single 
state of Nature - perhaps with payoffs formulated as expected 
values or perhaps, as Tintner (80) has suggested, making their 
decision in terms of higher moments of the payoffs' probability 
distributions1. 
As a general assessment of the model, the farmers were 
asked whether they considered the constructed representation 
"'"By necessity, these probability distributions would be 
subjective. 
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of the pre-purchase decision problem to be a good, fair or 
poor representation of the problem. The responses were as 
follows : 
good î 38 
fair : 26 
poor : 13 
This rating is a subjective one. None the less, the 
figures indicate that the majority of the farmers considered 
the model reasonable in construction. Such a reaction is 
typical. As Luce and Raiffa (48, p. 292) note, once a norma­
tive mode of decision making has been pointed out to decision 
makers they will usually recognize it as such; often tending 
to consider the problem in such a manner in the future. It 
is interesting that all of the 31 farmers whose stated formal 
conception of an opposition approached that postulated by the 
model were included among the 64 who thought the constructed 
model either good or fair. In fact, 26 of them said it was 
good. Twelve of the 13 who said poor belonged to the group 
of 19 farmers who nominated as a primary influence on their 
choice a factor apparently incompatible with the model's con­
ception of Nature. 
The effect of outlook information 
For a farmer considering feeder cattle as a possible 
enterprise, the crucial period for making plans and purchases 
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is from July to December. During these months, outlook fore­
casts of feeder and fat cattle market conditions during the 
coming season are available. These predictions, emanating 
from official sources, are discussed and analyzed in many of 
the communication media used by farmers. Alternatively, by 
attending sales the farmer may make his own appraisal of the 
trend of events in determining what we have called Nature's 
strategy. 
The fact that outlook information is available tends to 
overshadow the implication of our model that uncertainty 
exists. If the information were pertinent and accurate, and 
the forecasts made turned out to be correct, uncertainty would 
not prevail. However, such is not the case. One reason for 
this is a practical one. In principle, correct forecasts can 
be made. It is not necessarily true that predictions will be 
upset by reactions to the predictions. This has been shown 
by Grunberg and Modigliani (27) and Simon (75» pp. 79-87) and 
studied extensively by Theil (78, pp. 379-410). However, al­
lowance for these reactions can only be made if a continuous 
function describing the reaction of those concerned to a 
published prediction or forecast is available. Such a func­
tion is not available with respect to outlook forecasts rele­
vant to the feeder and fat cattle markets1. Evidence presented 
^Kutish, F. Department of Economics and Sociology, Iowa 
State College, Ames, Iowa. Outlook forecasts for cattle. 
Private communication. 1958. 
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below shows that farmers do react to outlook forecasts. 
Therefore, such forecasts, in so far as they are quantified 
rather than simply directional, can only be correct by co­
incidence. Moreover, even directional forecasts will be upset 
if reaction to the forecast is strong enough. 
There is little evidence available as to the reaction of 
Mid-Western cattle feeders to outlook information and fore­
casts. Heer (32) in 1953 studied the directional accuracy of 
forecasts made in the Iowa Farm Outlook Letter (38) over the 
three previous years. This publication is a primary source 
of the outlook information that is made available to cattle 
feeders in Iowa. Beer's study indicated that 73 per cent of 
the predictions made therein about the beef cattle market were 
correct. However, utilizing Heer's data, it appears that of 
predictions made for cattle in the crucial pre-purchase period 
of the year from July to September inclusive, only 55 per cent 
were correct. For June to September inclusive, the figure 
was 62 per cent. It is noteworthy that the greatest reaction 
to published forecasts probably occurs during these months. 
Such reaction was probably a significant factor causing the 
percentage of successful predictions to decline during this 
planning and purchasing period. Moreover, it is likely that 
reactions to such forecasts have become stronger since 1953 -
even to the extent that some farmers have become so subtle 
as to react to a forecast in the opposite direction to what 
would be expected. That this is so was evidenced by data 
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collected in this study. 
Before considering these data, an important feature of 
the published forecasts must be noted. It is that the majority 
of forecasts are not pertinent in terms of the decision prob­
lem within the feeder cattle enterprise. They do not, in 
general, consider a particular type of cattle versus another 
type. Among all the predictions studied by Heer (32, pp. 20-
38), there is not one out of the 65 relevant to cattle that 
is couched in terms of specific types of cattle. Cattle are 
always referred to either as feeder cattle or fat cattle. 
Such information, if correct, is of use in deciding between 
the feeder cattle enterprise and other enterprises ; for deci­
sions within the feeder cattle enterprise it is practically 
useless. On these grounds alone it could be argued that 
available outlook information does not negate the implication 
of our model that absolute uncertainty prevails in the situa­
tion studied. The lack of specification in the forecasts, 
taken together with the data showing the lack of success in 
prediction during the feeder cattle planning and purchasing 
period, argues very strongly for the conclusion that absolute 
uncertainty does prevail. 
So far as the descriptive value of the model is concerned, 
the important point is whether the farmers considered such 
information to be useful and whether they used it. To this 
end the farmers were asked if, prior to making their own deci­
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sion, they actively sought information on the kinds of feeders 
already bought by other farmers or that they appeared in­
terested in buying. Thirty-six of the farmers said they did, 
*+l saying no. These responses can be checked against the 
farmer's statement of his conception of the role of the other 
farmers with feeders as given in Table 6. Those who did seek 
such information should tend to consider other farmers with 
feeders as a group. The extent to which this was so is shown 
in Table 8. 
Table 8. Correspondence between farmers' seeking of informa­
tion and their conception of other farmers with 
feeders 
Conception of Number of farmers 
other farmers Seeking information Not seeking information 
with feeders 
As a group 18 12 
As individuals 13 16 
Not mentioned 5 13 
Total 36 bl 
Half of those who sought information considered other 
farmers with feeders as a group. This contrasts with the 
figure of approximately one third for those who did not seek 
information. As would be hoped, the majority of the respond­
ents who did not mention other farmers with feeders as being 
important were among the group who did not seek information. 
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However, the correspondence between the two sets of data is 
not all that one would desire. Perhaps some of the farmers 
said they sought information in order to show themselves in 
a favorable light. Alternatively, some may not have under­
stood the implications of their seeking information with re­
gard to their conception of an opposition. 
Outlook information was thought to be helpful in their 
pre-purchase planning by 29 of the farmers. Of the remainder, 
21 thought it harmful and 27 thought it had no effect either 
way. All 29 of those who thought outlook information helpful 
were among the 36 who said they actively sought such informa­
tion. That 48 of the 77 farmers did not consider the informa­
tion to be helpful is further evidence that outlook informa­
tion is of little use in combating the uncertainty surrounding 
the pre-purchase decision problem in the feeder enterprise. 
Indeed, two of the farmers who said the outlook predictions 
were helpful commented that this was because they then knew 
it would be better to do the opposite! In effect, they 
thought outlook information, taken at its face value, to be 
harmful. They must therefore be classed with the 21 farmers 
who said outlook information was harmful. These 21 farmers 
were asked why they thought this was so. The reason given 
by 13 of them was that too many farmers followed the predic­
tion, causing it to be wrong. Four said that the forecasts 
were based on inaccurate information. The remaining four 
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based their opinion on historical grounds : they had followed 
a forecast that was unsuccessful. 
Summary 
This chapter was aimed at assessing the descriptive value 
of the postulated normative model of the production decision 
problem facing an entrepreneur operating under free competi­
tion. To this end, data pertinent to the pre-purchase deci­
sion problem within the feeder cattle enterprise were examined. 
These data related to a population of 77 farmers. 
Figure 1 summarizes the data by way of a tree diagram. 
Three types of branches may be distinguished in terms of 
agreement with the overall set of postulates of the model. 
In Figure 1, the farmers are stratified at five levels. 
The first relates to the hypothesis that the farmers simplify 
the decision problem by selecting for consideration some small 
number of acts from all those that are available. As the tree 
shows, all the farmers did carry out this simplification. 
The second level of stratification is based on the farmers' 
statements of their conception of an opposition. For 31 of 
the farmers, this statement was in close agreement with the 
model although only three gave answers in exact agreement with 
the model. The third level of stratification hinges on the 
farmers responses to an open-ended question asking what was 
the primary factor influencing their choice between alterna-
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Figure 1. Classification of farmers in terms of agreement 
with major aspects of the postulated model 
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tive feeder cattle programs. These responses were classified 
on the basis of whether or not the specified factor was 
compatible with the model. The fourth level of stratification 
is based on the farmers' statements as to whether or not they 
considered their alternative acts in terms of payoffs varying 
according to the conditions that might prevail. Those who 
said yes were, at least in this regard, acting in agreement 
with the model. The last stratification level is based on 
the farmer's assessment of outlook information taken on its 
face value, as being helpful or not helpful. Those who 
thought such information of no direct help were in agreement 
with the model. 
The tree shows that of the 77 farmers, 12 could be said 
fairly certainly to consider the decision problem in the 
fashion postulated by the model. For another three, the model 
was probably descriptively correct. Some of the remaining 62 
farmers may have considered the problem in the manner postu­
lated by the model but it is unlikely. In its entirety the 
model therefore has descriptive value for only a small propor­
tion of the population examined. 
None the less, a large proportion of the farmers did ap­
parently behave in partial agreement with the model. Thus 
all 77 farmers considered a simplified set of alternative 
acts; 58 specified as the primary factor influencing their 
choice a factor compatible with the model; 2k made allowances 
for payoff variations over various possible states of Nature; 
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and 50, in so far as they thought outlook information to be 
of no direct help, probably considered the decision problem 
as one involving a high degree of uncertainty. 
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VIII. ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE 
A number of theories of choice applicable to decision 
making under absolute uncertainty were presented in Chapter 
III. The mechanics of their use was illustrated by an example 
in Chapter IV. The present chapter is devoted to an empirical 
appraisal of these theories. The source and collection of 
the data to be used has been discussed in Chapter VI; it suf­
fices to point out here that the data refer to the same 
population of 77 farmers considered in our appraisal of the 
model. 
In assessing the role played by the theories, we attempt 
to answer the five questions listed below. The answers given 
to these questions will not apply to all decision makers under 
absolute uncertainty1. Strictly speaking, the answers relate 
only to the 77 individuals studied. We recognize this fact. 
However, the data will also be analyzed statistically as if 
the 77 farmers were a random sample from the super-population 
of all Corn Belt owner-operators between 30 and 50 years of 
age who had fed an average of at least 25 feeder cattle in 
Absolute uncertainty prevails when the decision maker 
has no objective knowledge of the likelihood of occurrence 
of the possible outcomes of his decision. He knows only what 
outcomes may occur. 
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each of the three feeding seasons prior to the survey"*". 
Throughout the text whenever we refer to the survey panel as 
a random sample, we will always mean a random sample from this 
super-population. In this manner, the presentation is made 
a little less cumbersome. The assumption of randomness 
relative to the super-population is an extremely strong as­
sumption. Me have no evidence to support it, the data neces­
sary to test the reliability of the assumption being unavail­
able. In consequence, we report the statistical tests based 
on this assumption with diffidence. Perhaps they will be of 
interest to the reader despite their inadequacies. 
The questions considered in this chapter are as follows, 
the first three being concerned with the descriptive value of 
the theories and the last two with their possible normative 
role. 
1. To what extent do the theories have descriptive value? 
In other words, do the farmers tend to make decisions 
under absolute uncertainty by analyses of the situa­
tion similar to those postulated by the theories? 
2. How stable is the decision maker's approach to deci-
tests based on analysis of variance and Chi-square 
tests will be the principal statistical procedures used. In 
using analysis of variance to make tests of significance, it 
will be assumed that the data fulfill the necessary assump­
tions, viz. that the various fixed effects and the error are 
additive and that the errors are noncorrelated and normally 
distributed. 
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sion making as the setting of the decision problem 
varies? 
3. So far as the theories are descriptively true, what 
characteristics of a decision maker's background tend 
to be associated with the selection of a particular 
approach to the decision problem? 
4. For those theories advanced as normative decision 
criteria, what value might they have in reducing ex 
ante resource misallocation? Equivalently, for the 
decision problems studied, do salient discrepancies 
exist between the farmers' solutions and the norma­
tive solutions? 
5. Are there noteworthy differences between the various 
normative decision criteria in the degree to which 
they reduce ex ante resource misallocation in the 
situations studied? 
Answers to these questions, so far as they can be given, 
will be based on the farmers' solutions of a number of deci­
sion problems under absolute uncertainty. These problems were 
of two types, some being completely hypothetical and some 
representing a practical problem within the feeder cattle 
enterprise. To simplify the presentation we will first con­
sider these two sets of problems separately, drawing the 
analyses together later. We begin by considering the hypo­
thetical decision problems. 
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Description of the Hypothetical Decision Problems 
These problems were based on the payoff matrix used to 
exemplify the theories in Chapter IV. For convenience, this 







A1 2,500 3,5oo 0 1,500 
A2 1,500 2,000 500 1,000 
A3 0 6,000 0 0 
a4 i,5oo 4,500 0 0 
In posing the hypothetical problems to the farmers, the 
alternative acts , A2, Ag and A^ were described simply as 
four possible annual investments ; each requiring the same 
amount of capital. The payoffs shown opposite each act were 
specified as the possible dollar net returns that might accrue 
over the investment year if that act were chosen. It was 
pointed out that for a given investment choice, the likelihood 
of receiving any particular payoff relevant to that choice 
was completely unknown; the decision maker could only be sure 
that he would receive one of the payoffs listed opposite 
whichever act he selected. 
This basic problem was posed in four "once only" contexts. 
Two of these specified that the alternative selected was to 
101 
be the only income source; the other two that a sure annual 
income of $3,000 additional to that derived from the selected 
act was also available. For each of these income situations 
the farmer was asked which act he would choose when the 
selected investment, firstly, could only be made once and, 
secondly, had to be made in each of 20 consecutive years. It 
was stipulated that Nature's strategy might vary from year to 
year over these 20 years. 
The farmers were asked to treat each problem as if it 
were a real-life decision that had to be made under their 
current circumstances. No attempt was made to specify the 
available acts as real-world alternatives. However, the net 
income figures used are not unrealistic compared to those 
commonly found throughout the survey area"1". For each solution 
nominated, the raison d'etre for that specific choice was also 
requested. 
All the farmers were owner-operators with considerable 
resources at their disposal. Also, none of the alternative 
acts could lead to absolute losses. It is therefore reason­
able to regard the one year setting of the problem as having 
only short-run effects; the 20 year setting being considered 
as having long-run repercussions on the decision maker. Thus 
Howell, H. B. Department of Economics and Sociology, 
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. Net farm incomes in Marshall 
County, Iowa. Private communication. 1957* 
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the four decision problems can be characterized as follows : 
(a) short-run with no sure income; 
(b) short-run with sure income; 
(c) long-run with no sure income; 
(d) long-run with sure income. 
Descriptive Role of the Theories of Choice: 
Hypothetical Decision Problems 
The frequencies with which each of the alternatives were 
chosen in each setting of the problem by the 77 farmers are 
listed in Table 9» For convenience, the theories of choice 
compatible with the selection of each alternative are also 
noted in the table. and A^ were the acts most frequently 
selected. With no sure income available, the majority of 
farmers chose Ag* With an additional sure income, the major­
ity chose Aj. Only when an additional sure income was avail­
able did a significant proportion of the respondents choose 
A^ or A^. 
Had the farmers made their selections in a random manner, 
a distribution pattern with approximately 20 selecting each 
act would be expected. In no case do the listed distributions 
approach such a pattern. Moreover, as Table 9 shows, there 
are quite distinct differences between the frequency patterns 
for each setting of the decision problem. Ipso facto, it is 
concluded that the farmers made their choices in an active 
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Table 9* Decision theories compatible with the selection of 
each alternative and the number of farmers select­
ing each alternative in each hypothetical decision 
problem 















no. no. no. no. 
Ai Laplace; 22°  32
b 4lc 44c 
A2 Wald; Hurwiczd; 
Simon6; Shackle; 52C 4lc 16 13 
A3 
f Hurwicz ; Shackle; 2 2 13 6 
a4 Savage; 1 2 7b 14* 
Total 77 77 77 77 
aSimon1s theory with a zero aspiration level is compatible 
with each alternative. 
^Including one of the two farmers with extremely large 
farms. 
cIncluding one of the two farmers with extremely large 
farms. 
dWith /#> 8/9. 
®With an aspiration level greater than zero. 
fWith /?<8/9. 
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way and that credence may be given to their explanations of 
these choices. Assuming the 77 farmers to be a random sample, 
Chi-square "goodness of fit" tests strongly support the 
hypothesis that the farmers' selections were purposive^. 
Relative to an equal distribution of frequencies throughout 
the cells of Table 9, the value of Chi-square for each problem 
setting is as follows: 
short-run with no sure income : 74.3; 
short-run with sure income: 34.9; 
long-run with no sure income: 32.8; 
long-run with sure income: 44.4. 
A Chi-square test for independence between the setting 
of the decision problem and the alternatives chosen, regarding 
the data matrix of Table 9 as a contingency table, also led 
to rejection of the hypothesis that the choices made were 
independent of the problem setting. The value of Chi-square 
was 75»2 with no pooling of the data and 67.4 when the 
frequencies for A^ and A^ were pooled. 
Decision procedures followed 
In all cases in which A^ was chosen, the respondents gave 
^In making these tests, the frequencies for A^, A^ and A^ 
were pooled in each of the "no other income" settings of the 
problem, as suggested by Snedecor (76, p. 30) for cases where 
some classes have frequencies of less than five. 
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as their reason that it had the highest average payoff or that 
its row total was the largest. Selection of A^ was therefore 
always based on the Laplace criterion. It was not based on 
the use of Simon's theory with a zero aspiration level; this 
was quite evident during the collection of the data. Selec­
tion of A^ was always preceded by some numerical calculations 
on the part of the respondent, either of row totals or aver­
ages. Numerical calculations by the respondent never led to 
any choice other than that of A^. 
All farmers selecting A2 indicated that they did so be­
cause it guaranteed a minimum return of $500 under all pos­
sible states of Nature. Their reasoning is in agreement with 
the Wald criterion, the Hurwicz criterion with a zero degree 
of optimism, Simon's theory and the special case of Shackle's 
theory when it is equivalent to the Wald criterion. We have 
already noted that the Hurwicz criterion with a zero level of 
optimism is equivalent to the Wald criterion. Given the 
respondents' reasoning, it seems most probable that the selec­
tion of A2 was generally based on a Wald maximin approach or 
the use of Simon's theory with a non-zero aspiration level, 
rather than on the special cases of the Shackle and Hurwicz 
theories. Moreover, in situations where the decision maker's 
aspiration level exceeds or equals the maximum minimum payoff, 
Simon's theory is equivalent to the Wald criterion. There is 
thus only a small chance of error in attributing the selection 
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of A2 to a Wald criterion type of approach. Certainly it is 
the approach most implicit in the farmers' raison d'etre. 
All explanations given by the farmers for the selection 
of Ag emphasized a preference for gambling. In choosing A^, 
the respondents recognized its riskiness relative to the other 
alternatives but were attracted by the possibility of receiv­
ing the maximum possible payoff of $6,000. Such behavior 
rules out the Simon theory as a basis for selection of A^. A 
gambling motivation is, however, quite compatible with a 
Shackle or a Hurwicz type of approach. Perhaps the most that 
can be deduced from the reasons given for the selection of 
A^ is that its choice was probably based on some Hurwicz type 
criterion, the general form of which, as given by Radner and 
Marschak (64, p. 62), subsumes the Shackle approach when ab­
solute uncertainty prevails. 
A gambling motivation was generally given for the choice 
of A^; many of the farmers suggesting that this investment 
alternative was chosen as a compromise between the relative 
"safeness" of A^ or Ag and the "riskiness" of A^. Such 
reasoning is suggestive of the Savage regret approach although 
no farmer came close to giving an explicit statement of this 
criterion as the basis for his selection of A^. 
Overall, it appears that only the Laplace and the Wald 
criteria have widespread descriptive value in explaining the 
farmers' choice. Conversely, Shackle's claim to have formu­
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lated a general explanation of decision making must be dis­
missed. In choosing A^, a large proportion of the respondents 
made a choice incompatible with Shackle's hypothesis. 
Stability of choice 
Nothing has been said of the shifts in choice that oc­
curred as the setting of the hypothetical decision problem 
varied. Inspection of Table 9 shows that many changes in 
choice occurred ; otherwise each alternative would have been 
selected the same number of times in each of the four settings 
of the decision problem. Only a third of the farmers did not 
alter their choice as the problem's context varied. One farmer 
always chose A^, one always Ag, 11 always A^ and 13 always 
A-p It is certain that the shifts in choice that occurred are 
a function of the particular payoffs and problem settings 
specified in the hypothetical problems. In consequence, the 
changes in choice will not be discussed in full detail. Only 
the general implications of the data will be considered. Of 
these, the most important is the fact that two-thirds of the 
respondents varied their decision making approach as the con­
text of the decision problem altered. It would be interesting 
to study the pattern of these changes in approach over a range 
of assured incomes and time influences. This is not possible 
here. Our data are too limited. 
Of the changes in choice that occurred, the majority 
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related to the income setting of the problem and not the length 
of time over which the decision would be influential. To some 
extent, this is revealed by inspection of Table 9» It is 
shown far more clearly by the data of Tables 10 and 11. 
Table 10 relates to the time setting of the hypothetical 
decision problem. In it, no account is taken of the income 
Table 10. Frequency of occurrence of pairs of choices among 
the alternatives A^, Ag, Ag and A^ relative to the 
time settings of the hypothetical decision prob­
lems ; and frequency with which each alternative 












no. no. no. no. no. 
A1 57 3 1 2 63 
A2 17 51 0 0 68 
A3 2 0 7 6 15 
\ 0 0 0 8 8 
Total frequency 76 54 8 16 154 
setting of the decision problem. The table entries were 
derived by adding together the corresponding frequencies for 
each choice pair A^Aj (i = 1,2,3,4; j = 1,2,3,4) in the two 
"no sure income" settings of the problem and in the two "addi­
tional sure income" settings of the problem; A^ and A., refer­
ring to the choices made by each respondent in the short-run 
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Table 11. Frequency of occurrence of pairs of choices among 
the alternatives A^, Ag, A^ and A^ relative to the 
income settings of the hypothetical decision prob­
lems; and frequency with which each alternative 















no. no. no. no. no. 
A1 32 0 10 12 54 
h 53 29 5 6 93 
A3 0 0 4 0 4 
0 0 0 3 3 
Total frequency 85 29 19 21 154 
and long-run contexts of the problem, respectively. Since 
each farmer was asked to make two short-run and two long-run 
decisions, each respondent is recorded twice in Table 10. 
Equivalently, the table relates to twice 77 or 154 choice 
pairs. Entries on the main diagonal of the table's "A^Aj 
matrix" indicate the number of times out of 154 that the 
choice pair A^A^ (i=j) occurred. Such pairs constitute 80 
per cent of the total number of choice pairs. In other words, 
80 per cent of the solutions given by the farmers relevant to 
the time setting of the problem show no change in choice (or 
change in the decision making approach) as the time setting 
of the problem varied. Assuming the survey farmers to be a 
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random sample, the 95 per cent confidence interval for the 
percentage of choice pairs of the type A^A^ (i=j) is from 71 
to 87 per cent1. 
The frequencies of choice pairs of the type A^Aj (i£j ) 
are shown by the entries off the main diagonal of the "A^Aj 
matrix" of Table 10. Each such pair represents a shift in 
choice by a respondent between the short-run and long-run 
setting of the problem. Thirty-one such shifts in choice oc­
curred ; of these, 17 were away from A2 into A^ as the time 
influence of the decision became greater. Remembering that 
the raisons d1etre for selecting A2 generally suggested use 
of the Wald criterion while those for A^ corresponded to the 
Laplace criterion, it appears that the majority of the shifts 
in choice occasioned by the extension of the decision's time 
influence related to a change from a Wald to a Laplace ap­
proach. The converse change, indicated by the pair A^A2, oc­
curred three times. The choice pair A^A^ occurred six times, 
indicating in these cases a change from a conservative to a 
less conservative approach as the time influence of the deci­
sion lengthened. Overall, despite the conflicting tendencies 
noted, the data indicate that the farmers were least conserva­
tive in their long-run decisions; remembering, however, that 
the majority of the choice pairs indicate no change in the 
^Based on the assumption that the number of such choice 
pairs follows a binomial distribution (76, pp. 2-6). 
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respondents' decision making approach as the time setting of 
the problem varied. 
Except that it relates to the income context of the 
hypothetical decision problems and takes no account of their 
time setting, Table 11 is similar in construction to Table 10. 
Mechanically, it may be read in the same fashion as Table 10. 
Such perusal indicates that only 68 out of 15V, or 44 per 
cent, of the solutions given by the farmers relevant to the 
income setting of the problem show no change in choice (or 
change in the decision making approach) as the income setting 
of the decision problem varied. Again assuming the survey 
panel to be a random sample, the 95 per cent confidence 
interval for this estimate of 44 per cent is from 34 to 54 
per cent. The figure of 44 per cent contrasts markedly with 
the corresponding figure of 80 per cent relative to the time 
setting of the problem. Obviously, within the range of time 
and income settings specified, the respondent's decision making 
approach was generally far more responsive to variations in 
the income setting of the problem than to variations in the 
time setting. Inspection of Table 11 reveals that altogether 
there were 86 shifts in choice between the two income contexts 
of the problem; 53 of these changes were away from A^ into 
A-p implying a shift from a Wald to a Laplace approach, as 
the income uncertainty associated with the decision decreased. 
Indeed, perusal of the off-diagonal entries of Table 11 shows 
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that every change in choice was either away from A2 into A-p 
A^ or A^, or from A^ into A^ or A^ as income uncertainty de­
creased. Since the raisons d'etre given for selection of A^ 
or A^ invariably involved a gambling motivation, it is ap­
parent that every shift in choice denoted the adoption of a 
less conservative decision making approach as the income un­
certainty inherent in the problem's context declined. More­
over, comparison of the choice frequencies given in Table 9 
for similar time settings of the problem reveals that a major­
ity of the respondents changed their decision making approach 
as the income setting of the problem varied. This is in con­
trast with the situation relative to variations in the time 
influence context of the problem. As Table 9 also shows, only 
a minority of the respondents altered their approach to the 
problem as its time influence varied. 
Comparing the solutions for the long-run and short-run 
problems with no sure income available, as listed in Table 9, 
little difference in popularity between A^ and A^ is evident. 
Indeed, neither of these acts were very popular; apparently, 
with no additional sure income available, only a few of the 
farmers were prepared to gamble. However, with an additional 
sure income of $3,000 available, both Ag and A^ became far 
more popular. Also, inspection of Table 9 shows that a 
distinct difference in popularity between A^ and A^ developed 
as the period of influence of the decision varied: in the 
113 
short-run setting Ag was by far the most popular of the two; 
in the long-run context, the position was reversed1. Since 
A^ is intuitively a safer investment than Ag, it appears that 
most of those farmers who "gambled" in the sure income setting 
preferred to take greater risks in their short-run decisions 
than in their long-run decisions. This contrasts with the 
behavior of those who switched from a Wald type of approach 
to the Laplace algorithm as the time influence of the deci­
sion became greater. The latter tended to take greater risks 
in their long-run decisions. Numerically, the former group 
were more important. 
Associations between patterns of choice and selected charac­
teristics of the respondents 
The respondents were asked to solve the hypothetical de­
cision problems in terms of their current circumstances. As­
suming that they did, we now consider these solutions against 
the respondents' backgrounds ; attempting to perceive what as­
sociations exist between the patterns of choice over the four 
problems posed and some basic attributes of the respondents. 
In doing this, we will exclude those two respondents who 
operated extremely large firms relative to the other 75 
members of the population. While the age, education and num-
^Assuming the population to be a random sample, the (ad­
justed) Chi-square test value for this difference in popularity 
is 3*6. This value is significant at the six per cent level. 
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ber of dependents of these two farmers were not atypical, 
their financial attributes and the characteristics of their 
farm operation were very different. To include these two 
farmers in an analysis based on averages would accord them 
too much influence1. 
Table 12 lists the means of some characteristics of those 
farmers following each of the patterns of choice shown at the 
top of the table. Four choice patterns are delimited; in­
tuitively, they are the most meaningful of all those that 
might have been listed. For both and A^ there was a note­
worthy number of farmers who chose this single act in each 
of the four settings of the hypothetical decision problem. 
These farmers are grouped separately in the table under the 
headings of "Always A^" and "Always A^". The 13 farmers who 
always selected A^ used the Laplace criterion consistently. 
It is most likely that the 11 who always chose Ag were follow­
ing an approach of the Wald type. The remaining farmers are 
classified into two groups: those who changed their choice as 
the setting of the problem varied but always selected either 
A-j_ or Agi and those who selected either Ag or A^ at least 
once as a solution for one of the four problems posed. Ag 
and A^ are grouped together because, intuitively, they are 
the least safe of the alternative acts. Their selection, 
^he choices made by these two farmers are indicated by 
footnotes b and c of Table 9* 
Table 12. Average of selected characteristics of those farmers within each 
decision pattern group3 
Characteristic Unit Decision pattern over the four hypo- Overall 
thetical decision problems average 
Always Either Always Sometimes 
A2 A1 or AG A1 AG or A^ 
(11 (22 (13 (29 • (75 
farmers) farmers) farmers) farmers) farmers) 
Age year 45.2 40.2 42.4 42.1 42.1 
Formal education year 10.9 11.1 12.0 11.8 11.5 
Dependents no. 2.8 3.6 3.4 3-9 3.6 
Total capital 
96.8 invested $1,000 91.0 121.2 127-5 108.5 
Net worth $1,000 84.6 107.2 104.6 82.3 93.9 
Equity per cent 93.0 88.4 82.0 85.0 86.5 
Feeder cattle 
purchased* no. 77.7 115.6 121.9 115.5 111.1 
Calves per cent 62.2 44.7 59.6 39.1 47.1 
Yearlings per cent 37.8 54.8 34.4 49.6 47.1 
Two-year 
olds per cent0 0.0 0.5 6.0 11.3 5.8 
aThe two farmers with extremely large farms are excluded. 
^Cattle purchased during the period July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1957* 
cPer cent of number of feeder cattle purchased. 
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given the availability of or Ag, implies a tendency to 
gamble or at least to take risks. Conversely, A^ and Ag are, 
relative to A^ and A^, conservative alternatives. In Table 
12, these four decision patterns are tabled from left to right 
in their intuitive order of decreasing conservativeness. The 
far right column of the table lists the mean of each con­
sidered attribute for the overall group of 75 farmers. 
Assuming the survey panel to be a random sample, F tests 
based on analysis of variance (76, pp. 268-269) indicate that 
no significant differences1 exist among the means listed in 
Table 12 relative to each characteristic. None the less, the 
associations between the decision making patterns and the 
decision maker's characteristics as revealed in Table 12, are 
significant in terms of the population of 77 farmers. More­
over, as the following discussion shows, the data of Table 12 
tend to follow what might be termed an explainable - or at 
least not unexpected - pattern. 
Age Those farmers who always selected Ag tended to 
be the older members of the population. It seems reasonable 
that these older respondents should use a Wald type of ap­
proach. They probably place more emphasis on maintaining 
their current situation as a base for their retirement rather 
than on bettering their current status. The younger members 
of the group generally chose either A^ or Ag, switching be-
^t the 10 per cent level of significance. 
117 
tween the Laplace and Wald approaches as the context of the 
decision problem varied. 
Education On the average, those respondents who chose 
Ag had the smallest number of years of formal education. To 
some extent, this may be correlated with the fact that these 
farmers tended to be the elder ones; their opportunities to 
obtain education may not have been as great as those avail­
able to younger members of the population. Those who used 
the Laplace criterion, choosing A^, had the most education. 
Dependents Perhaps unexpectedly, those who always 
chose Ag had the smallest number of dependents. This may be 
because these farmers were, in the main, the older ones whose 
children, in consequence, were no longer classed as dependents. 
Introspectively, we would have thought conservative choices 
to be associated with a larger than average number of de­
pendents; especially among farmers, for their business and 
family interests are so closely associated. However, those 
respondents with a more than average number of dependents 
tended to choose the more risky but possibly more remunerative 
alternatives, A^ and A^, at least once. It may be that a 
larger number of dependents leads to the taking of greater 
risks, on the average, because of greater pressure on avail­
able income and the relatively larger income necessary for 
goal satisfaction. 
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Total capital invested Quite large differences existed 
among the four groups in terms of their capital investment. 
Above average investment tended to be associated with con­
sistent selection of A^ or of either A^ or Ag. On the other 
hand, those choosing Ag had the smallest capital investment. 
Small capital investment, relative to the average investment 
of the overall group, was also associated with selection of 
Ag or A^. It would be especially interesting to know what, 
if any, causal relationships predominate among these particular 
associations. 
Net worth Those farmers with a smaller than average 
net worth tended to follow either the least conservative choice 
pattern, sometimes selecting Ag or A^, or else the most con­
servative pattern, always choosing Ag. Such contrasing deci­
sions suggest that the decision maker's inherent psychological 
makeup may be the dominant influence affecting his choice. 
Equity Ceteris paribus, the lower an entrepreneur's 
equity ratio, the greater the risk he is taking. To a degree, 
therefore, an entrepreneur's equity ratio is an indication of 
his willingness to take risks. This is borne out by the 
equity data of Table 12. Those respondents with a higher than 
average percentage equity either always chose Ag or either 
A^ or Ag. As previously mentioned, these are the two most 
conservative choice patterns among the four patterns de-
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limited. Indeed, those choosing Ag - which corresponds to a 
Wald type of approach to the decision problem - had a very 
high percentage equity on the average. Conversely, those who 
used the Laplace approach or tended to gamble by sometimes 
choosing either A^ or A^ had relatively low equity ratios. 
Feeder cattle -purchased Compared to other enterprises 
possible on Mid-West farms, the feeder cattle enterprise is 
very risky (7, p. 327). Hence, to some extent, the size of 
a farmer's feeder enterprise is an indication of his tendency 
to take risks. However, the total number of cattle or any 
other unweighted aggregate index is only a rough indication 
of the risk taken. Such measures do not take account of the 
differences in risk between the various age types of cattle; 
differences that are quite substantial. Least risky are 
calves while two-year olds are extremely risky. Yearlings 
have an intermediate level of associated risk (49, pp. 3-5)• 
Against this background, we now consider the cattle data listed 
in Table 12. 
As expected, those farmers who used a Wald type of ap­
proach, always choosing Ag, tended to have smaller feeder 
cattle enterprises. Moreover, their feeder operation con­
tained the greatest proportion of calves of any of the groups 
listed and the smallest proportion of two-year olds. Con­
versely, those who tended to gamble by sometimes selecting 
Ag or A^ had the largest proportion of two-year olds and the 
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smallest proportion of calves. Since two-year olds are the 
most risky type of cattle to fatten, it is not surprising that 
the importance of two-year olds increases across the table as 
the conservatism of the decision pattern decreases. 
Beyond listing in Table 12 the number of respondents 
within each group, nothing has been said so far of the rela­
tive importance of the four decision pattern groups. If the 
panel farmers are regarded as a random sample, the 95 per cent 
confidence interval1 for the percentage of farmers within each 
group is as follows, the groups being listed as in Table 12: 
Thus it appears that for decision problems under absolute 
uncertainty falling within the range of time and income set­
tings studied here, repeated samplings would estimate that 
perhaps as few as 51 per cent or as many as 71 per cent of 
the decision makers within the super-population might ap­
proach such problems only in the fashions postulated by Wald 
2 
and Laplace . 
1Based on the assumption that the number of farmers in 
each group follows a binomial distribution (76, pp. 2-6). 
p 
There is one chance in 20 that the relevant percentage 
would lie outside the specified range. 
Always A^ 
Either A^ or A2 
Always A^ 
9 to 24 per cent; 
20 to 39 per cent; 
10 to 26 per cent; 
Sometimes A^ or A^ : 29 to 49 per cent. 
121 
From an economic viewpoint, a more interesting measure 
of the relative importance of the decision pattern groups is 
their role in terms of production; that is, vis a vis the 
market. For our purposes, a satisfactory index of this is 
the relative weight of feeder beef purchased and fat beef sold 
by each group. Such figures are listed in Table 13 for the 
Table 13. Percentage of feeder beef bought and of fat beef 
sold, in 1956-57 by the survey panel, handled by 
each decision pattern group 
Decision pattern 
group 
Per cent of all 
feeder beef 
bought 
Per cent of all 
feeder beef 
sold 
Always A2 9-3 10.0 
Either A^ or A2 30.1 30.4 
Always A^ 17.9 18.8 
Sometimes A^ or A^ 42.7 40.8 
1956-57 season. It is noteworthy that those who changed their 
decision making approach, as the setting of the hypothetical 
decision problem varied, handled nearly three quarters of all 
the beef fed. 
We now sum up the data of Tables 12 and 13• 
Most distinctive, but least important, were those farmers 
who always chose A^. In making this selection they apparently 
used a Wald criterion approach. On the average, they were 
the oldest and least educated members of the population. They 
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had the highest average equity ratio and the smallest total 
capital investment. Also, they tended to have the smallest 
feeder enterprises and, within this enterprise, to feed the 
highest proportion of calves. 
Those respondents who gambled by sometimes selecting A^ 
or A^, probably on the basis of some Hurwicz or Savage type 
of approach, were characterized by a relatively high educa­
tional level, a relatively low capital investment, the small­
est equity ratio and the largest number of dependents of any 
decision pattern group. Their feeder enterprises tended to 
be larger than average; and to have the highest proportion of 
two-year olds and the smallest proportion of calves among the 
four groups studied. Of all, they were the most important 
group. 
The farmers who consistently used the Laplace criterion, 
always choosing A^, generally had the most years of formal 
education, a relatively high net worth and a low equity ratio. 
The data suggest that those respondents who varied be­
tween a Laplace and a Wald type of approach were not simply 
a "cross" of those who used only a Wald approach or only a 
Laplace approach. Compared with the latter two groups, farm­
ers choosing either A^ or A^ tended to be wealthier, younger 
and to have more dependents. Also, their feeder enterprise 
consisted mainly of yearlings with a lower proportion of 
calves than was found in either of the groups based on con­
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sistent use of only the Laplace or only a Wald type of approach. 
It would be interesting to know what, if any, causal rela­
tions exist among the associations drawn out above. From our 
data we can say nothing in this regard. Nor will we digress 
to explore the implications of the above material for analyses 
of feeder beef demand and fat beef supply. 
Normative Role of the Theories of Choice: 
Hypothetical Decision Problems 
No normative implications of real-world import can be 
drawn from analysis of the farmers' solutions of the hypo­
thetical problems. The idealized arrangement of the payoff 
matrices precludes the discernment of irrational choices. 
Also, the problems have no specific real-world connotation. 
We therefore pass directly to a consideration of the practical 
problems and the respondents' reactions to them. 
Description of the Practical Decision Problems 
These problems were constructed from data supplied by the 
farmers". They relate to pre-purchase planning within the 
feeder cattle enterprise. Each farmer's set of considered 
feeder programs, as discussed in Chapter VI, were taken as 
^The question used was number IX:2 of Schedule B as 
shown in Appendix B. 
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his alternative acts1. For each of these possible programs, 
the farmer was asked to give his expectation of the most 
probable buying and selling price of cattle under four pos-
p 
sible states of Nature . Two farmers could not do this. 
Formulation of the decision problem in such terms was beyond 
them. In consequence, the major part of the analysis of the 
practical problems refers to 75 respondents. 
The specified states of Nature were the four combinations 
possible between two mutually exclusive weather possibilities 
and two mutually exclusive aggregative fattening policies on 
the part of all other farmers with a feeder cattle enterprise. 
The feeder raiser group was specified as behaving in "average 
or normal fashion". The reason for this simplification is 
discussed on pages 84 and 85 above. Admittedly, each respond­
ent may have had a different conception of average behavior 
by the feeder raiser group. However, a lack of absolute 
uniformity in the respondents' conception of the feeder 
raisers' role does not vitiate the analysis. Our primary 
interest is in the individual farmer's solutions of the prob­
lems posed; not in any aggregation of these solutions. 
Weather was specified in terms of the magnitude of the 
^The alternatives considered by each farmer are listed 
in Appendix C. 
2These expected buying and selling prices are tabulated 
in Appendix D. 
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national corn crop. The two alternatives were a large nation­
al corn crop leading to an average corn price of $1.10 per 
bushel through the fattening season or a small corn crop giv­
ing rise to an average price of $1.30 per bushel. By using 
this mode of expression, the possible effects of the weather 
were defined in a manner meaningful to the farmers. The 
alternatives open to all other cattle feeders were taken as 
their planning to produce mainly short-fed cattle to be sold 
from March to June or mainly long-fed cattle to be sold from 
June to September. The four combinations among these alter­
natives will be designated as follows : 
8^: good cropping weather, marketings mainly March to 
June; 
Sg: good cropping weather, marketings mainly June to 
September ; 
S^: poor cropping weather, marketings mainly March to 
June; 
S^i poor cropping weather, marketings mainly June to 
September. 
Having obtained the farmer's price expectations for each 
of his acts under each state of Nature, he was immediately 
asked which alternative(s) he would select. The number of 
cattle to be fed under each program was also requested. From 
these data, the proportion of the farmer's feeder enterprise 
resources that would be devoted to each alternative was 
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calculated. As in the real-world situation, the respondent 
was allowed to select the null alternative of having no feeder 
cattle if he desired. The problem was posed under the follow­
ing three circumstances: first, with either good or poor 
weather possible; second, with good weather certain; third, 
with poor weather assured. For each of these problems it was 
specified that absolute uncertainty prevailed over Nature's 
possible states. 
Normative payoff matrices were constructed from the price 
expectation and cattle feeding data supplied by the respond­
ents1. In these matrices, the payoff elements were expressed 
as the expected percentage net return on each act, allowance 
being made for the length of the investment. Constant re-
2 turns to scale were presumed to prevail in each alternative . 
Under this assumption, the payoff elements are comparable. 
Assuming profit maximization, as our model does, a basis of 
preference exists between individual payoffs. Theoretical 
solutions to the practical decision problems were obtained by 
applying the theoretical procedures, as illustrated in Chap­
ter IV, to the normative payoff matrices^. 
^The construction of the payoff matrices is explained 
in Appendices E and F. The matrices are listed in Appendix 
G. 
2No evidence could be found to vitiate this assumption. 
^The theoretical solutions are tabled in Appendix H. 
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We may now examine the farmers' solutions1 of these 
practical decision problems ; studying them in relation to the 
questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. As before, 
we begin by considering the descriptive role of the theories 
of choice. 
Descriptive Role of the Theories of Choice: 
Practical Decision Problems 
In terms of the practical decision problems, we can only 
consider the descriptive role of the Laplace equiprobability, 
Wald maximin and Savage regret theories of decision making 
under absolute uncertainty. The theories of Hurwicz, Simon 
and Shackle cannot be appraised. Why? Because the respond­
ents' pessimism-optimism indices, aspiration levels and gam­
bling indifference maps are unknown. Nor will the Wald maxi­
min and Savage regret criteria be considered with only pure 
strategies permitted. Since mixed strategies are feasible in 
the practical problems, it would be irrational to consider 
the Wald and Savage procedures only in terms of pure strat­
egies. Thus, in referring to these criteria in relation to 
the practical problems, we will always imply their use with 
mixed strategies allowed. 
Relevant to our analysis, the theoretical solutions of 
the practical problems can be divided into two main classes. 
^The farmers' solutions are tabled in Appendix H. 
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If the payoff matrix contains a dominant row, all three 
theories - Laplace, Wald and Savage - select as optimal the 
act corresponding to that row; all three answers to the prob­
lem are then identical. Such occurrences constitute the first 
grouping of the theoretical solutions. When the payoff matrix 
does not contain a dominant row, the theories will not suggest 
identical solutions. Such occurrences constitute the second 
class of solutions. The relative importance of these two 
groupings of the solutions is shown in Table 14 for each prob­
lem setting. 
Table 14. Classification of theoretical solutions to the 
practical decision problems 
Problem setting Number of problems in which the 
Laplace, Wald and Savage solutions 
were: 
Identical Not identical 
Good weather certain 60a 15 
Poor weather certain 66 9 
Either good or poor 
weather 52 23 
aIncluding one problem whose solutions, for all prac­
tical purposes, were identical. 
Thus, of the 225 problems constructed, 178 contained a 
dominant alternative which was automatically selected by each 
of the theoretical decision procedures. That so many dominant 
acts existed is partly due to the small number of alternatives 
present in each problem. It also reflects the feelings of 
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those respondents who did not attach strong differential ef­
fects to some or all of Nature's possible states. 
Assuming the survey panel to be a random sample, a Chi-
square contingency test value of 8.0 for the data of Table 14 
indicates that there is less than one chance out of a 100 that 
the occurrence of identical solutions is not independent of 
the setting of the practical decision problems. Moreover, as 
the discussion below outlines, a reasonable explanation can 
be given for the pattern of the data in terms of our the­
oretical model. 
Dominant alternatives tended to occur most frequently 
when poor weather was certain. This is possibly a reflection 
of the fact that with poor weather assured, fewer cattle 
would be fed and fewer farmers would feed cattle. Under such 
circumstances there would be fewer aggregative maneuvers 
possible by those other farmers fattening feeder cattle; a 
phenomenon most likely leading to a smaller range of possible 
variation in fat cattle prices and, concomitantly, a greater 
chance that a dominant alternative might exist. Conversely, 
with either good or poor weather possible, it might be ex­
pected that there would be least chance of a dominant alter­
native occurring. As the above figures show, dominant alter­
natives were least frequent when the weather was not specified. 
We will first examine the farmers' solutions for those 
problems containing a dominant alternative. 
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All theoretical solutions identical 
Table 15 gives a qualitative classification of the farm­
ers' solutions for those 1?8 problems with a dominant alter­
native. The classification is in terms of the agreement be­
tween the farmer and theoretical solutions. As previously 
mentioned, the theoretical solutions were obtained by applying 
the relevant decision criteria to the normative payoff matrix 
of each problem. For each problem setting, the total number 
of farmers within each solution classification is shown at 
the bottom of Table Vy. These totals are also given as a 
percentage of the total number of problems in each setting. 
Comparison of these percentages within each qualitative group­
ing indicates that little variation existed between problem 
settings. The reason for this is easily given: in most cases, 
a farmer's solutions for all three problem settings fell in 
the same qualitative class. 
Averaged over each problem setting, 4l per cent of the 
farmers' solutions coincided exactly with the theoretical 
solution; in addition, 46 per cent of the farmers' solutions 
overlapped the theoretical solution. These were cases where 
the farmer selected a mixed strategy that included the optimal 
act as a component. For only 13 per cent of the problems were 
the farmer and theoretical solutions disjunct. Obviously, 
the respondents tended to select, at least as a part of their 
program, the alternative suggested by the theoretical pro-
Table 15. Correspondence between farmer and theoretical solutions to the prac­





Number of cases Number of cases Number of cases Total number of 

















G P E 




G P E 
no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. 
1 12 13 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 13 13 
2 6 11 5 12 10 10 4 5 4 22 26 19 
3 4 5 3 6 6 6 3 2 1 13 13 10 
4 0 0 0 7 6 5 0 0 0 7 6 5 
5 0 0 0 3 6 3 0 0 0 3 6 3 
7 0 l 0 1 0 1 l 1 1 2 2 2 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 22 30 21 29 28 25 9 8 6 60 66 52 
37# 4%% 40# 48# 42# 48# 15# 13# 12# 100# 100# 100# 
aG denotes the problem setting with good weather certain. 
kp denotes the problem setting with poor weather certain. 
CE denotes the problem setting with either good or poor weather possible. 
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cedures. But, as the following discussion of Table 15 indi­
cates, this does not imply that the theories played any ex­
tensive descriptive role. 
Of the 155 farmer solutions that included the theoretical 
solution at least in part, 2k per cent could hardly avoid 
being correct; they related to "problems" involving only a 
single feeder program . Another 35 per cent of these 155 
farmer solutions related to farmers who considered only two 
alternatives. Only in one case out of the 36 in which more 
than three acts were considered, was a strategy corresponding 
exactly to the theoretical solution chosen. Moreover, in the 
majority of those cases where the farmer's solution overlapped 
the theoretical solution, the optimal act was only of minor 
importance in the farmer's solution. Nor was there any sig­
nificant correspondence evident between the farmers approaches 
to the short-run hypothetical decision problems (which cor­
respond best in time influence to the practical problems) and 
the classification of the farmers' solutions in Table 15• 
Also, contrary to one's hopes, the solutions of those 2k 
farmers who considered more than one state of Nature did not 
correspond with the theoretical solutions to any greater ex­
tent than was evident for the other members of the panel. 
^Tn some respects, it would have been proper and con­
venient to exclude these trivial problems from Table 15 and 
its concomitant discussion. However, the presentation is 
simplified by their inclusion. 
133 
Purposive selection by the respondents, based on calculations 
akin to those involved in our construction of the payoff 
matrices and application of the decision algorithms, appears 
unlikely. 
As is shown in the following paragraphs, a similar con­
clusion must be drawn from analysis of those problems not 
containing a dominant act. Also, for both solution groups, 
this conclusion remains true when Wald and Savage approach 
solutions based on only pure strategy selection are allowed. 
All theoretical solutions not identical 
Forty-seven of the 225 problems had payoff matrices such 
that the Laplace, Wald and Savage criteria solutions were not 
identical. The farmers' solutions of these problems are 
classified in terms of their agreement with the theoretical 
solutions in Table 16. In making this tabulation, the farm­
er's solution was regarded as coinciding with the theoretical 
if it included the acts of the normative solution in propor­
tions within the range y^ + 0.10, where y^ is the fraction 
of resources that should be devoted to the i th act. The 
range + 0.10 allows for possible errors of estimation in both 
farmer and normative solutions ; errors deriving from inac­
curacies in the data used to calculate production costs. To 
a degree, the range of + 0.10 is arbitrary. However, it is 
Table 16. Correspondence between farmer and theoretical solutions to the prac­
tical decision problems in those cases where all theoretical solu­
tions were not identical 
Number of Number of cases in which farmer's Total number of 
alternatives solution in agreement with: cases in which 
considered Laplace Wald Savage None of the all theoretical 
solution solution solution theoretical solutions were 
— solutions not identical 
G P E G P E G P E G P E G P E 
no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, o_ (X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 0 1 2 1 4 ld 2d ld 5 3 7 9 5 12 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 4 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 3 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 2 0 1 2 1 4 ld 2d 3d il 7 16 15 9 23 
aG denotes the problem setting with good weather certain, 
kp denotes the problem setting with poor weather certain. 
CE denotes the problem setting with either good or poor weather possible. 
^Including one problem already listed under agreement with the Wald solution. 
135 
thought to be not unreasonable1. 
Inspection of Table 16 reveals that only 16 of the 47 
farmer solutions coincided with a theoretical solution. Four­
teen of these instances were for problems involving only two 
acts. Of these 14 problems, 12 had theoretical solutions in­
volving both alternatives in approximately equal proportions. 
The farmers may have tended to allocate their resources in 
similar proportions as a simple compromise between the two 
alternatives. The normative solutions to the other four of 
the 16 problems involved only pure acts. Coincidence between 
the farmer and theoretical solutions could again have been 
due to chance. Given the data of Table lo, this seems most 
likely. Also, no significant correspondence existed between 
the farmers' solutions to the hypothetical short-run decision 
problems and their solutions to the practical problems. This 
supports the contention that the farmers' analyses of the 
practical problems were not based on considerations akin to 
those used in deriving the normative solutions. 
Alternative hypotheses 
We cannot say that the Laplace, Wald and Savage theories 
played any significant descriptive role in relation to the 
Howell, H. B. and Kutish, F. Department of Economics 
and Sociology, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. Errors in cal­
culating cattle feeding costs. Private communication. 1958. 
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normative payoff matrices for the practical problems. This 
contrasts with the fact that in the hypothetical decision 
problems a majority of the farmers did tend to use a Laplace 
or Wald type of approach. Probably a multitude of factors 
contribute to this discrepancy. However, only three possible 
causes will be discussed here. They are hypothesized as the 
most important. 
Profit maximization Profit maximization has been as­
sumed to dominate the decision makers' appraisal of his prob­
lem. Perhaps this assumption is too strong; for instance, 
some of the decision makers may have preferences between 
alternative acts based on non-economic characteristics of the 
acts. Others may gamble for its own sake. 
Strangeness of the model As shown in Chapter VII, only 
a minor proportion of the farmers approached the decision 
problem in a manner similar to that postulated by the norma­
tive model. The "strangeness" of the constructed decision 
problem with its implicit use of the model may have confused 
many of the respondents. 
Calculation difficulties In making our analysis, we 
have used normative payoff matrices. As shown in Appendix E 
and F, the development of these matrices involved a series of 
cumbersome calculations. Implicitly, we assumed that the 
respondents would also make these calculations, or know in­
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tuitively from previous experience the adjustments that had 
to be made. Without doubt, this is an extremely strong as­
sumption. Its lack of fulfillment is probably the major cause 
for the high degree of irrationality shown in the farmers' 
solutions. However, the fact that the farmers did not make 
the transformations from expected prices to expected profits 
correctly, does not necessarily vitiate the descriptive role 
of the theories. The farmers may have been using the theories, 
not in relation to the normative payoff matrices, but in 
terms of some naive set of payoffs. 
Naive payoffs The simplest such hypothesis is that the 
farmers made their choices simply in terms of the expected 
buying and selling prices of the cattle; no account being 
taken of intermediate production costs. To test this hy­
pothesis, payoff matrices were constructed for each problem 
in terms of the margins between expected buying and selling 
prices for each alternative. The farmers' solutions were 
checked against the theoretical solutions for this naive 
formulation of the decision problems. Again no significant 
correspondence was found between the theoretical and empirical 
solutions ; nor between the farmers' solutions to the practical 
problems and their decision making approach to the short-run 
hypothetical problems. The hypothesis must be dismissed. 
Habitual selection An alternative hypothesis is that 
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the farmers did not solve the constructed problem in an active 
way; perhaps they had a rather fixed feeder cattle operation 
from year to year which they nominated as their solution to 
the problem. As a test of this hypothesis, the farmers' solu­
tions to the practical problems were checked against the 
history of their feeder enterprises during the two previous 
seasons. The 13 farmers who considered only a single alter­
native were excluded from this phase of the analysis. Of the 
remaining 62 farmers, 21 per cent had solutions to the prac­
tical problems coinciding either exactly or very closely with 
their actual feeder programs over the two previous years. 
They apparently made their feeder cattle decisions on a 
habitual basis ; when confronted with the practical decision 
problem they had probably reiterated the habitual solution. 
It appears certain that for these 13 farmers, and for the 13 
who considered only a single alternative, the decision 
theories we have elaborated played no descriptive role in the 
short-run of a single season. It may be that the theories 
played some role over the longer run for these farmers in 
initially determining their habitual decision; more likely, 
though, their original longer run decision was based on an 
aspiration level approach of the Simon type. Perhaps they 
found a feeder enterprise pattern that was initially satis­
factory and simply maintained this same pattern, never seek­
ing better alternatives. 
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Nothing has been said of the 49 respondents whose feeder 
operation varied within the two prior seasons. In general, 
they nominated solutions that varied over the three problem 
settings and were, in consequence, usually different from 
either of their two historical selections. These farmers, 
therefore, probably approached the practical problems in an 
active manner. Moreover, they constitute the bulk of the 
population. On these grounds, we cannot dismiss the theories 
as playing no role with respect to the practical problems. 
They may have been used by a few or many members of the popu­
lation - even though we have been unable to specify their 
operational bases. However, the theories assuredly were not 
used in terms of the normative model implicit in our original 
construction of the payoff matrices for the practical prob­
lems. Ipso facto, it is to be expected that the theories have 
normative value; their use should reduce ex ante resource 
misallocation. The correctness of this expectation is as­
sessed in the following section. 
Normative Hole of the Theories of Choice: 
Practical Decision Problems 
The average expected annual per ceat net return from the 
farmer, Laplace, Wald and Savage solutions for each state of 
Nature in each problem setting is shown in Table 17. Inspec­
tion of the table reveals that these returns differ little 
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from state to state within each solution. Also, only rela­
tively small differences exist between the average payoffs 
for the Laplace, Wald and Savage solutions. Given the prev­
alence of dominant alternatives, this is not unexpected. The 
outstanding feature of the data is the difference between the 
farmer and normative solutions. For every state of Nature in 
every problem setting, the average expected payoff from the 
farmer solutions is markedly smaller than that from any of 
the three normative solutions. 
Table 17. Average expected annual per cent net return under 
each state of Nature for the farmer's, Laplace, 
Wald and Savage solutions of the practical deci­
sion problems 
Solution Good weather Poor weather Either good . or poor 
certain certain weather possible 
S1 S2 S3 s4 S1 S2 s3 s4 
Farmer 20.5 19.0 18.0 18.9 20.1 19.9 18.1 18.1 
Laplace 25.4 23.8 23.5 22.9 24.9 23.8 23.4 22.9 
Wald 25.2 23.8 23.0 23.0 24.8 23.9 23.0 22.8 
Savage 25.2 23.8 23.3 23.0 24.8 23.8 22.9 22.5 
Assuming the survey panel to be a random sample, F tests 
based on analysis of variance using designed comparisons among 
the means (76, pp. 254-256) of Table 17 indicate that the dif­
ferences between the farmer and theoretical solution means are 
highly significant1; also that significant differences do not 
^The value of the F statistic was I5l« 
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exist among the theoretical solution means1. 
Table 18 lists the magnitude of the average discrepancies 
between the farmer and normative solution payoffs. The per­
centage increase in net return that would be expected if the 
normative strategy had been selected rather than the farmers' 
nominated solution is shown in Table 19» Obviously the de­
cision theories examined do have practical normative import 
ex ante. Nothing can be said of their role in reducing ex 
Table 18. Average gain in expected annual per cent net re­
turn under each state of Nature that would occur 
if the farmers used the Laplace, Wald or Savage 
criteria 
Criterion Good weather Poor weather Either good or poor 
certain certain weather possible 
S1 S2 S3 s4 S1 s2 S3 S4 
Laplace 4.9 4.8 5-5 4.0 4.8 3-9 5-3 4.8 
Wald 4.7 4.8 5-0 4.1 4.7 4.0 4.9 4.7 
Savage 4.7 4.8 5.3 4.1 4.7 3-9 4.8 4.4 
post resource misallocation. The extent to which they did 
so would depend on the correctness of the farmers' price 
expectations. 
Perusal of Table 19 also shows that the three normative 
theories do not differ greatly in the extent to which they 
reduce resource misallocation ex ante - as would be expected 
given the data of Table 17. None the less, some noteworthy 
1The value of the F statistic was less than one. 
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Table 19. Average percentage increase in expected annual 
per cent net return under each state of Nature 
that would occur if the farmers used the Laplace, 
Wald or Savage criteria 





Either good or poor 
weather possible 










23.9 19.6 29.3 26.5 
23.4 20.1 27.0 26.0 
23.4 19.6 26.5 24.3 
differences do exist. In the problem setting with good 
weather certain, the average expected payoffs from the Wald 
and Savage solutions are dominated by those from the Laplace 
solutions. With poor weather assured, the Wald approach is 
dominated. On the other hand, with weather unspecified, the 
Savage approach is inferior to the Laplace and Wald algorithms. 
That the Laplace solutions are never dominated, while the Wald 
and Savage are, is not surprising. It reflects the conserv­
atism of the Wald and Savage approaches. However, as the 
figures show, this conservatism may not be very important. 
The data of Table 19 can also be interpreted as an in­
dication of the extent to which the survey farmers tended to 
be irrational, assuming profit maximization as their goal. 
Table 20 gives a better indication of the degree of irra­
tionality that prevailed. It presents frequency distributions 
of the discrepancies between the farmer and Laplace criterion 
solutions under each state of Nature. Had they used the 
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Table 20. Frequency distributions of the change in expected 
annual per cent net return that would occur if 
the farmers used the Laplace criterion 
Interval Good Poor Either good or poor 
weather weather weather possible 
certain certain 
si S2 s3 s4 si S2 s3 s4 
no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no. 
-15.0 to -10.1 1 
-10.0 to 
-5.1 1 1 
-5.0 to -0.1 2 6 1 4 3 10 2 5 
0.0 to 4.9 40 43 43 47 40 42 4l 43 
5.0 to 9.9 15 10 17 13 17 14 19 19 
10.0 to 14.9 13- 10 7 4 6 3 6 1 
15.0 to 19.9 3 1 3 3 2 2 4 3 
20.0 to 24.9 2 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 
25.0 to 29-9 1 1 1 1 1 
30.0 to 34.9 1 2 1 
35.0 to 39.9 
40.0 to 44.9 1 
Laplace < criterion , 17 per cent of the farmers would , on 
average, have increased their expected net re turn by 10 or 
more percentage points ; six per cent of the farmers would have 
decreased their net return. Because the frequencies for the 
Wald and Savage criteria follow essentially the same pattern, 
they are not presented. 
It is interesting to examine Table 19 from the point of 
view of an extension worker. What decision procedures should 
he recommend to the members of the population, assuming the 
farmers correctly formulate the payoff matrices? To the ex­
tension worker, the three sets of data of Table 19, one for 
each problem setting, constitute three decision problems 
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under absolute uncertainty. The decision approach he should 
recommend in each setting would then vary as follows, depend­
ing on which criterion he himself used in solving these three 
problems: 
Decision procedure Decision procedure to be recommended with: 
used by extension Good Poor weather Either good or poor 
worker weather certain weather possible 
certain 
Laplace Laplace Laplace Laplace 
Wald Laplace Savage Wald 
Savage Laplace 0.69 Laplace 0.82 Laplace 
0.31 Savage 0.18 Wald 
Only if he used the Savage approach would the extension 
worker ever need to recommend a randomized mixture of decision 
procedures. 
Summary 
Five questions were posed in the introduction to this 
chapter. They are reiterated below, together with a brief 
summary of the answers relevant to the survey panel elaborated 
in the text. 
1. To what extent do the theories have descriptive value? 
Examination of the farmers1 solutions to a set of hypo­
thetical decision problems indicated that a majority of the 
farmers tended to use an approach similar to either the Laplace 
or Wald procedures. Also, it was evident from the respondents' 
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answers that Shackle's claim to have a general descriptive 
explanation of decision making must be dismissed. From 
comparison of the farmer and theoretical solutions to a set 
of practical decision problems nothing could be said of the 
descriptive roles of the theories per se. It was apparent, 
however, that the theories played no descriptive role in terms 
of the normative model underlying the practical problems. 
2. How stable is the decision maker's approach to deci­
sion making as the setting of the decision problem 
varies? 
One third of the respondents did not vary their decision 
making approach over the four settings of the hypothetical 
problem. The remainder of the farmers adopted a less con­
servative approach as the income uncertainty inherent in the 
problem decreased; of this remainder, a majority shifted from 
a Wald type of approach, using the Laplace criterion in its 
stead; a minority, using the Laplace criterion when no sure 
income was available, discarded it in favor of a "gambling" 
approach when an additional sure income was available. The 
length of time over which the decision would be influential 
did not appear to be as important as the income context of 
the problem in determining the decision approach followed. 
Some of the respondents tended to follow a less conservative 
approach when the problem had only short-run repercussions ; 
a few behaved conversely. 
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3. So far as the theories are descriptively true, what 
characteristics of a decision maker's background tend 
to be associated with the selection of a particular 
approach to the decision problem? 
Among the population studied, consistent use of a Wald 
type of approach tended to be associated with a low level of 
total capital investment and a very high equity ratio. These 
respondents were also, on average, the older and least educated 
members of the population. Those who always used the Laplace 
algorithm generally had the most years of formal education, 
a relatively high net worth and a low equity ratio. In con­
trast with those using only a Wald or a Laplace approach were 
those farmers who switched between these two procedures. On 
the average they were wealthier, younger and had more depend­
ents. Assuming the respondents to be a random sample of 30 
to 50 year old Corn Belt owner-operators with a feeder cattle 
enterprise, none of the differences in attributes mentioned 
above were statistically significant. 
4. For those theories advanced as normative decision 
criteria, what value might they have in reducing ex 
ante resource misallocation? 
In every practical problem setting examined, the re-, 
spondents would have been able to increase their expected net 
return by at least 21 per cent on the average if they had used 
the Laplace, Wald or Savage procedures. Assuming the survey 
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panel to be a random sample of 30 to 50 year old Corn Belt 
owner-operators with a feeder cattle enterprise, the average 
increases in expected net return that would have been obtained 
by use of the normative criteria, instead of the farmer's own 
solution, were statistically significant. Obviously, the 
Laplace, Wald and Savage theories do have normative value in 
the practical situation studied. 
5. Are there noteworthy differences between the various 
normative decision criteria in the degree to which 
they reduce ex ante resource misallocation? 
For the situation examined, there were no salient dif­
ferences between the Laplace, Wald and Savage algorithms in 
terms of the extent to which they reduced ex ante resource 
misallocation. 
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IX. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Invariably, real-world economic decisions are clouded by 
uncertainty about the future. This study has been concerned 
with decisions made under one type of uncertainty - that 
described as absolute. In such circumstances the decision 
maker has no objective knowledge of the likelihood of occur­
rence of the possible outcomes of his decision. He knows only 
what outcomes may occur. 
Is absolute uncertainty of any economic significance? 
Part I of the dissertation considered this question. A game 
theoretic model of the production decision problem facing an 
entrepreneur was constructed. Assuming an economic hierarchy 
of the type and magnitude generally found in the real-world, 
the game theory approach proved unsatisfactory. Its assump­
tions were too demanding. However, by realizing the implica­
tions of~ a situation involving a large number of entrepreneurs 
whose production decisions interact and all of whom have only 
human capabilities, a more satisfactory model was derived. 
Essentially, this model was normative; being postulated as the 
most rational way for the entrepreneur to view the production 
decision problem. It met the exigencies of the real-world 
situation by assuming that the decision maker simplified his 
choice problem to a degree compatible with his mental 
capabilities ; appraising only some subset of his available 
acts and confining his attention to a small number of states 
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of Nature. These states of Nature were specified as broad 
aggregative maneuvers possible on the part of his opponents 
considered en masse. The logical implication of this model 
is that the production decision problem is one under absolute 
uncertainty - so long as opponents are so numerous that they 
cannot be taken into account individually. Since many 
entrepreneurs operate under such circumstances, each facing 
many production decision problems, absolute uncertainty is 
not without economic significance. 
Using the constructed model, an empirical assessment of 
the normative and descriptive roles of a number of theories 
of choice relevant to absolute uncertainty was attempted in 
Part II. Some of these theories are primarily normative. 
Such are those of Laplace, Wald, Savage and Hurwicz. However, 
being but simple algorithms, it is not implausible that these 
theories might have descriptive value. The remaining 
theories - those of Simon and Shackle - are purely descrip­
tive; they have no normative connotation. 
For the empirical analysis, data were collected during 
1956-57 by way of a four stage personal interview panel survey. 
The panel constituted a population of 77 respondents all of 
whom: 
(1) were farming in Marshall County, Iowa ; 
(2) were aged between 30 and 50 years in June, 1957; 
(3) had owned and operated at least 80 acres of farmland 
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during the three years prior to June, 1957; 
(4) had fed an average of at least 25 feeder cattle in 
each of the three feeding seasons prior to the 
survey; 
(5) cooperated in all stages of the survey. 
The above restrictions ensured that the respondents were 
familiar with the feeder cattle enterprise. This was impor­
tant, the empirical analysis being based upon the decision 
problem facing a Mid-West farmer within his feeder cattle 
enterprise at the pre-purchase planning stage of a given 
season. It was possible to specify this problem in terms of 
the normative model constructed in Part I. However, examina­
tion of the farmers' responses revealed that only 12 out of 
the 77 could be said fairly certainly to consider the decision 
problem in the fashion postulated by the model. For another 
three farmers, the model was probably descriptively correct. 
In its entirety, the model therefore had descriptive value 
for only a small proportion of the population. None the less, 
a majority of the farmers behaved in partial agreement with 
the model: all considered some simplified subset of the alter­
natives available to them; 58 specified as a primary factor 
influencing their choice a factor compatible with the the­
oretical specification of the model; 24 of the respondents 
made allowance for outcome variations over two or more states 
of Nature. 
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To assess the possible normative and descriptive roles 
of the theories, the respondents were asked to solve two sets 
of decision problems under absolute uncertainty. 
The first of these sets consisted of four hypothetical 
problems. The farmers' solutions to these problems, together 
with their raisons d'etre for the choices made, indicated that 
probably only the Wald and Laplace theories had any significant 
descriptive value. Also, it was evident from the respondents' 
answers that Shackle's claim to have formulated a general 
descriptive explanation of decision making must be dismissed. 
Moreover, only a minority of the farmers consistently used 
the same approach to each of the hypothetical decision prob­
lems. It is certain that the decision approach used, and 
consequently the choice made, depends to a large extent on 
the setting of the decision problem. In this regard, our 
analysis revealed that within a practical range of income and 
time influence contexts, income was more important than the 
time influence of the decision in determining which decision 
approach would be used. Consistent use of a Wald type of ap­
proach tended to be associated with a low level of total 
capital investment and a very high equity ratio. On average, 
these respondents were also the older and least educated 
members of the population. Those who always used the Laplace 
algorithm generally had the most years of formal education, 
a relatively high net worth and a low equity ratio. In con­
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trast with those farmers using only a Wald or a Laplace ap­
proach were those respondents who switched between these two 
procedures as the setting of the decision problem varied. 
Generally, they were wealthier, younger, and had more depend­
ents. Moreover, they were numerically more important than 
either of the groups using only a Wald or only a Laplace type 
of approach. 
The other set of problems were practical. They related 
to a real-world situation. Each respondent was asked for data 
relevant to his pre-purchase decision problem within the feed­
er cattle enterprise. Given this data, the farmer was asked 
for his solutions to this problem when it was posed in three 
different contexts. From comparison of the farmers' and the 
theoretical solutions to these practical problems nothing 
could be said of the descriptive roles of the theories per se. 
It was apparent, however, that the theories played no descrip­
tive role in terms of the normative model underlying the 
construction of these practical problems. Conversely, the 
possible normative role of the theories was noteworthy. In 
every setting of the practical problems, the respondents would 
have been able to increase their expected profits by at least 
21 per cent on the average if they had used the Laplace, Wald 
or Savage procedures. 
While there were no salient differences between these 
algorithms in the extent to which they reduced ex ante re­
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source misallocation, the Wald and Savage procedures did tend 
to be more conservative than the Laplace algorithm. 
Throughout the analysis, limitations abound. They are 
unavoidable in an exploratory study. For the convenience of 
the cursory reader, the major shortcomings are summarized 
below. 
Firstly, profit maximization was assumed to be the 
dominant goal of the entrepreneur. Ideally, it would have 
been better to have worked in terms of utility. It would also 
have been impractical. 
Secondly, our empirical analysis assumed that the re­
spondent's solution to a constructed decision problem cor­
responded exactly with the decision and resultant action he 
would have taken if faced with that same problem in real life. 
To overcome this limitation would be extremely difficult. It 
seems certain that attempts to observe real life decisions 
and determine their raisons d'etre would be frustrated by an 
effect of the Heisenberg type (8, pp. 38-40). 
Thirdly, the respondents were only asked to solve each 
decision problem once. Had they been asked to solve the prob­
lems at other points in time they may have given different 
answers. Our analysis has made no allowance for any random­
ness of response. Of course, this is a shortcoming to be 
found in most research based on personal interview surveys. 
Fourthly, the empirical analysis related, in strict 
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terms, only to a population, of 77 farmers'1". Moreover, much 
of the study revolved around but one of the many production 
decision problems faced by these entrepreneurs. Nor was al­
lowance made for interaction between these many decision 
problems. 
Other limitations are discussed in the text. They are 
felt to be less important than those listed above. No doubt 
all of them are significant to some extent. Whether they 
vitiate the analysis so that it must be taken cum grano salis 
is a decision the reader must make. However, prior to making 
this decision, he should read the body of the dissertation. 
However, in assessing the normative and descriptive 
roles of the theories of choice, the data were also analyzed 
statistically as if it were derived from a random sample of 
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XI. APPENDIX A: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 
The mean and range of some selected attributes of the 
survey farmers are shown in the accompanying tables. Personal 
characteristics are summarized in Table 21, financial data in 
Table 22 and farm organization characteristics in Table 23. 
A wide range is evident for a majority of the character­
istics. With the exception of equity, which has a slightly 
negatively skewed distribution, all of the attributes listed 
in Tables 22 and 23 have a frequency distribution that is 
strongly positively skewed. Typical is the distribution of 
operated acres. * It is as follows: 
Acres operated Number of farmers 








Perusal of the above figures shows that the population 
contained two farmers with extremely large farms. Averages 
of the more important characteristics of the survey panel, 
calculated with these two farmers excluded, are given in 
Table 1 on page 48 of the text. 
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Table 21. Selected personal characteristics of the popula­
tion3 Î mean and range 
Item Unit Mean Range 
Low High 
Age year 42.1 31 50 
Dependents no. 3-6 0 7 
Education 
School year 11.0 4 12 
College year 0.6 0 5 
Total year 11.6 4 17 
Work Experience. 
25 Full-time non-farm year 2.0 0 
Farm laborer year 4.8 0 16 
Tenant year 5-7 0 26 
Experience as owner-operator 
25 Current farm year 10.5 3 
Total year 11.4 3 27 
aAs at June, 1957* 
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Table 22. Selected financial characteristics of the popula 
tiona i mean and range 
Item Unit Mean Range 
Low High 
Invested capital 
















Total capital investment 
$1,000 

























Equity ratio per cent 88.4 52.6 100.0 
Gross income^  $1,000 49.1 8.0 680.0 
Gross farm income^  $1,000 41.9 8.0 442.0 
C^alculated from farmers' estimates as of July 1, 1957* 
kOperating capital, feed, stocks and bonds, and non-
farm investment. 
°Mainly unsecured notes. 
A^verage over 1954, 1955 and 1956. 
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Table 23• Crop and livestock programs followed by the pop­
ulation3 Ï mean and range 
Item Unit Mean Range 
Low High 
Land Operated acre 291.4 80 1,820 
Owned acre 239-3 80 1,820 
Rented acre 52.1 0 335 
Land TJseb 
Grain0 acre 145.5 0 900 
Soybeans acre 8.4 0 63 
Silage acre 8.7 0 200 
Hay acre 43-1 0 200 
Rotation pasture acre 24.9 0 500 
Permanent pasture acre 24.1 0 285 
Homestead, lots and waste acre 11.8 2 110 
Total acre 266.6 80 1,820 
Livestock 
32.4 Pig litters no. 0 100 
Feeder cattle purchased no. 137.4 9 1,200 
Calves no. 67.3 0 900 
Yearlings no. 63.6 0 817 
Two-year olds no. 6.5 0 140 
Beef cows no. 6.9 0 57 
Milking cows no. 2.6 0 40 
aDuring the 1956-57 season. 
T^otal of owned land plus share of rented land. 
0Including Soil Bank which averaged 3*6 acres per farm. 
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XII. APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
The schedules used in collecting the empirical data used 
in this study are presented on the following pages. Where 
convenient, the spatial arrangement of the original question­
naires has been abbreviated. 
Schedule A was completed in June, 1957; Schedule B in 
August, 1957; Schedule C in October, 1957; and Schedule D in 
January, 1958. Schedules A, B and C were completed by way of 
personal interview. Schedule D was mailed to the respondents; 
those not returning the schedule, or returning an incomplete 
schedule, were contacted by telephone. 
Data relevant to the dissertation were derived from the 
respondents1 answers to the following questions : 
Schedule A: I; III; IV; V; VIII. 
Schedule B: IV; VII; VIII; IX; X. 




Confidential Farm no. 
Enumerator 
BEEF FEEDER STUDY 
Conducted by the Department of Economics and Sociology, 
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
I. GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Name ' 
2. Mailing address 3* Phone no. 
4. Total acres operated ; acres owned ; acres rented 
5. Age 6. Highest year of school finished 
7. Years farming as owner-operator ; on this farm 
8. Years operating as tenant 
9. Years worked as farm laborer 
10. Full-time nonfarm work experience: Position 
Years 
11. Number of dependents 
II. EXPECTATIONS CF CORN AND HOG SELLING PRICES 
("Low" and "high" are extremes of range in which it is expected 
there are 9 chances out of 10 that the price will fall.) 
Mid-month 
CORN 





"Low High Most 
probable 
Low High Most 
probable 
September 157 xx xx xx 
October 157 xx xx xx 
December 157 xx xx xx 
March 158 xx xx xx 
April '58 
August * 58 xx xx xx 
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III. CROPPING PROGRAM 
(Circle double cropping) 








































Reasons for major changes between last year and this year: 
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17. LIVESTOCK PROGRAM 
Enterprise Last 12 months Planned coming 
12 months 
Litters fall pigs 
July 1 - Dec. 31 
Litters spring pigs 
Jan. 1 - June 31 
Cows milked spring '57 spring '58 
Dairy heifers 1 year old 
2 years old 
spring '57 spring '58 
Beef cows, calved spring '57 spring '58 
Beef heifers 1 year old 
2 years old 
spring 157 spring '58 
Feeder or stock calves sold 
Feeder cattle purchased 
Ewes lambed spring '57 spring 158 
Laying hens spring '57 spring '58 
Reasons for major changes between last 12 months and coming 
12 months : 
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No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade Weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 




































No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade Weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 



























V. 3« FEEDER ENTERPRISE: PLANS FOR SEASON BEGINNING 









No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade Weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 


























VI. EXPECTATIONS OF FEEDER CATTLE PRICES 
Specify market in mind: 
("Low" and "high" are extremes of range in which it is expected 





Mid-August Mid-September Mid-October 41d-November 
Low High Most 
prob 
able 
Low High Most 
Prob­
able 
Low High Most 
prob 
able 




Choice 500-800 lb. 
Choice 800-1100 lb. 









VII. EXPECTATIONS OF FAT CATTLE PRICES 
Mid-
month 
CHOICE STEERS: Specify market 
900-1100 lb. 1100-1300 lb. 
Low High Most 
probable 











VIII. CAPITAL POSITION 
As at Expected 
July 1, July 1, 
1957 1958 
1. Sale value of land and buildings 
Sale value of livestock this 
Sale value of machinery and farm 
equipment 
Sale value of feed stored 
Cash on hand or in bank 
Government bonds 
Corporation stocks and bonds 
Amount of money owed to you 
Sale value of other farm property 
Sale value of other property 
2. Farm mortgage 
Chattel mortgage 
Unsecured notes payable by you 
Household installment debts 
Other debts (tax, store, etc.) 
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IX. CAPITAL HISTORY 
1. Total capital owned when started farming 
as tenant ; as owner 
2. Amount borrowed when started farming 
as tenant ; as owner 
3. Amount inherited before starting as tenant 
while tenant 
since became owner 
4. Average gross income from all sources in last three 
years 




Confidential Farm no. 
Enumerator 
BEEF FEEDER STUDY 
Conducted by the Department of Economics and Sociology, 
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
I. EXPECTATIONS OF CORN AND HOG SELLING PRICES 
("Low" and "high1' are extremes of range in which it is expected 
there are 9 chances out of 10 that the price will fall.) 
Mid-month CORN 





Low High Most 
probable 
Low High Most 
probable 
September 157 xx xx xx 
October '57 xx xx xx 
December '57 xx xx xx 
March '58 xx xx xx 
April '58 
August 158 xx xx xx 
II. CORN YIELD EXPECTATIONS 
1. What average yield per acre do you now expect on your 
corn? 
2. In how many years out of ten do you think you can fairly 
successfully forecast the coming national corn crop in: 
mid-July ; mid-August ; and mid-September . 
3. What sort of national corn crop do you expect this season 
compared with the average over the last five seasons? 
% more; % less 























No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 



























V. EXPECTATIONS OF FEEDER CATTLE PRICES 
Specify market in minds 
("Low" and "high" are extremes of range in which it is expected 





Mid-September Mid-October Mid-November 
Low High Most 
prob­
able 
Low High Most 
prob­
able 




Choice 500- 800 lb. 
Choice 800-1100 lb. 







VI. EXPECTATIONS OF FAT CATTLE PRICES 
CHOICE STEERS: Specify market 
Mid-
month 
900-1100 lb. 1100-1300 lb. 
Low High Most 
probable 
Low High Most 
probable 
Dec. '57 









1. Do you actively seek information on what kind of feeder 
cattle other farmers have bought or are interested in 
buying before you decide your buying policy? . 
From what sources? 
2. Do the cattle outlook forecasts of such bodies as the 
USDA and ISC generally help, harm or not affect your 
feeder enterprise before you buy ; after you buy . 
If harm, why? . 
3. Do you attempt to keep other beef feeder operators in the 
dark as to what your feeder plans are? 
VIII. ROLE OF THE WEATHER AND OTHER POSSIBLE INFLUENCES 
1. Do you consider the type of weather that prevails through­
out the Corn Belt in a given cropping season to be of any 
influence in determining whether that season would be 
good or bad, profit wise, for feeder cattle? 
2. Which of the following statements, if any, best describes 
the way in which you normally think of your feeder cattle 
operation in relation to the national feeder operation in 
a given year? 
(a) yourself versus all the other farmers who have feeders. 
(b) yourself versus all other farmers with feeders and 
the meat packers. 
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(c) yourself versus the meat packers. 
(d) if none of the above, how do you think of the situa­
tion? 
3. If (a) or (b). Do you think of these other beef feeders 
as being: 
(i) just as much in opposition to one another as to you; 
or as 
(ii) a group mainly opposed to you rather than to one 
another ; or as 
(iii) a number of broad groups, the members of a given 
group being more in opposition to farmers in other 
groups than they are to one another. If (iii), 
what groups do you think of? 
4. If (b) or (c). Do you think of the meat packers as: 
(i) being joined in a single group in opposition to 
you; or as 
(ii) each acting individually in opposition to you; or as 
(iii) acting as a group at each market but being in op­
position between the different markets; or as 
(iv) sometimes acting in a group but at other times 
split up and opposing one another as well as you. 
IX. FEEDER PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES 
1. In planning your feeder cattle enterprise, what alternative 






Type Grade Weight Month Grade Weight Month 
2. What do you think your most probable buying and selling 
prices at the farm would be for each of these alternative 
programs under each of the following circumstances? As­




Good crop weather thru 
Corn Belt. 
(corn av. $1.10 thru 
season) 
Poor crop weather thru 
Corn Belt. 























































3• Which alternative(s) would you follow, and with how many 
head of cattle in each, if you were sure that throughout 
the Corn Belt there would be: 
(a) good cropping weather : 
(b) poor cropping weather: 
(c) either good or poor cropping weather: 
4. In making plans and purchases for your feeder enterprise 
each season, do you normally consider the problem, 
mentally or otherwise, in the fashion we have - with the 
possibility of cattle prices being one figure under one 
set of circumstances and other figures under other circum­
stances If yes, what possible circumstances do 
you normally take into account?] 
5. Do you think the way we have approached the problem of 
looking at your alternative feeder programs - with dif­
ferent prices being possible under different circumstances-
to be a good, fair or poor way of looking at the problem 
of what feeder programs to follow? 
X. CHOICE BETWEEN INVESTMENTS WITH UNCERTAIN RETURNS 
A, B, C, and D are four different but equally costly types of 
annual farm investment. They are listed below with their 
possible dollar net incomes printed opposite them. 
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Possible net income in dollars 
Investment A: 2,500 3,5oo 0 1,500 
Investment B: 1,500 2,000 500 1,000 
Investment C: 0 6,000 0 0 
Investment D: 1,500 4,500 0 0 
For each investment, the chance of obtaining, in a particular 
year, any particular one of the net incomes listed for that 
alternative is unknown; but you can be sure of getting one 
of the four net incomes listed. Suppose you select B and 
your net income turns out to be $1,000. Then if you had 
chosen C or D you would have got zero net income; if you had 
chosen A, you would have had a net income of $1,500. 
Given your current circumstances, financial and otherwise, 
which investment would you select: 
1. If you could only farm one year and have only one type of 
investment and 
(a) you had no other income source: Why? 
(b) you had a certain income of $3,000 as well as 
this : Why? 
2. If you could farm for 20 years and only follow one type 
of investment and 
(a) you had no other income source: Why? 




Confidential Farm no. 
Enumerator 
BEEF FEEDER STUDY 
Conducted by the Department of Economics and Sociology, 
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
I. EXPECTATIONS OF CORN AND HOG SELLING PRICES 
("Low" and "high" are extremes of range in which it is expected 
there are 9 chances out of 10 that the price will fall.) 
Mid-month CORN 
No. 2 Yellow 




Low High Most 
probable 
Low High Most 
probable 
December '57 xx xx xx 
March 158 xx xx xx 
April ' 58  
August ' 58  xx xx xx 
II. CROP YIELDS FOR CURRENT SEASON 
1. Hay: type ; acres ; total tons 
2. Silage: type ; acres ; total tons 
3* Grain, ave. bus. per acre: 
actual yield (if expected yield (if 
harvest complete) harvest incomplete) 
acres of corn 
acres of oats 
acres of soybeans 
























No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade Weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 



























Y. EXPECTATIONS OF FEEDER CATTLE PRICES IN MID-NOVMBER, 1957 
("Low" and "high" are extremes of range in which it is expected 
there are 9 chances out of 10 that the price will fall.) 




Low High Most 
prob­
able 
Quality Low High Most 
prob­
able 
Choice 500- 800 lb. Good-Choice 
Choice 800-1100 lb. Medium 
Medium 800-1000 lb. Market in mind 
VI. EXPECTATIONS OF FAT CATTLE PRICES 
Choice Steers : Specify market 
month 900-1: LOO lb. i: L00-1300 lb. 
Low High Most 
probable 











VII. FACTORS INFLUENCING FEEDER PROGRAM CHOICE 
Would you list in order of importance, with comments if de­
sired, the most important factors determining: 
(a) The type of feeder program that you follow in a given 
season: 
(b) The number of cattle that you buy in a given season: 
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VIII. CLASSIFICATION OF CATTLE 
1. To distinguish between one group of feeders and another 
on the basis of an average weight difference of one pound 
would not be very meaningful. On the other hand, to ig­
nore an average difference of 300 pounds might not be 
wise. At what minimum difference in weight do you think 
it meaningful, although perhaps impractical, to make a 
distinction: 
(a) for steer calves: 
(b) for heifer calves: 
(c) for yearlings : 
(d) for two-year olds: 
2. Likewise, what distinctions would you draw with respect 
to (i) time of purchase as feeders and (ii) time of sale 
as fat stock: 
(a) steer calves: 
(b) heifer calves : 
(c) yearlings: ; 
(d) two-year olds: 
3- Buying quality distinctions: 
4. Selling quality distinctions: 
5- Feed program distinctions: 
DC. MISCELLANEOUS 
1. What is the highest per cent return on capital per year 
you feel you could be certain of obtaining if you invested 
the capital now tied up in your cattle in other ways? $ 
2. To what extent do you use the capital that you invest in 
cattle for other investments during the period when it is 
not tied up in cattle? Owned capital Borrowed 
capital % 
3. Do you employ any labor, including family members, on a 
wage basis? If so, at what hourly wage? 
4. In a normal season, approximately what proportion of the 













No. Month Weight Price 
at 
farm 
Grade Weight No. Month 
Mostly 
Drylot 



























XIII. -APPENDIX C: FEEDER CATTLE PROGRAMS 
CONSIDERED BY EACH FARMER 
The details of the alternatives considered by each farmer 
are shown in Table 24. They are recorded here for future 
reference; especially by those who may wish to study the ef­
fects of vertical integration on cattle feeding entrepreneurs, 
if and whenever it may become important. 
In specifying the variables in the programs, the follow­
ing abbreviations are used: 
For age types : HC - heifer calves 
SC - steer calves 
Y - yearling steers 
TYO - two-year old steers 
For quality: M - medium 
G - good 
LC - low choice 
C - choice 
HC - high choice 
P - prime 
A combination of these symbols denotes a range of quality. 
Thus, G-C denotes good to choice quality. 
For weight: Where a range of weights was specified the 
limits of the range are given. Thus, 1100-
1200 denotes 1100 to 1200 pounds. 
For months : Each month is referred to by a numeral cor­
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responding to the order of the month in 
the calendar year. Thus, 9 signifies 
September. A range of months is denoted 
thus: 9-11, meaning September through 
November. Selling months normally refer 
to the calendar year following the buying 
months' calendar year. In some few cases, 
selling occurs in the second calendar year 
after buying. Such situations are easily 
identified by reference to the weight gain 
specified by the program. 
Feed program: D - drylot 
P - pasture 
Table 24. Specifications of the alternative feeder cattle programs considered by 
each farmer® 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number ; alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro- Quality Weight Month(s) 
number ; type in lb. gram in lb. 
1 1 HC M 500 6- 7 D C 850 2 
2 1 SC G 550 8 D G-C 1100 8 
3 1 Y G 600 9-10 D G-C 1100-1200 7- 8 
4 1 Y C 600 9-10 D HC 900-1000 3- 4 
5 1 Y G-C 700 9-10 D C 1200 8- 9 
6 1 Y C 640 10 D HC 1300 8 
7 1 SC C 350-450 9-10 D C 1100 9-11 
8 1 HC C 400 10 P HC 900 9 
9 1 HC G 425 11 D G-C 850 5- 6 
10 1 HC G 400-450 12 D G-C 850 7- 8 
11 1 SC C 400-450 9-11 D C 1000-1100 8-10 
12 1 SC C 300-400 9-11 D C 1000 9-11 
13 1 Y C 575 9-10 D C 950-1050 3- 4 
aThe meanings of the symbols used in this table are explained in the intro­
duction to Appendix C. 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. 
14 1 Y M-G 600 9-11 
2 SC G 350-400 9-11 
15 1 HC C 350-450 9-11 
2 HC G 350-450 9-11 
16 1 HC G 400 10 
2 HC G 400 10 
17 1 Y C 600-700 9-11 
2 SC C 400-500 9-11 
18 1 SC G-C 400-500 9-12 
2 Y G-C 500-600 11-12 
19 1 Y G 750 10 
2 HC G 400 11 
20 1 SC C 450 10-11 
2 Y C 550 11-12 
21 1 Y G 600-700 10 
2 SC G 450 10 
22 1 Y G—C 500-600 9 
2 SC G-C 450 7 
23 1 Y G 700 10-11 
2 SC LC 500 7 
Feed Selling specifications 
pro- Quality Weight Month(s) 
gram in lb. 
P G—C 1000-1100 5-6 
P G-C 1000 9-1.1 
P C 850-1000 9-11 
P C 850-1000 9-11 
P LC 900 10 
D LC 900 10 
D C 1250-1350 7-9 
P C 1050-1150 10-12 
D LC 950-1050 9-12 
D LC 1050-1150 9 
D C 1100-1200 5 
D LC 800- 900 5 
D HC 1050-1150 8-10 
D HC 1050-1150 8 
D C 1050 6 
D C 1050 7 
D G—C 975-1025 4 









Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
numberi alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s ) Pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number $ type » in lb. gram in lb. 
24 1 Y G 550 10 D C 1000 5-6 
2 HC LC 400 11 D C 850 8 
25 1 SC G-C 450 12 P C 950-1050 10 
2 Y G 600 12 D C 1100 8 
26 1 Y G 600-700 10-11 D G-C 1000 4-5 
2 HC G 300-450 10-11 D G-C 800 6 
27 1 SC G-C 350-450 9-11 D C 900-1050 6-8 
2 SC G-C 350-450 9-11 D C 1050-1200 10-12 
28 1 Y C 600-650 9 D P 1200 7 
2 SC HC 400 9-10 P P 1050-1150 11-12 
29 1 SC C 400-450 10-11 D C 1100 10-11 
2 Y C 650-700 10-11 D C 1200 6 
30 1 HC C 525 9 D C 900- 950 4-5 
2 SC G 450 12 D C 950-1000 5 
31 1 Y C 700 9-11 D C 1300 6-8 
2 SC C 4oo 10 P C 1200 12 
32 1 SC G-C 425-475 10-11 D C 1000-1100 9-10 
2 SC G-C 425-475 10-11 P C 1150-1250 10-11 
33 1 Y G-C 650-750 10 D C 1150-1200 8-9 
2 SC C 400-450 10-11 P C 1050-1150 9-10 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Parmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. gram in lb. 
34 1 Y G 550 10 P C 1100 5 
2 SC G 450 10 P C 1100 9 
35 1 Y C 75 0 10 D C 1100-1200 4-5 
2 SC C 450 10 D C 1150-1200 9 
36 1 SC G 400 10 P C 1050 11 
2 SC G 4oo 10 D C 1000-1100 10 
37 1 SC G 400-600 10-11 D C 900-1050 7-8 
2 HC G 450-550 10-11 D C 800- 900 4-5 
38 1 SC G 400 12 P C 1000-1100 2 
2 TYO M 800-900 12 P M 1200 7 
39 1 HC C 325 11 D C 850 7 
2 Y C 550 11 D C 950 6 
40 1 SC G—C 4oo 10-11 P C 1000-1100 12 
2 Y G-C 550-600 10-11 P c 1000-1100 6-7 
41 1 Y C 500-550 9-11 P c 1100-1200 9-11 
2 SC C 450 9-11 P c 1000-1100 9-11 
42 1 Y G 750 9 D HC 1250-1400 4-5 
2 SC C 400 11-12 P C-P 1150 12 
43 1 Y C 600-700 8 D C 1050-1150 5-6 
2 Y G-C 550 8-9 D C 900- 950 1-3 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number: type in lb. gram in lb. 
44 1 Y C 750 10 D C 1150-1250 6 
2 Y C 600 10-12 P C 1150-1250 9-11 
45 1 SC G-C 450 10-11 D C 900-1100 10-11 
2 SC G-C 450 8-9 D C 900-1100 8-9 
3 SC G-C 450 6-7 P C 900-1100 7-8 
46 1 Y C 700-750 9 D C IIOO-I3OO 4-5 
2 SC C 500 9-11 P C 1050-1150 10-12 
3 SC G 500 6 P C 1100 6 
47 1 Y C 600 10 D C 1250 ? 2 Y M 700 10 D G 1050 4 
3 Y C 600 10 D C 1000 4-6 
48 1 SC C 350-400 8 P C-HC 1000-1100 9-11 
2 SC C 350-400 10-11 D C-HC 1000-1100 9-10 
3 TYO C 850-950 9 D C-HC 1100-1200 12 
49 1 TYO c 1050 8-12 D HC 1250-1350 1-4 
2 TYO c 950 8-12 D HC 1150-1250 1-4 
3 Y c 700-800 8-12 D HC 1150-1250 4-7 
50 l SC c 450 10 D C 950-1050 9 
2 Y M-G 650 8-9 D G 1100 6-7 
3 HC G-C 42 5 10 P C 900-1000 9 
51 1 SC G-C 375 9 P C 1000 8 
2 SC G-C 375 9 D HC 900- 950 6 
3 Y M 550-650 10 D G—C 1000-1100 5-6 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number: type in lb. gram in lb. 
52 1 TYO C 950 8-9 D C-P 1250-1350 1-2 
2 Y C 700-750 10 D C-P 1100-1200 7 
3 SC C 400 10-11 D C-P 1050-1150 11-12 
53 1 SC G-C 350 11 D C 1000-1100 9 
2 SC G-C 350 10 P C 1000-1100 11 
3 Y G-C 600-700 12 D C 1100 7-8 
54 1 SC C 475 10 D C 1000 10 
2 Y G-C 750-800 10 D G 1200 7 
3 Y M 600 8 D C 900 1 
55 1 TYO C 950 9 D C 1250-1350 2 
2 Y C 700-750 10 D C 1100-1300 6-7 
3 SC C 400-500 10 D C 1100-1250 9-11 
56 1 SC c 425 10-11 P C 1050-1100 9-10 
2 Y G 600-650 11-12 P C 1100-1150 5-6 
3 TYO G 975 9 D C 1200-1300 1-2 
57 1 Y c 600 8-9 D C-P 950-1050 3-4 
2 Y c 700 8-9 D C-P 1050-1150 7-8 
3 SC C 450 10-11 P C-P 1000-1200 10-11 
58 1 Y G—C 700 11 D C 1200 6-8 
2 SC C 425 10 D C 1050 8-10 
3 HC C 400 10 D C 925 5-6 
59 1 Y c 650-750 9-12 D c 1000 6-7 
2 Y c 600 9-12 D c 1100 6-9 
3 SC c 500 9-12 D c 1050-1150 6-9 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling spécifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. gram in lb. 
59 4 SC G 500 9-12 D C 1000-1100 7-10 
60 1 Y C 725 10 D C 1200-1300 5 
2 Y C 725 11 D C 1200-1300 6 
3 SC C 4oo 10 D C 1000 10 
4 SC C 400 11 D c 1000 10 
61 1 Y C 600-800 10-11 D p 1200-1250 7-8 
2 SC C 400-500 10-12 D p 1200-1250 12-2 
3 SC C 4oo-5oo 10-12 P p 1200-1250 1-3 
4 HC C 4oo 10-12 D C-P 850- 900 7-9 
62 1 Y HC 700 9-11 D C-P 1200-1300 6-8 
2 Y LC 700 9-11 D c 1000-1100 3-5 
3 HC C 450 9-11 P HC 950 9-11 
4 SC C 450 9-11 D HC 1100-1200 10-12 
63 1 TYO G 900 8 D C 1250 1-2 
2 SC G 400 10 D C 1100 10-11 
3 HC G 400 10 D C 850 6-7 
4 Y G-C 750 9 D c 1050 5 
64 1 TYO C 1000 8 D c 1300-1400 12 
2 Y C 750 9 D c 1100-1200 3 
3 Y C 75 o 9 D c 1200-1300 6-8 
4 Y M 650 8 D c 925 12 
65 1 SC G-C 400 7 P c 1000-1250 8-10 
2 SC G-C 400 9 P c 1000-1250 10-12 
3 Y G-C 600 7 P c 1050-1250 5-7 4 Y G-C 600 9 P c 1050-1250 7-9 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Feed 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. gram in lb. 
66 1 Y M 675 10 D C 1100 6 
2 SC C 500 10 P C 1050-1150 9 
3 Y M 675 10 D C 1100 4 
4 SC C 400 9 P C 1000-1050 10 
67 1 Y C 650 9 P C-HC 1100-1200 7-9 
2 Y c 650 10 P C-HC 1100-1200 8-10 
3 Y G 650 9 P C-HC 1100-1200 7-9 
4 Y G 650 10 P C-HC 1100-1200 8-10 
5 TYO G-C 900 9 D HC 1300 3 
68 1 Y M 600 11 D G 950 4 
2 Y G 550-650 7 D G 1050 1-3 
3 Y G 550-650 12 D G 1050 6-8 
4 Y G 600 12 P G 1000 6 
5 Y M 600 7 P G 1000 1 
69 1 SC G-C 450 9-10 P LC 1050-1200 9-10 
2 TYO G-C 950 9-10 D LC 1200-1300 4-5 
3 Y G-C 650 9 P LC 1050-1150 6 
4 TYO G-C 950 9-10 P LC 1300-1400 2-3 
5 HC G-C 450 9-11 P LC 850- 950 6-7 
70 1 Y M 500-600 10 D G 900 4 
2 SC C 400-500 11 D HC 950-1050 9 
3 SC C 475 12 P C 1050-1150 11-12 
4 HC c 400 12 P C 900-1050 11 
5 SC c 350-450 12 P C 1050-1150 12 
71 1 Y G 800 10 D C 1150-1250 4 
2 SC c 450 8 D C 1050 6 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro­ Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. gram in lb. 
71 3 • SC C 4^ 0 10 D C 1050 10-11 
4 SC C 450 12 P C 1050 10-11 
5 TYO G 750-800 12 D LC 1200-1250 6-7 
72 1 SC P 500 10-11 P C-P 1100 9-10 
2 SC G 500 10-11 D C-P 1100 9-10 
3 Y C 700 12 D C-P 1200-1300 7 
4 Y C 700 - 12 P C-P I2OO-13OO 9-10 
5 Y C 700-800 10 D C-P 1200-1300 5 
73 1 TYO C 925 9-11 D C 1200-1300 3-5 
2 TYO G 925 9-11 D G 1200-1300 3-5 
3 Y C 650 8 P C 1150-1250 5-7 
4 Y C 650 8 D C 1150-1250 4 
5 Y c 650 11 D C 1150-1250 7 
6 SC c 400-450 9-11 P C 1150-1250 11-1 
7 HC c 400 9-11 P C 900-1000 9-11 
74 1 TYO G-C 900 8-9 D C 1100-1300 12-1 
2 Y G-C 700 10 D C-P 1200-1250 6-8 
3 SC C 4oo 10 D C-P 1100 10 
4 SC • C 400 10 P C 1000 11-12 
5 SC C 400 10 P C-P 1100 11-12 
6 SC C 400 10 D C-P 1100-1200 1-2 
7 SC C 4oo 10 D c 1200-1300 1-3 
75 1 Y C 650 10 D c 1000-1100 6-8 
2 Y M 650 10 D G 1000-1100 4-6 
3 Y C 550 10 D C 900-1000 7 
4 Y M 550 10 D G 850- 950 5 
5 SC C 420 il P C 1050-1150 il 
Table 24. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Buying specifications Feed Selling specifications 
number : alternative Age Quality Weight Month(s) pro- Quality Weight Month(s) 
number : type in lb. gram in lb. 
75 6 SC M 420 11 P G 900-1000 8 
7 HC C 420 11 P C 850- 950 8 
8 HC M 420 11 P G 750- 850 6-7 
76b 1 SC C 450 11 D C 1250 12 
2 Y C 750 9-10 D C 1400 6-7 
77b 1 SC C 750 11 P C 1000-1100 11-12 
2 Y C 400 12 D C 1000-1100 6 
bThis is one of the two farmers who could not conceptualize the practical 
decision problems in the desired way. 
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XXV. APPENDIX D; EXPECTED PRICES AND PRODUCTION COSTS 
RELEVANT TO EACH CONSIDERED FEEDER CATTLE PROGRAM 
The expected purchase cost of feeder cattle, estimated 
production cost of fat cattle and expected selling price of 
fat cattle for each possible state of Nature in the practical 
decision problems are shown in Table 25 for each farmer's 
considered alternatives. 
Table 25. Expected purchase cost of feeder cattle, estimated production cost of 
fat cattle and expected selling price of fat cattle under each state 
S, for each considered alternative In the practical decision problems 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase Estimated production Expected selling 
number: alter- cost per lb. of cost per lb. of final price per lb. of 
native Initial liveweight liveweight final liveweight 
number gb gO gd se Sg 83 81 Sg 8^  
1 1 18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 18.71 18.71 18.20 18.20 22.0 23.O 19.0 20.0 
2 1 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.19 20.19 21.30 21.30 23.0 22.0 23.0 22.0 
3 1 19.0 19.0 17.0 17.0 19.53 19.53 19.47 19.4? 22.5 20.5 26.0 22.0 
4 1 20.0 20.0 15.0 22.0 19.44 19.44 17.19 21.49 24.0 24.0 20.0 27.0 
5 1 20.0 20.0 17.5 17.5 18.95 18.95 18.12 18.12 25.0 23.0 27.0 25.0 
6 1 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.21 20.21 21.34 21.34 27.5 26.0 27.5 26.0 
7 : 25.0 25.0 23.5 23.5 20.39 20.39 20.83 20.83 26.5 28,5 25.0 27.0 
8 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 18.73 18.73 18.72 18.72 24.0 22,0 25.0 23.0 
No data are presented for those two farmers, numbers 76 and 77, who could not 
conceptualize the practical decision problems in the desired way. All costs are 
expressed in cents. 
bGood cropping weather, marketings mainly March to June. 
cGood cropping weather, marketings mainly June to September. 
P^oor cropping weather, marketings mainly March to June. 
ePoor cropping weather, marketings mainly June to September. 
Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
numberi alter- cost per lb. of 







9 1 20.0 20.0 17.5 17.5 
10 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18,0 
11 1 22.5 22.5 21.0 21.0 
12 1 22.5 22.5 20.0 20.0 
13 1 22.0 22.0 18.5 18.5 
14 1 24.0 24.0 23.0 23.0 
2 25.0 25.0 23.5 23.5 
15 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
2 18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 
16 1 16.0 18.0 15.0 18.0 
2 16.0 18.0 15.0 18.0 
17 1 21.0 22.0 21.0 23.0 
2 18.0 20.0 20.0 22.0 
18 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
2 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
19 1 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 
2 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Estimated production Expected selling 
cost per lb. of final price per lb. of 
liveweight 1 final liveweight 
S1 s2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 
19.11 19.11 18.67 18.67 19.0 22.0 19.0 21.0 
19.19 19.19 19.01 19.01 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
19.65 19.65 19.96 19.96 26.0 24.5 27.0 26.0 
19.22 19.22 19.32 19.32 25.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
21.23 21.23 20.01 20.01 23.0 26.0 20.0 22.0 
21.62 21.62 21.86 21.86 25.0 26.0 25.0 26.0 
19.74 19.74 20.11 20.11 27.0 25.0 27.0 25.0 
19.24 19.24 19.31 19.31 22.0 23.0 20.0 20.5 
18.27 18.27 18.34 18.34 20.0 21.0 18.0 18.5 
16.55 17.54 17.03 18.52 18.0 22.0 19.0 23.0 
16.77 17.77 17.28 18.77 18.0 22.0 19.0 23.0 
20.52 21.06 21.63 22.71 25.0 27.0 25.0 30.0 
17.16 18.08 19.02 19.94 21.0 23.0 25.0 27.0 
19.08 19.08 18.99 18.99 22.0 21.0 21.0 20.0 
21.12 21.12 21.15 21.15 24.5 24.0 23.0 22.0 
21.77 21.77 22.57 22.57 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
23.41 23.41 24.49 24,49 25.0 25.0 24.0 25.0 
Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
numbers alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweighl 




20 1 20.0 21.0 19.0 20.0 
2 18.0 19.0 18.0 19.0 
21 1 19.0 18.0 17.0 18.0 
2 25.0 25.0 21.5 21.5 
22 1 18.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 
2 20.5 20.5 19.0 19.0 
23 1 22.5 22.5 20.0 20.0 
2 22.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
24 1 21.0 20.5 19.7 19.2 
2 22.0 21.5 21.0 21.0 
25 1 19.0 19.0 18.0 18.0 
2 18.5 18.5 18.0 18.0 
26 1 22.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
2 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 
27 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
2 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
28 1 21.5 21.5 18.5 18.5 
2 25.0 25.0 23.0 23.0 
29 1 24.0 24.0 23.0 23.0 
2 22.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
Estimated production Expected selling 
cost per lb. of final price per lb. of 
liveweight final liveweight 
Sg S3 Sg Sj 
18.54 18.99 19.06 19.52 22.5 22.0 24.0 22.0 
19.04 19.57 20.16 20.70 22.5 22.0 24.0 22.0 
19.88 19.22 19.43 20.09 21.5 22.0 20.0 22.0 
21.08 21.08 20.37 20.37 25.0 23.5 23.0 21.5 
19.07 19.07 19.51 19.51 19.0 20.0 17.0 18.0 
18.36 18.36 18.49 18.49 22.0 23.0 19.5 21.0 
21.91 21.91 21.15 21.15 23.4 24.0 23.0 25.0 
19.26 19.26 19.70 19.70 23.4 24.0 23.0 25.0 
20.61 20.31 20.85 20.56 23.5 24.0 23.5 24.0 
19.94 19.68 20.39 20.39 25.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 
17.63 17.63 17.93 17.93 22.0 21.0 23.0 21.0 
19.17 19.17 19.88 19.88 23.0 22.5 22.5 22.0 
21.78 21.78 21.87 21.87 26.0 27.0 26.0 27.0 
19.55 19.55 20.53 20.53 24.0 24.0 25.0 26.0 
18.63 18.63 18.71 18.71 22.5 21.0 22.0 20.0 
18.25 18.25 18.52 18.52 21.0 22.5 20.0 22.0 
21.02 21.02 20.41 20.41 23.5 21.5 22.0 19.5 
19.62 19.62 19.82 19.82 27.7 24.5 25.0 24.0 
20.16 20.16 20.74 20.74 29.0 27.0 30.0 27.0 
21.33 21.33 21.69 21.69 27.0 25.0 28.0 26.0 
Table 25» (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number : alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweighl 
number : S1 s2 s3 s4 
30 1 22.0 22.0 16.0 16.0 
2 18.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 
31 1 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
2 17.5 17.5 20.0 20.0 
32 1 27.5 27.5 25.0 25.0 
2 27.5 27.5 25.0 25.0 
33 1 19.5 19.5 18.5 18.5 
2 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
34 1 22.5 22.5 17.5 17.5 
2 24.0 24.0 18.5 18.5 
35 1 20.0 20.0 17.0 17.0 
2 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
36 1 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 
2 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 
37 1 20.0 20.0 21.0 21.0 
2 18.0 18.0 19.0 19.0 
38 1 24.0 23.0 20.0 20.0 
2 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
39 1 18.5 18.5 17.5 17.5 
2 21.0 21.0 19.5 19.5 
Estimated production Expected selling 
cost per lb. of final price per lb. of 
liveweight final liveweight 
S-l Sg S^  S^ . S^  Sg So S^  
20.93 20.93 18.15 18.15 19.0 23.0 15.0 17.0 
18.03 18.03 17.25 17.25 18.0 19.0 16.0 16.0 
20.02 20.02 21.06 21.06 23.0 22.0 24.0 24.0 
16.24 16.24 18.25 18.25 25.0 22.5 26.5 25.5 
22.38 22.38 22.14 22.14 26.5 26.5 28.5 27.0 
20.63 20.63 20.58 20.58 26.5 26.5 28.5 27.0 
20.03 20.03 20.29 20.29 24.5 23.0 20.0 23.0 
18.95 18.95 19.93 19.93 21.0 25.0 21.0 27.5 
21.19 21.19 19.64 19.64 24.5 24.5 17.5 17.5 
19.73 19.73 18.16 18.16 24.0 22.5 18.5 20.0 
20.44 20.44 19.14 19.14 23.0 26.0 20.0 23.0 
19.38 19.38 19.56 19.56 25.0 24.0 21.0 22.0 
18.62 18.62 19.61 19.61 24.0 26.0 24.0 27.5 
19.34 19.34 20.37 20.37 24.0 26.0 24.0 27.5 
19.26 19.26 20.73 20.73 22.5 23.5 24.5 25.5 
18.65 18.65 19.99 19.99 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 
19.52 19.09 18.79 18.79 27.0 28.0'30.0 30.0 
13.44 13.44 13.95 13.95 14.0 14.0 15.5 15.5 
17.54 17.54 18.25 18.25 23.2523.2 24.2 24.2 
20.00 20.00 19.96 19.96 24.0 23.0 25.0 24.0 
Table 25« (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number: alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweight 
number : 8^  8g 83 
Estimated production 
cost per lb. of final 
liveweight 
Expected selling 
price per lb. of 
final liveweight 































21.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 
19.5 19.5 18.5 18.5 
22.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
24.0 24.0 22.0 22.0 
20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
25.0 25.0 21.0 21.0 
23.5 23.5 22.0 22.0 
22.5 22.5 18.0 18.0 
22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 
22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 
20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
22.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
23.0 23.0 19.0 19.0 
25.5 25.5 22.5 22.5 
22.5 22.5 18.0 18.0 
22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 
20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
18.0 18.0 2.0.5 20.5 
18.5 18.5 17.2 17.2 
18.29 18.29 18.85 18.84 21.0 23.0 22.5 24.0 
19.42 19.42 19.69 19.69 22.0 23.0 23.0 25.0 
19.92 19.92 20.46 20.46 22.0 24.0 24.0 26.0 
19.63 19.63 19.59 19.59 24.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 
21.30 21.30 21.14 21.14 23.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 
19.33 19.33 18.81 18.81 25.0 23.0 26.0 26.0 
22.99 22.99 22.78 22.78 23.O 25.0 24.0 26.0 
21.21 21.21 19.07 19.07 23.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 
22.27 22.27 23.12 23.12 22.5 24.5 22.5 24.5' 
21.17 21.17 22.11 22.11 25.0 24.5 26.0 25.5 
19.08 19-08 18.99 18.99 23.0 20.0 21.5 19.0 
20.09 20.09 20.00 20.00 23.0 22.0 23.0 21.0 
19.35 19.35 19.72 19.72 24.0 23.0 23.0 24.0 
22.55 22.55 20.79 20.79 23.0 28.0 21.0 24.0 
21.20 21.20 20.54 20.54 26.0 25.5 23.0 25.5 
19.62 19.62 18.20 18.20 21.5 22.5 17.0 18.0 
21.07 21.07 21.18 21.18 25.0 24.0 23.0 22.0 
19.63 19.63 19.01 19.01 21.0 18.0 19.0 16.0 
20.22 20.22 19.82 19.82 23.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 
16.69 16.69 18.73 18.73 23.O 22.0 24.5 23.5 




Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number : alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweight 
number: S-^  S2 îaô 
48 3 20.5 20.5 18.5 18.5 
49 1 23.5 23.5 22.5 22.5 
2 23.O 23.0 21.0 21.0 
3 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
50 1 25.0 25.0 23.0 23.0 
2 25.0 25.0 23.0 23.0 
3 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 
51 1 18.0 18.0 16.5 16.5 
2 18.0 18.0 16.5 16.5 
3 16.5 16.5 14.0 14.0 
52 1 22.2 22.2 19.5 19.5 
2 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
3 25.0 25.0 21.0 21.0 
53 1 20.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 
2 21.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 
3 19.0 19.0 18.0 18.0 
54 1 24.0 24.0 22.0 22.0 
2 23.0 23.0 20.0 20.0 
3 20.0 20.0 16.0 16.0 
55 1 23.0 23.0 20.0 20.0 
2 23.0 23.0 20.0 20.0 
3 26.0 26.0 23.0 23.0 
Estimated production 
cost per lb. of final 
liveweight 
S1 s2 s3 S4 
Expected selling 
price per lb. of 
final liveweight 
21.83 21.83 20.82 20.82 23.7 24.7 24.5 23.5 
25.15 25.15 25.02 25.02 28.0 26.0 22.5 24.5 
24.09 24.09 23.05 23.05 27.0 25.0 21.0 21.0 
23.17 23.17 22.83 22.83 27.0 25.0 20.0 20.0 
21.54 21.54 21.46 21.46 27.0 27.0 28.0 28.0 
23.57 23.57 23.20 23.20 27.0 27.0 28.0 28.0 
19.44 19.44 20.40 20.40 23.5 22.5 23.5 22.5 
17.57 17.57 17.99 17.99 23.5 22.0 20.5 18.7 
17.79 17.79 18.11 18.11 19.5 22.0 24.0 22.0 
18.35 18.35 17.78 17.78 18.0 20.0 16.0 21.0 
23.55 23.55 22.02 22.02 25.0 27.0 25.0 27.0 
22.20 22.20 21.71 21.71 25.0 25.0 25.0 23.0 
20.55 20.55 19.92 19.92 30.0 30.0 28.0 28.0 
21.34 21.34 21.15 21.15 25.0 22.0 24.0 22.0 
24.13 24.13 22.97 22.97 24.0 21.0 24.0 23.0 
19.84 19.84 17.65 17.65 23.0 23.0 22,0 19.0 
24.05 24.05 22.54 22.54 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 
22.33 22.33 21.29 21.29 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 
21.07 21.07 20.82 20.82 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number : alter- cost per lb. of 
native Initial liveweight 
number : 8^  S2 
56 1 20.0 20.0 23.0 23.0 
2 18.5 18.5 18.0 18.0 
3 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
57 1 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 
2 20.0 20.0 21.0 21.0 
3 24.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 
58 1 21.0 21.0 19.0 19.0 
2 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 
3 19.0 19.0 17.0 17.0 
59 1 23.5 23.5 21.5 21.5 
2 24.0 24.0 18.0 18.0 
3 25.0 25.0 20.0 20.0 
4 23.0 23.0 18.0 18.0 
60 1 20.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 
2 20.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 
3 23.0 23.0 22.0 22.0 
4 22.5 22.5 21.5 21.5 
61 1 20.0 20.0 18.5 18.5 
2 23.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 
3 23.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 
4 20.0 20.0 17.5 17.5 
62 1 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
2 18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 
Estimated production 
cost per lb. of final 
liveweight 
S1 s2 s3 sl+ 
17.80 17.80 20.09 
18.56 18.56 19.08 
22.04 22.04 21.07 
21.17 21.17 22.05 
20.78 20.78 22.31 
19.77 19.77 21.17 
20.72 20.72 20.39 
19.50 19.50 19.59 
17.89 17.89 17.96 
23.95 23.95 23.15 
22.26 22.26 20.13 
21.80 21.80 19.61 
20.80 20.80 18.70 
20.06 20.06 20.37 
20.06 20.06 20.37 
20.00 20.00 20.56 
19.73 19.73 20.29 
20.65 20.65 20.59 
19.82 19.82 20.02 
19.08 19.08 18.98 
18.66 18.66 18.38 
20.16 20.16 19.93 
19.05 19.05 18.38 
Expected selling 
price per lb. of 
final liveweight 
























20.09 25.0 25.0 
19.08 21.7 21.7 
21.07 23.0 23.O 
22.05 21.0 23.5 
22.31 23.O 24.0 
19.77 26.0 26.0 
20.39 22.0 23.0 
19.59 25.0 25.0 
17.96 24.0 24.0 
23.15 23.5 24.5 
20.13 23.O 23.O 
19.61 23.0 24.0 
18.70 23.0 23,5 
20.37 22.0 24.0 
20.37 21.5 23.5 
20.56 23.0 24.0 
20.29 22.5 23.5 
20.59 25.0 21.0 
20.02 27.0 27.0 
18.98 27.0 27.0 
18.38 23.0 21.5 
19.93 23.0 20.0 
18.38 20.0 17.0 
Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number : alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweight 
number : S 1 s. 2 s3 s4 
21 .0 21 .0 20.0 20.0 
23 .0 23 .0 22.0 22.0 
20 .0 20 .0 18.0 18.0 
23 .0 23 .0 21.0 21.0 
20 .0 20 .0 18.0 18.0 
22 .0 22 .0 21.0 21.0 
22 .0 22 .0 19.5 19.5 
22 .0 22 .0 20.0 20.0 
22 .0 22 .0 20.0 20.0 
20 .0 20 .0 17.5 17.5 
22 .5 22 .5 22.5 22.5 
24.0 24 .0 24.0 24.0 
21 .0 21 .0 21.0 21.0 
22 .0 22 .0 22.0 22.0 
20 .0 20 .0 19.7 19.7 
21 .5 21 .5 21.0 21.0 
20 .0 20 .0 19.7 19.7 
22 .0 22 .0 21.5 21.5 
20 
.5 20 .5 19.5 19.5 
20 .0 20 .0 19.0 19.0 
19 .0 19 .0 18.5 18.5 
18 
.5 18 .5 18.0 18.0 














cost per lb. of final 
liveweight 
Expected selling 
price per lb. of 
final liveweight 
19.18 19.18 19.79 19.79 25.O 22.0 24.0 21.0 
18.81 18.81 19.38 19.38 27.0 25.0 26.0 23.0 
21.62 21.62 20.90 20.90 25.0 26.0 22.0 22.0 
19.55 19.55 19.79 19.79 28.0 28.0 26.0 26.0 
18.88 18.88 18.81 18.81 24.0 24.0 20.0 20.0. 
22.32 22.32 22.18 22.18 25.0 25.0 26.0 26.0 
23.24 23.24 22.07 22.07 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
21.44 21.44 21.06 21.06 23.O 23.O 24.0 24.5 
21.70 21.70 21.30 21.30 26.5 24.0 27.0 24.0 
21.10 21.10 20.97 20.97 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
18.44 18.44 19.47 19.47 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 
19.05 19.05 20.08 20.08 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 
20.25 20.25 21.10 21.10 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
20.84 20.84 21.69 21.69 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
21.02 21.02 21.02 21.02 21.5 22.0 22.5 23.0 
19.16 19.16 19.80 19.80 26.5 25.0 27.0 26.0 
20.20 20.20 20.20 20.20 22.0 22.5 23.0 23.5 
18.88 18.88 19.61 19.61 25.0 24.0 26.0 25.5 
20.02 20.02 20.26 20.26 24.5 22.5 25.5 24.5 
19.72 19.72 19.96 19.96 25.0 22.5 25.5 24.5 
18.81 18.81 19.29 19.29 24.5 22.0 24.5 24.0 
18.50 18.50 18.99 18.99 24.5 22.0 24.5 24.0 
19.92 19.92 20.25 20.25 19.5 21.5 22.0 24.0 
Table 25« (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number: alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweight 
number: S2 S3 
68 1 16.0 15.0 16.5 16.0 
2 20.5 20.5 22.0 22.0 
3 20.0 20.0 21.0 21.0 
4 16.0 16.0 17.0 17.0 
5 16.5 16.5 17.5 17.5 
69 l 23.5 23.5 20.0 20.0 
2 19.0 19.O 19.0 19.0 
3 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 
4 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 
5 21.5 21.5 16.0 16.0 
70 1 19.0 18.0 19.0 18.0 
2 22.0 22.0 21.5 21.5 
21.0 21.0 20.5 20.5 
18.0 18.0 17.5 17.5 
23.O 23.0 22.5 22.5 
71 1 18.0 I80O 16.0 16.0 
2 24.0 24.0 22.0 22.0 
23.0 23*0 21.0 21.0 
24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
72 1 25.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 
2 24.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
3 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 
4 22.0 22.0 22.0 22,0 
5 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Estimated production Expected selling 
cost per lb. of final price per lb. of 
liveweight final liveweight 
S^  Sg S3 Sx Sg S3 
18.30 17.63 19.51 19.18 20.0 20.0 21.0 21.0 
20.46 20.46 22.32 22.32 22.0 22.0 22.5 22.5 
20.15 20.15 21.71 21.71 22.0 22.0 23.0 23.0 
18.47 18.47 20.07 20.07 19.0 19.0 21.0 21.0 
18.79 18.79 20.38 20.38 17.5 17.5 18.5 18.5 
18.26 18.26 17.40 17.40 26.0 24.0 27.0 25.0 
21.59 21.59 21.59 21.59 21.0 23.0 22.0 25.0 
19.31 19.31 18.61 18.61 24.0 23.O 24.0 25.0 
20.76 20*76 20.76 20.76 22.5 22.5 24.0 24.0 
20.60 20.60 18.22 18.22 23.5 22.5 24.0 23.0 
20.39 19.73 21.30 20.65 22.0 23.0 22.0 23.0 
19.99 19.99 20.66 20.66 23.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 
18.52 18.52 19.19 19.19 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
17.64 17.64 18.45 18.45 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 
18.68 18.68 19.49 19.49 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
20.19 20.19 19.73 19.73 22.5 23.O 22.5 23.0 
20.67 20.67 20.67 20.67 24.0 24.0 25.0 25.0 
19.60 19.60 19.56 19.56 24.0 25.0 24.0 25.0 
19.74 19.74 20.64 20.64 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
21.62 21.62 22.69 22.69 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
21.01 21.01 20.38 20.38 25.0 25.0 25.0 24.0 
21.15 21.15 20.05 20.05 24.0 23.0 24.0 23.0 
21.24 21.24 22.22 22.22 25.0 25.0 25.0 24.0 
20.56 20.56 21.35 21.35 25.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 
21.82 21.82 22.63 22.63 23.0 24.0 23.0 24.0 
Table 25. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected purchase 
number : alter- cost per lb. of 
native initial liveweight 
number : 
Estimated production 
cost per lb. of final 
liveweight 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
Expected selling 
price per lb. of 
final liveweight 

































22.0 22.0 20. 
22.0 22.0 20. 
22.0 22.0 20. 
22.0 22.0 20. 
22.0 22.0 20, 
22.0 22.0 20. 








20.0 20.0 18.5 18.5 18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 
20.0 20.0 17.0 17.0 
18.0 18.0 16.5 16.5 
23.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 
17.0 17.0 16.5 16.5 
18.5 18.5 17.5 17.5 













































































26.0 28.0 24.0 26.0 













25.0 25.5 26.0 24.5 


















XV. APPENDIX E: DERIVATION OF NORMATIVE PAYOFF MATRICES 
FOR THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
As pointed out in Chapter VII, rational analysis of the 
decision problem necessitates that the elements of the payoff 
matrix be comparable. This was achieved by using as payoff 
elements the annual per cent net return expected from each of 
the considered feeder program alternatives under each possible 
state of Nature. These per cent returns were calculated for 
each farmer as follows. 
Denote by: 
aij ' the expected annual per cent net return on in-
O 
vestment in alternative A^  if the state of 
Nature Sj should prevail. 
p^ j : the farmer's expected selling price at the farm 
in cents per pound liveweight of fat cattle from 
O 
A^  if Sj occurs. 
cij " the estimated cost of production in cents per 
pound liveweight of fat cattle from A^  if Sj 
occurs. The method of calculating these produc­
tion costs is shown in Appendix F. 
e^  : the farmer's proportionate equity in the capital 
invested in A? if A^  is selected. This figure 
could not be ascertained precisely. As an ap­
proximation, the farmer's estimate of his year 
to year to year average equity ratio for his 
I 
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feeder cattle enterprise was used. 
r : the maximum annual per cent net return the farmer 
felt certain of receiving from alternative in­
vestment of his feeder enterprise capital during 
the period of the year when it is free for in­
vestment elsewhere. 
s s the proportion of the farmer's equity in his 
feeder enterprise capital that he normally in­
vests elsewhere when it is not invested in feeder 
cattle. 
t^  : the fraction of the year during which the farm­
er's feeder enterprise capital is free for in­
vestment elsewhere. 
O 
mi Î the length of feeder program in months. 
The payoff elements were then calculated for each farmer 
by the following formulae: 
«> aij = -E; 
(8) a„ = pi.1 ' °l.i + ci.1eirstl .100 ifm <12. 
13 cij x 1 
While reinvestment of the farmer's personal capital in 
the off-feeder season was common, only one farmer reinvested 
borrowed capital. The net return from this investment was 
included in the calculation of his payoff matrix. 
211 
The above formulae assume that the feeder enterprise 
capital is invested in full at the start of the feeder pro­
gram. In practice, this is not the case. The major part of 
the investment occurs when the feeders are bought, the re­
mainder accumulating over the period of the program as feed 
and other services are expended on the cattle. To take ac­
count of the exact sequence and rate of this accumulation 
would not be feasible. It would also be unrealistic in so 
far as many of the farmers kept capital aside to cover their 
feeder enterprise. Overall, the assumption of a lump-sum 
investment makes the percentage returns slightly less than 
exact estimation (if it were possible) would show them to be. 
However, the ranking of payoffs both within and between alter­
natives would probably not be changed since the rate of 
capital accumulation over the feeding season is approximately 
equal for each type of feeder cattle program after the 
initial purchase outlay has been made. 
212 
XVI. APPENDIX Fi DERIVATION OF PRODUCTION COST PER 
POUND LIVEWEIGHT OF FAT CATTLE 
The cost of producing fat cattle under each alternative 
feeder program for each possible state of Nature in the 
practical decision problems was calculated by the following 
procedure; 
Costs 
Feeders at farm lb. at S per hundred $ 
Corn bu. at S per bushel S 
Corn silage tons at S per ton $ 
Hay tons at $16 per ton £„ 
Pasture days at 10 cents . per day $ 
Supplement lb. at b- cents per lb $_ 
Hired labor hours at S per hour $ 
Salt and mineral per head 
Veterinary and medical expenses per head 
Miscellaneous expense including death loss 
Calves: 6% of cost of feeders 
Others: 3% of cost of feeders 
Interest 




Total cost of fat animal 
Selling weight lb. 
Cost of production: 
(total cost 7 selling weight) x 100. _cents per lb. 
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When a reasonable knowledge of the feed requirements was 
evident, the quantities of the various feeds nominated by the 
farmer were used in making these calculations. Otherwise the 
quantities used were those published by the Iowa State College 
Agricultural Extension Service (37)• For the few cases where 
grain or silage other than corn was used, a conversion to corn 
or corn silage equivalents was made using Morrison's "all 
analyses" feed evaluation factors for corn (54, pp. 1135-
1142). 
The feeder cattle buying prices used were those expected 
by the farmer under each of Nature's possible states. Corn 
prices also varied over Nature's states, as outlined in 
Chapter VIII. Silage was valued on an opportunity cost basis 
in terms of corn; hence the cost of silage also varied over 
the possible states of Nature. Opportunity cost was used 
because actual costs were unavailable. 
The only labor costs included were those for hired labor, 
their being no rational basis for costing the owner-operator's 
labor. This follows normal farm management accounting pro­
cedures. Only ten farmers used hired labor, including family 
labor paid on a wage basis. For these farmers the actual wage 
rate being paid was used. The labor requirements used in 
calculating labor cost were those tabulated by the Department 
of Economics and Sociology of Iowa State College (39)• 
214 
XVII. APPENDIX G: NORMATIVE PAYOFF MATRICES FOR 
THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
Table 26 lists the normative payoff matrices for the 
practical decision problems. As explained in Chapter VII, 
to make the matrix elements comparable they are expressed as 
the expected annual per cent net return on investment forth­
coming from each considered feeder cattle program for each 
possible state of Nature. 
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Table 26. Expected annual per cent net return on investment 
for each considered feeder program under each 
possible state of Nature S. in the practical de­
cision problems ** 
Farmer Considered Expected annual per cent net return 
raber : alternative 
number : SÎ 4 S3 s4 
1 1 17.6 22.9 4.4 9.9 
2 1 13-9 9.0 8.0 3.3 
3 1 15.2 5.0 33.5 13.0 
4 1 25.5 25.5 18.3 27.6 
5 1 32.1 21.5 49.2 38.1 
6 1 36.7 29.2 29.4 22.4 
7 1 27-7 36.7 18.5 27.3 
8 1 28.1 17.5 33.5 22.9 
9 1 -0.6 15.1 1,8 12.5 
10 1 25-9 25.9 27.1 27.1 
11 1 32 6 24.9 35.5 30.5 
12 1 30.1 19.7 19.0 19.0 
















14.9 -It 6.2 0.9 
tember, 
c 
aGocd cropping weather, marketings mainly March to June. 
G^ood cropping weather, marketings mainly June to Sep-
Poor cropping weather, marketings mainly March to June. 



















Considered Expected annual per cent net return 
alterna-' ' 
number : 
native Sj S2 S, 
1 8.8 25.4 11.6 24.2 
2 7.3 23.8 9.9 22.5 
1 22.4 28.8 16.2 32.7 
2 20.7 25.1 29.0 32.7 
1 15.3 10.1 10.6 5.3 
2 16.0 13.6 8.7 4.0 
1 10.2 10.2 6.3 6.3 
2 6.8 6.8 -2.0 2.1 
1 21.9 16.4 26.4 13.3 
2 19.0 13.2 19.8 7.1 
1 8.1 14.5 2.9 9.5 
2 18.6 11.5 12.9 5.5 
1 -0.4 4.9 -12.9 -7-7 
2 19.8 25.3 5.5 13.6 
1 7.7 10.4 9.7 19.1 
2 21.7 24.8 16.9 27.1 
1 14.5 18.6 13.1 17.2 
2 25.7 22.3 22.9 18.0 
1 24.8 19.1 28.3 17.1 
2 20.0 17.4 13.2 10.7 
1 21.4 26.O 20.9 25.5 
2 24.0 24.0 23.0 27.9 
1 21.3 13.2 18.1 7.3 
2 13.9 21.5 7.4 17.3 
1 11.8 2.3 7.8 -4.5 
2 34.3 20.6 21.6 17.5 
1 43.8 33.9 44.6 30.2 
2 26.6 17.2 29.1 19.9 
1 -8.0 11.1 -16.1 -5.1 
2 1.7 7.3 -5.3 -5.3 
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Expected annual per cent net return 
S1 S2 S3 s4 
31 1 14.9 9.9 14.0 14.0 
2 46.2 33.1 38.7 34.0 
32 1 18.7 18.7 28.9 22.2 
2 28.4 28.4 38.5 31.2 
33 1 22.5 15.0 -1.2 13.5 
2 10.9 32.0 5.5 38.1 
34 1 17.1 17.1 -9.4 -9*4 
2 21.9 14.3 2.1 10.4 
35 1 13.0 27.6 4.9 20.6 
2 29.1 23.9 7.5 12.6 
36 1 26.7 36.6 20.6 37.1 
2 24.1 34.4 17.8 35.0 
37 1 4.7 9.9 6.9 11.8 
2 22.2 27.6 24.2 29.2 
38 1 32.8 40.0 51.1 51.1 
2 4.4 4.4 11.3 11.3 
39 1 33.1 33.1 33.4 33.4 
2 20.6 15.6 25.8 20.8 
40 1 11.5 20.0 15.0 21.2 
2 13-3 18.4 16.8 27.0 
41 1 10.4 20.5 17.3 27.1 
2 22.3 12.1 22.5 32.7 
42 1 8.0 17.5 18.3 23.0 
2 27.O 17.5 35.3 35.3 
43 1 1.5 10.2 6.8 15.6 
2 12.8 12.8 14.5 14.5 
44 1 1.0 10.0 -2.7 6.0 
2 18.1 15.7 17.6 15.3 
45 1 20.5 4.8 13.2 0.0 
2 14.5 9.5 15.0 5.0 
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Table 26. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected annual per cent net return 
number : alternative 
number: 
S1 s2 S3 s4 
45 3 22.2 17.4 15.4 20.0 
46 1 2.5 24.7 1.5 16.0 
2 20.9 18.7 11.0 22.3 
3 9.6 14.7 -6.6 -1.1 
4? 1 18.6 13.9 8.6 3.9 
2 7.0 —8 «3 0.0 -15.8 
3 13.7 13.7 5.9 5.9 
48 1 32.4 27-3 26.4 21.8 
2 38.4 32.7 36.8 31.3 
3 12.5 17.1 21.4 16.6 
49 1 13.3 5-3 -8.1 —0.1 
2 14.1 5.8 1.9 6.2 
3 17.8 9.2 2.1 6.4 
50 1 25.6 25.6 30.7 30.7 
2 15.1 15.1 21.2 21.2 
3 21.1 16.0 15.4 10.5 
51 1 33.7 25.2 13,9 4.2 
2 9.6 23.7 32.5 21.5 
3 -1.9 9.0 -10.0 18.1 
52 1 6.2 14.6 13.5 22.6 
2 12.6 12.6 15.1 5.9 
3 42.4 42.4 37.4 37.4 
53 1 38.3 27.3 32.8 22.2 
2 39.9 29.3 35.2 25.0 
3 18.6 23-7 16.9 21.9 
5*4 1 17.1 3.1 13.5 4.0 
2 —0 « 2 -12.6 4.9 0.5 
3 16.8 16.8 25.5 8.5 
55 1 9.3 9.3 l6.5 16.5 
2 30.5 30.5 36.9 36.9 
3 32.9 32.9 34.5 34.5 
56 1 40.6 40.6 24.6 : 24.6 
2 18.0 18.0 21.. 4 21.4 
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Expected annual per cent net return 
S1 s2 s3 s4 
56 3 5.4 5.4 10.2 10.2 
57 1 -0.8 11.0 -0.2 8.8 
2 10.7 15.5 7.6 3.1 
3 31.5 31.5 27.5 24.4 
58 1 7.2 12.0 8.9 13.8 
2 28.4 28.4 32.9 32.9 
3 34.9 34.9 34.4 34.4 
59 1 -0.9 3.3 8.9 0.3 
2 4.0 4.0 12.5 24.9 
3 6.2 10.8 15.4 18.0 
4 11.1 13.5 20.8 23.5 
60 1 11.0 21.0 9.3 14.2 
2 8.5 18.5 6.9 11.8 
3 15.0 20.0 16.7 21.6 
4 14.3 19.4 16.1 21.0 
61 1 21.1 1.7 l4.l 2.0 
2 31.0 31.0 29.9 29.9 
3 33.2 33.2 33.8 33.8 
4 23-3 15.2 30.6 25.1 
62 1 14.8 0.0 28.7 16.2 
2 6.5 -9.2 23.9 10.3 
3 30.3 14.7 21.3 6.1 
4 38.7 29.2 30.4 16.6 
63 1 16.8 21.4 6.4 6.4 
2 4l.5 41.5 30.1 30.1 
3 27.7 27.7 6.9 6.9 
4 12.7 12.7 17.9 17.9 
64 1 7.0 7.0 12.5 12.5 
2 8.4 8.4 15.1 17.5 
3 22.5 11.0 27.1 13.0 
4 10.6 10.6 16.7 16.7 
65 1 32.8 32.8 26.5 26.5 
2 35.7 35.7 29.5 29.5 
3 19.0 .19.0 14.2 14.2 
4 20.4 20.4 15.7 15.7 
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Table 26. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Expected annual per cent net return 
number: alternative 
number : 
S1 s2 S3 s4 
66 1 29.9 25.0 30.1 27.7 
2 38.7 30.8 36.7 31.7 
3 11.1 13.6 16.1 18.6 
4 3-8 6.1 8.5 10.9 
67 1 22.6 12.6 26.1 21.2 
2 27.0 14.3 28.0 23.0 
3 30.5 17.2 27.3 24.7 
4 32.7 19.2 29.3 26.6 
5 -0.5 9.5 10.3 20.1 
68 1 9.3 13.4 7.6 9.5 
2 
. 7.5 7-5 0.8 0.8 
3 9.2 9.2 5.9 5.9 
4 2.9 2.9 4.6 4.6 
5 -6.9 -6.9 -9.2 -9.2 
69 1 42.4 31.4 55.2 43.7 
2 3«6 12.9 4.4 18 ;3 
3 25.8 20.6 30.5 35.8 
4 11.9 11.9 15.1 15.1 
5 15=3 10.5 33.0 27.5 
70 l 7.9 16.6 3-3 11.4 
2 15.1 25.1 21.0 25.8 
3 24.2 24.2 19.8 19.8 
4 19.0 19.0 13.8 13.8 
5 23.1 23.1 18.0 18.0 
71 1 11.4 13.9 14.0 16.6 
2 16.1 16.1 20.9 20.9 
3 22.4 27.5 22.7 27.8 
4 26.6 26.6 21.1 21.1 
5 6.4 6.4 1.4 1.4 
72 1 19.0 19.0 22.7 17.8 
2 13.5 8.7 19.7 14.7 
3 17.7 17.7 12.5 8.0 
4 21.6 16.7 17.1 12.4 
5 5.4 10.0 1.6 6.0 
73 1 -5.8 2.2 0.5 13.3 
2 -1.4 3.2 11.2 16.2 
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Table 26. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered _ Expected annual per cent net return 
number : alternative S-, SP 2, Sv 
number : ~ 
73 3 16.4 16.4 19.6 19.6 4 17.9 15.5 17.9 20.3 
5 23.6 18.7 26.0 18.8 6 27.4 22.9 29.1 26.9 
7 19.3 I6.7 26.5 23.9 
74 1 6.9 6.9 20.0 20.0 2 22.7 24.8 24.3 28.9 
3 35-7 46.1 34.0 44.3 4 23.7 33.1 25.8 35.3 5 38.0 48.8 41.1 48.8 6 22.5 30.3 19.4 27.0 
7 12.5 12.5 17.0 17.0 
75 1 14.5 7.2 22.7 10.4 2 1.3 6.4 17.2 12.0 
3 12.6 10.2 12.8 5.1 4 6.1 2.3 3.7 -1.3 5 30.1 22.4 36.2 18.5 6 30.2 21.1 28.4 16.7 
7 21.3 29.7 2.1 21.4 8 13.6 25.0 4.8 15.8 
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XVIII. APPENDIX Hï FARMER AND THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS 
TO THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
The farmers' solutions and those suggested by the La­
place, Wald and Savage criteria for the practical decision 
problems are listed in Table 27. In this table, blank spaces 
occur frequently in the solution columns. Such spaces in­
dicate that the relevant alternative is not pertinent to the 
solution for the particular problem setting being considered. 
For each problem setting, the farmer solutions show the 
proportions in which the farmer would have invested a given 
sum among each of his considered alternatives. The the­
oretical solutions were deduced from application of the 
relevant decision criteria to the payoff matrices of Appendix 
G. They show the proportions in which the farmer should have 
allocated his investment among his considered alternatives 
had he appraised the problems in terms of the theoretical 
criteria. Hence the theoretical solutions are normative. 
In a number of cases, the Wald and Savage criteria dic­
tate mixed strategies. These strategies were determined by 
the procedures for solving games outlined by Allen (3, pp. 
511-516) and Heady (29). 
Table 27» Solutions to the practical decision problems as given by the farmers, 
the Laplace equiprobability criterion, the Wald maximum criterion8 and 
the Savage regret criterion* 
Farmer Considered Farmer Laplace Wald Savage 
number alternative solution solution solution solution 
number Gb pc Ed G p E G p E G p E 





















1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 























1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 


























7 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
8 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
9 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
10 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
aWith mixed strategies permitted. 
denotes the problem setting with good weather certain. 
CP denotes the problem setting with poor weather certain. 
dE denotes the problem setting with either good or poor weather possible. 
Table 27. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 


























13 1 1.00 1.00 
14 1 























2 1.00 0.50 
17 1 0.48 0.47 0.47 












19 1 1.00 - 0.56 
2 1.00 0.44 
20 1 0.48 0.48 0.48 
2 0.51 0.52 0.52 
21 1 1.00 
2 1.00 1.00 











G  P E G  P  Ë  G  P  E  


















1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 















1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 .00 



























1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 i:oo 1.00 
1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 



















Table 27. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 
number G P E 
22 2 
23 1 0.53 0.52 0.52 
2 0.47 0.48 0.47 
24 1 0.55 0.54 0.55 
2 0.45 0.46 0.45 
2 5 1 1.00 
2 1.00 
26 1 1.00 
2 
27 1 0.47 0.47 0.47 
2 0.53 0.53 0.53 
28 1 0.17 
2 0.83 1.00 1.00 
29 1 0.46 0.47 0.47 
2 0.54 0.53 0.53 
30 1 0.55 0.53 0.54 
2 0.45 0.47 0.46 
31 1 0.44 0.43 0.44 








 1.00 1.00 
Laplace Wald Savage 
solution solution solution 
G P E  G P E  G P E  
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.48 0.48 0.48 
0.52 0.52 0.52 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.43 0.43 
0.57 1.00 0.57 
0.47 0.52 0.52 
0.53 0.48 0.48 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.28 0.02 0.26 
0.72 0.98 0.74 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 27. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer Laplace Wald Savage 
number alternative solution solution solution solution 






0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.74 










































































1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
39 1 
2 




























,0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
43 1 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.12 0.09 
Table 27. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 
number G P E 






44 1 0.70 0.70 0.70 
2 0.30 0.30 0.30 
45 1 1.00 
2 
3 1.00 
46 1 0.58 0.55 0.56 
2 0.42 0.45 0.44 
3 
47 1 0.56 0,57 0,57 
2 0.22 0.22 0.22 
3 0.22 0.21 0.21 
48 1 0.23 0.41 0.40 
2 0.36 0.59 0.60 
3 0.41 
49 1 0.22 
2 0.78 0.51 
3 1.00 0.49 
50 1 1.00 0.67 
2 
3 1.00 0.33 
51 1 1.00 0.52 
2 0,48 
Laplace Wald Savage 
solution solution solution 
G P E  " G P E  G P E  
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1,00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1,00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.09 
0.91 1.00 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 
.1,00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 ' 0.29 
1.00 0.71 
1.00 0.87 0.91 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0,25 0.25 
0.75 1.00 0.75 
1.00 0.57 0.71 
0,43 0.29 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 0.56 
1.00 0.44 
Table 27. (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 
number G p E 
















53 1 0.57 
2 0.57 0.56 









1 .00  
55 1 0.32 
2 0.52 0.35 0.51 
3 0.48 0.33 0.48 
56 1 0,53 0.56 0.55 




3 1.00 1.00 1.00 
58 1 0.33 0.26 0.27 
2 0.37 0.4l o.4o 
3 0.30 0.33 0.33 







G P  E  G P E  G P  E  
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 




1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.02 0.02 
0.98 1.00 0.98 
l.oo 0.50 
l.oo 0.50 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 27» (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 




































2 0.20 0.13 


































Laplace Wald Savage 
solution solution solution 
G P E  G P E  G P E  
0.l4 0.13 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.87 
0.18 0.12 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.88 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.86 0.27 0.24 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.76 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 27* (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 
number _G P E 
65 3 0.16 0.16 0.16 
4 0.16 0.16 0.16 
66 1 0.30 0.18 0.24 
2 0.22 0.34 0.28 
3 0.18 0.28 0.23 
4 0.30 0.20 0.25 
67 1 
2 
0.45 0.45 O.45 
0.55 0.55 0.55 
68 1 0.29 0.29 0.29 
2 
•3 0.27 0.27 0.2 7 
2 0.12 0.12 0.12 
5 0.32 0.32 0.32 
69 1 0.51 0.52 0.51 
2 








70 1 0.27 0.39 
2 0.13 0.12 0.17 









G P E G P E G P E 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1*00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 0.29 0.09 1.00 0.40 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.91 0.60 
Table 27« (Continued) 
Farmer Considered Farmer 
number alternative solution 
number G P E 
71 1 0.23 0.15 
2 0.26 0.33 0.32 
0.19 0.25 0.12 
0.20 0.26 0.25 
0.12 0„l6 0.16 
2 















5 0.56 0.52 
6 0.44 1.00 0.48 
7 
74 1 0.31 0.30 0.30 
2 0.36 0.36 0.36 
0.17 0.18 0.18 







G P E G P E G P E 
1.00 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 0.95 
1.00 0.05 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.18 1.00 0.61 
0.82 0.39 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.53 0.32 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 

















1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.52 0.52 
0.48 0.48 0,48 
0.55 0.92 0.82 
0.45 0.08 0.18 
233 
XIX. LITERATURE CITED 
1. Akerman, J. Professor Shackle on economic methodology. 
Kyklos. 11: 341-361. 1958. 
2. Allais, M. Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant 
le risqueî critique des postulats et axiomes de 
l'école américaine. Econometrica. 21: 503-546. 1953* 
3. Allen, R. G. D. Mathematical economics. Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd, London. 1957* 
4. Arrow, K. J. Alternative approaches to the theory of 
choice in risk-taking situations. Econometrica. 19: 
404-437. 1951. 
5. . Le role des valeurs boursières pour la re­
partition la meilleure des risques. In International , 
colloquium on econometrics, Paris , 1952. pp. 4l-
47. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 
Paris. 1953* 
6. . Utilities, attitudes, choices: a review note. 
Econometrica. 26: 1-23. 1958. 
7. Beresford, R. 151 questions on cattle feeding and 
marketing. Iowa State College Agr. Ext. Serv. Bui. 
P99. 1949. 
8. Bohr, N. Atomic physics and human knowledge. John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1958. 
9. Bruner, J. S., J. J. Goodnow and G. A. Austin. Study 
of thinking. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, 
N.Y. 1956. 
10. Cannell, C. F. and R. L. Kahn. Collection of data by 
interviewing. In Festinger, L. and D. Katz, eds. 
Research methods in the social sciences, pp. 327-380. 
Dryden Press. New York, N. Y. 1953. 
11. Carter, C. F., G. P. Meredith and G. L. S. Shackle, eds. 
Uncertainty and business decisions. 2nd ed. Liver­
pool University Press. Liverpool. 1957. 
12. Chipman, J. S. Stochastic choice and subjective prob­
ability. Mimeographed. Behavioral Science Division, 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Washington, 
D.C. Dec. 30, 1957. 
234 
13* Coombs, C. H. and D. Beardsïee. On decision-making under 
uncertainty. In Thrall, R. M., C. E. Coombs and R. L. 
Davis, eds. Decision processes, pp. 255-286. John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1954. 
14. Cox, C. B. Meat packing. Agr. Res. Dept., Swift and 
Company, Chicago, 111. 1958 . 
15. , E. J. Eisenach and M. P. Mitchell. Beef cattle 
prices. Ind. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 582. 1953» 
16. Davidson, D., P. Suppes and S. Siegel. Decision making: 
an experimental approach. Stanford University Press. 
Stanford, Calif. 1957» 
17. Debreu, G. Une économie de l'incertain. Unpublished 
manuscript. (Original not available for examination; 
cited in Koopmans, T. C. Three essays on the state 
of economic science, p. 6l. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
New York, N.Y. 1957*) 
18. Dorfman, R., P. A. Samuelson and R. M. Solow. Linear 
programming and economic analysis. McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc. New York, N.Y. 1958. 
19. Dowell, A. A. and K. Bjorka. Livestock marketing. 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. New York, N.Y. 1941. 
20. Edwards, W. Theory of decision-making. Psychological 
Bulletin. 51: 380-417- 1954. 
21. de Finetti, B. La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses 
sources subjectives. Annales de 1'Institute Henri 
Poincare. 7: 1-68. University of Paris, Paris. 1937» 
22. Flood, M. M. Some experimental games. Management 
Science. 5: 5-26. 1958. 
23. Foldes, L. Uncertainty, probability and potential 
surprise. Economies. 25: 246-254. 1958. 
24. Fox, K. Analysis of demand for farm products. U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Tech. Bui. 1081. 1953-
25. Friedman, M. Essays in positive economics. University 
of Chicago Press. Chicago, 111. 1953. 
26. Graaf, J. de V., and W. J. Baumol. Three notes on "Ex­
pectation in economics". II. Economica. 26: 338-342. 
1949. 
235 
27. Grunberg, E. and Modigliani, F. The predictability of 
social events. Journal of Political Economy. 62: 
465-478. 1954. 
28. Hart, A. G. Anticipations, uncertainty, and dynamic 
planning. Studies in Business Administration. 11: 
1-98. 1940. 
29. Heady, E. 0. Applications of game theory in agricultural 
economics. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
6: 1-13. 1958. 
30. . Economics of agricultural production and re­
source use. Prentice-Hall, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1952. 
31. and ¥. V. Candler. Linear programming methods. 
Iowa State College Press. Ames, Iowa. 1958. 
32. Eeer, J. F. Directional accuracy of farm price predic­
tions in the Iowa farm outlook letter. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis. Iowa State College Library, Ames, Iowa. 
1953. 
33» Hicks, J. R. The theory of uncertainty and profit. 
Economica. 11: 170-189. 1931* 
34. Hildreth, C. and F. G. Jarrett. Statistical study of 
livestock production and marketing. John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1955-
35» Hughes, C. E. Points that guide the packer in buying 
livestock for slaughter. Armour's Analysis. 4(1): 
1-7. April-June. 1955* 
36. Hurwicz, L. Optimal!ty criteria for decision making 
under ignorance. Mimeographed. Cowles Commission 
Discussion Paper, Statistics, No. 370. 1951» 
37* Iowa State College Agr. Ext. Serv. Approximate feed 
requirements for fattening beef cattle. Mimeographed. 
Iowa State College Agr. Ext. Serv. Economic informa­
tion 96. August, 1957• 
38. . Iowa farm outlook letter. Mimeographed. 
39* Iowa State College Department of Economics and Sociology. 
Farm input-output data for budgeting and linear pro­
gramming. Mimeographed. Iowa State College Dept., 
of Economics and Sociology, Ames, Iowa. 1957. 
236 
40. Johnson, G. L. Learning processes: The individual ap­
proach. N. D. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui* 400: 64-68. 1955» 
41. Kalisch, G., J. W. Milnor, J. Nash and E. D. Nering. 
Some experimental n-person games. In Thrall, R. M., 
C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis, eds. Decision 
processes, pp. 301-328. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
New York, N.Y. 1954. 
42. Kaufmann, F. Methodology of the social sciences. 
Humanities Press. New York, N.Y. 1958. 
43. Knight, F. H. Risk, uncertainty and profit. Houghton 
Mifflin Co. New York, N.Y. 1921. 
44. Kohls, R. L. and D. Paarlberg. Short time response of 
agricultural production to price and other factors. 
Ind. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 555. 1950. 
45. Koopmans, T. C. Three essays on the state of economic 
science. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. New York, N.Y. 
1957. 
46. Luce, R. D. A probabilistic theory of utility. Econo­
metrica. 26: 193-224. 1958. 
47. and E. W. Adams. The determination of subjec­
tive characteristic functions in games with misper-
ceived payoff functions. Econometrica. 24: 158-171» 
1956. 
48. and H. Raiffa. Games and decisions: introduc­
tion and critical survey. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
New York, N.Y. 1957» 
49. Maione, C. C. Guides to profit for cattle feeders. Iowa 
State College Agr. Ext. Serv. Pamphlet 127. Rev. 
1955. 
50. Marschak, J. Homo stochasticus. Mimeographed. Cowles 
Commission, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. Dec. 
30, 1957. 
51. . Towards an economic theory of organization 
and information. In Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs and 
R. L. Davis eds. Decision processes, pp. 187-220. 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1954. 
52. McKinsey, J. C. C. Introduction to the theory of games. 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. New York, N.Y. 1952. 
237 
53* Miller, G. A. The magical number seven, plus or minus 
two: some limits on our capacity for processing in­
formation. Psychological Review. 63: 81-97» 1956. 
54. Morrison, F. B. Feeds and feeding. 21st ed. Morrison 
Publishing Co. Ithaca, N.Y. 1951. 
55. Morrison, T. C., G. G. Judge and E. H. Tompkins. Impact 
of price expectations and uncertainties on decision 
making by poultry firms. Conn. (Storrs) Agr. Exp. 
Sta. Bui. 320. 1955. 
56. Mosteller, F., and P. Nogee. An experimental measure of 
utility. Journal of Political Economy. 59: 371-404. 
1951. 
57. von Neumann, J., and 0. Morg ens tern. Theory of games 
and economic behavior. 2nd ed. Princeton University 
Press. Princeton, N.J. 1947. 
58. Newell, A., J. C. Shaw and H. A. Simon. Elements of a 
theory of human problem solving. Mimeographed. Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. Report P-971. 1957* 
59» Nordin, J. A. Expectations in economics. Econometrica. 
20: 700-701. 1952. 
60. O'Connor, D. J. Uncertainty as a philosophical problem. 
In Carter, C. F., G. P. Meredith and G. L. S. Shackle, 
eds. Uncertainty and business decisions. 2nd ed. 
pp. 12-19. Liverpool University Press. Liverpool. 
1957. 
61. Papandreou, A. G. Economics as a science. J. B. Lippin-
cott Co. Chicago, 111. 1958. 
62. . Test of a stochastic theory of choice. Uni­
versity of California Publications in Economics. 16: 
1-18. 1957. 
63. Plaxico, J. S. and J. L. James. Beef cattle prices. 
Okla. Exp. Sta. Bui. B-486. 1957. 
64. Radner, R. and J. Marschak. Note on some proposed deci­
sion criteria. In Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs and 
R. L. Davis, eds. Decision processes, pp. 61-68. 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1954. 
65. Robbins, L. Essay on the nature and significance of 
economic science. 2nd ed. Rev. Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd. London. 1952. 
238 
66. Savage, L. J. Foundations of statistics. John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. Hew York, N.Y. 1954. 
67. • The theory of statistical decision. Journal 
of the American Statistical Association. 46: 55-67» 
1951» 
68. Schoeffler, S. Toward a general definition of rational 
action. Kyklcs. 7* 245-274. 1954. 
69. Shackle, G. L. S. Expectation in economics. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 1949. 
70. . Expectation in economics. In Carter, C. F., 
G. P. Meredith and G. L. S. Shackle, eds. Uncertainty 
and business decisions. 2nd ed. pp. 94-102. Liver­
pool University Press. Liverpool. 1957» 
71. . Three notes on "Expectation in economics". 
III. Economica. 26: 343-346. 1949. 
72. . Time in economics. North-Holland Publishing 
Company. Amsterdam. 1958. 
73. . Uncertainty in economics. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge. 1955» 
74. Shubik, M. Information, theories of competition, and 
the theory of games. Journal of Political Economy. 
60: 145-150. 1952. 
75» Simon, H. A. Models of man. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
New York, N.Y. 1957» 
76. Snedecor, G. w. Statistical methods. 5th ed. Iowa 
State College Press. Ames, Iowa. 1957» 
77. Swift and Company. Livestock prices and what causes them 
to change. Swift and Co. Agr. Res. Bui. No. 44. Rev. 
Chicago, 111. 1958 . 
78. Theil, H. Economic forecasts and policy. North-Holland 
Publishing Company. Amsterdam. 1958. 
79. Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis, eds. Deci­
sion processes. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, 
N.Y. 1954. 
80. Tintner, G. A contribution to the non-static theory of 
choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 56: 274-306. 
1942. 
239 
81. Tucker, A. W. Game theory and programming. Mimeographed. 
Dept. of Math., Okla. Agr. and Mech. College, Still­
water, Okla. 1955» 
82. U.S. Census Bureau. 1954 census of agriculture. Vol. 
II, general report, statistics by subjects. 1956. 
83. U.S. Dept. of Agr. Agricultural Marketing Service. Beef 
marketing margins and costs. U.S. Dept. Agr. Agri­
cultural Marketing Service. Misc. Pub. 710. 1956. 
84. . Livestock and meat situation. 
85. . • Livestock market news. 
86. Wald, A. Statistical decision functions. John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 1950. 
87. Weckstein, R. S. On the use of the theory of probability 
in economics. Review of Economic Studies. 20(3): 
191-199. 1953. 
88. Wilder, R. I. Introduction to the foundations of math­
ematics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, N.Y. 
1952. 
89. Working, E. J. Demand for meat. University of Chicago 
Press. Chicago, 111. 1954. 
90. Wray, M. J. Uncertainty, prices and entrepreneurial 
. expectations - an applied study. Journal of Industrial 
Economics = 4? 107-128. 1956. 
